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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation focuses on a quasi-governmental committee formed in 
November, 1932 during the interim Mexican presidency of Abelardo L. Rodríguez. “El 
Comité Nacional de Repatriación” (The National Repatriation Committee) brought 
together Mexican businessmen, politicians, social-aid administrators and government 
officials to deal with the U.S. repatriations of “ethnic Mexicans” (Mexican nationals and 
Mexican Americans). The Comité attempted to raise half a million pesos (“La Campaña 
de Medio Millón”) for the repatriates to cultivate Mexico’s hinterlands in agricultural 
communities (“colonias”). However, the Comité’s promised delivery of farm equipment, 
tools, livestock and guaranteed wages came too slowly for the still destitute and starving 
repatriados who sometimes reacted with threats of violence against local and state 
officials. Cloaked in political rhetoric, the Comité failed to meet the expectations of the 
repatriate population and the Mexican public. The ambitious plans of the Comité became 
mired in confusion and scandal. Finally, bowing to pressure from Mexican labor unions 
and the Mexican press, President Rodríguez dissolved the Comité on June 14, 1934.  
In addition, this work addresses Mexican immigration settlement through the 
early 1930s, Mexican immigration theory, the administration of President Herbert Hoover 
and the conational exodus. The hardships faced by the repatriates are covered as well as 
unemployment issues, nativism, and U.S. immigration policies through the early years of 
the Great Depression. The conclusions reached confirm that the general Mexican public 
welcomed the Campaña de Medio Millón and the work initiated by the National 
Repatriation Committee. However, the negative publicity regarding the failure of the two 
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principal resettlement colonies in Oaxaca and Guerrero convinced President Rodríguez to 
disband both the Comité and the Campaña de Medio Millón.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation focuses on a quasi-governmental committee formed in 
November, 1932 by interim Mexican president Abelardo Lujan Rodríguez.  “El Comité 
Nacional de Repatriación” (The National Repatriation Committee) brought together 
Mexican businessmen, politicians, social-aid administrators and government officials to 
deal with U.S. repatriations of ethnic Mexicans.  The Comité attempted to raise half a 
million pesos ( “La Campaña de Medio Millón”) for the repatriates to cultivate Mexico’s 
hinterlands in agricultural communities (“colonias”).  However, the Comité’s promised 
delivery of farm equipment, tools, livestock and guaranteed wages came too slowly for 
the repatriados who sometimes reacted with threats of violence against local and state 
officials.  Cloaked in political rhetoric, the Comité failed to meet the expectations of the 
repatriate population (many were U.S. citizens coerced and “migrated back to Mexico”) 
or the Mexican general public.  The ambitious plans of the Comité became mired in 
confusion and scandal.  Finally, bowing to pressure from Mexican labor unions and the 
highly critical Mexican press, President Rodríguez dissolved the Comité on June 14, 
1934. 
 El Comité Nacional de Repatriación enjoyed early successes and its influential 
members made for good publicity.  At the onset of the “Campaña de Medio Millón,” the 
Comité rallied the Mexican nation to support the thousands of repatriados.  The Comité’s 
diverse membership instilled a public sense of duty and responsibility for the plight of the 
repatriates (not just Mexican men, but women, children and families).  The members of 
the Comité (representatives from Mexican charitable organizations, industry, commerce, 
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and government officials), sensed a nation-building opportunity and embraced the chance 
to raise money for the noble repatriate cause.  Public donations and worker contributions 
to the “Campaña de Medio Millón” was also significant.   
 The brief existence of the Comité (during the most intense period of U.S. 
“depression-era” repatriation drives) planned for the construction of agricultural colonias 
in Mexico that the Comité hoped would absorb repatriates into the national economy.  
Bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Mexican governments, aid workers, 
municipal leaders, businessmen, transportation executives and union representatives 
motivated the Comité to address the “repatriate issue” as a national duty.   My research 
includes U.S. State Department papers (American Consulate General, Mexican Affairs 
Division, The National Archives), Spanish-language newspapers in the United States, 
Mexican newspapers (primarily El Universal and Excélsior) and the important secondary 
sources on the general subject of Mexican repatriation (see partial list below).1  These 
publications and sources present much of the “north of the border” appraisals of bi-
national politics and vested interests.  However for the more complete story, I travelled to 
                                               
1 Jaime R. Aguila,  “Mexican /U.S. Immigration Policy Prior to the Great Depression,”  Diplomatic 
History, 31:2, 2007. 
  Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez,  Decade of Betrayal, Mexican Repatriation in the 
1930s.  Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press,  1995. 
  Camille Guerin-Gonzales,  Mexican Workers and American Dreams:  Immigration, Repatriation, and 
California Farm Labor, 1900-1939.  New Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press,  1994. 
  Abraham Hoffman,  “Mexican Repatriation Statistics:  Some Suggested Alternatives to Carey 
McWilliams,”  The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4.  October, 1974.  
  Abraham Hoffman,  Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression,  Repatriation Pressures,  
1929-1939.  Tucson,  University of Arizona Press,  1974. 
  Arturo F. Rosales,  Chicano!  The History of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement.  Houston:  
Arte Público Press,  1997. 
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Mexico City (with Professor Arturo Rosales) and combed through four important 
archives.2 
 This dissertation will also provide a comparative exploration of the problem of 
repatriation in Mexico during the 1920s and early 1930s.  During the era known as the 
Maximato (1928-1934), former president Plutarco Elías Calles ruled behind the scenes.  
During these years, three presidents; Emilio Portes Gil, Pasqual Ortiz Rubio, and 
Abelardo Lujan Rodríguez owed their two-year interim administrations to Calles.  As 
American unemployment soared during the first years of the Great Depression, ethnic 
Mexicans in the United States became one group of scapegoats for the economic crisis 
and were often blamed for the inability of many native-born Americans to find and keep 
jobs.  Broadly, I will show that the administration of President Rodríguez and the 
founding of the Comité Nacional de Repatriación created a “new diplomacy” between the 
United States and Mexico during this difficult time (which was a departure from the 
previous laissez-faire approach taken by presidents Portes Gil and Ortiz Rubio).  
Specifically, I argue that the leadership and experience of Abelardo Rodríguez 
recognized the interdependency between the United States and Mexico and his important 
role as an active mediator during the most intense period of repatriation forged a 
complicated, yet on-going accommodation of the repatriation process. 
 The dissertation will follow a chronological sequence, but will be organized 
topically.  Each chapter will present a singular argument concerned with a specific topic 
                                               
2 1) Instituto Nacional de Migración (AHIHM), 2) Archivo General de la Nación, 3) Biblioteca Lerdo de 
Tejada, and   4) Archivo de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (The Mexican Foreign Relations 
Archive).   
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and theme.  The overarching question of the dissertation is:  How did the formation of the 
Comité Nacional de Repatriación deal with the issue of repatriates stranded on the 
Mexican side of the border?  While I want to present a thorough examination of Mexico’s 
approach to the repatriation problem, I also want to explore the bi-national complexities 
and diplomatic nuances that President Rodríguez was well-versed in.  This perspective is 
a distinct element that I analyze in the dissertation, so I will make every effort to keep the 
chapters as comparative as possible.  Further, the comparative investigation asks larger 
questions such as:  How did the interactions between the Comité and American interests 
shape repatriation policies? What can the short history of the Comité tell us about 
repatriation issues?  Once those questions have been established, I can be more specific 
and ask: Where does President Rodríguez fit in this larger narrative?  What do the themes 
of a “societal” rather than a “governmental” responsibility reveal about Mexican 
nationalism?   
After the patriotic fanfare (the return of the conationals) and the post-Mexican 
Revolution posturing, the Comité de Repatriación found very little common ground and 
its efforts fell short.  Compared to the vast numbers of repatriates, why were so few 
involved in the colonias projects? What explains the violence at the colonias?  Why were 
basic items (food, medicine, tools) and farm machinery not delivered to the colonias?  
Were there hidden issues of class that separated colonia workers from members and 
agents of the Comité?  These questions forecast the presidential campaign and 
administration of Lázaro Cárdenas and his “socialist” agenda.  (The inability of the 
Comité Nacional de Repatriación and President Rodríguez to turn U.S. repatriation drives 
into something more positive for Mexico.)   
  5 
Background and Historiography 
 On November 24, 1932, the leading Mexico City newspaper, El Universal, 
reported the formation of a Mexican National Repatriation Committee (“El Comité 
Nacional de Repatriación”).  According to the article, the Chief of the Mexican Migration 
Department, Andrés Landa y Piña, presided over a meeting (on November 23, 1932) 
attended by representatives from the Ministry of the Interior (Secretaria de Gobernacíon), 
the National Chamber of Commerce (Alfredo Levy), the Confederation of Industrial 
Organizations, the Red Cross, the Central Department of the Federal District, the Public 
Charities (Beneficía Pública) and the American Chamber of Commerce.3  Landa y Piña 
believed the problem of “numerous indigent Mexican repatriates from the United States” 
required the immediate attention of a “national rather than official committee.”4  His 
suggestion to staff the Comité de Repatriación Nacional with government representatives 
and businessmen from the Mexican industrial and commercial sectors met with 
unanimous approval.  The meeting adjourned with the appointment of a provisional, 
seven-member “Comité” initially responsible for fund-raising, lunch-room and dormitory 
construction for repatriate workers and housing for the unemployed repatriados. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Mexican government brought compatriot workers 
“home” in reaction to downturns in the American economy.  The U.S. recession of 1920-
1921 left thousands of impoverished Mexican laborers stranded in el Norte.  President 
Álvaro Obregón repatriated 15,000 Mexicans and formed the Department of Repatriation 
                                               
3 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs. Formation 
of Mexican National Repatriation Committee (December 1932), by John S. Littell, Vice-Consul, American 
Consulate General, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/36. 
Washington, D.C., 1932. 
4 El Universal, 24 November 1932. 
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within The Ministry of Foreign Relations.  Obregón’s administration (1920-1924) 
displayed a genuine concern for Mexican workers and the Mexican consular offices 
received increased government funding to assist immigrants in México de Afuera 
(external Mexico).  Consular coalition building with Mexican laborer (bracero) 
communities and “México de Afuera,” mutual aid societies such as the Comisiones 
Honorificas Mexicanos and the Brigadas de la Cruz Azul expanded the protective reach 
of the Mexican government in the United States.5  The presidential administration of 
Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) also committed government resources to the 
Comisiones and the Brigadas as the controversy over unrestricted Mexican immigration 
in America reached a “new urgency.”6  The Comisiones and Brigadas promoted Mexican 
nationalism, provided information regarding visas, identification cards, the immigration 
process and drafted applications for Mexican government assistance.7  An unsigned 
document dated February 15, 1928 titled, “Emigration-Immigration-Repatriation,” 
expressed the concerns of Mexican union leaders regarding the mistreatment of expatriate 
workers in the United States and called for President Calles to promulgate “an organic 
law to end emigration of Mexican laborers.”  The document also described that consular 
delegations traveled to Mexico City, “and requested Government aid and assistance for 
the repatriation of groups of Mexican laborers and their families in the United States.”8     
                                               
5 Jaime R. Aguila,  “Mexican/U.S. Immigration Policy prior to the Great Depression,”  Diplomatic History, 
31:2 (2007), 218. 
6 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans In The Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939 (Tucson:  University of Arizona Press, 1974), 24-30. 
7 Jaime R. Aguila,  “Mexican Mutual Aid: The Origin of the Comisiones Honorificas Mexicanas and the 
Brigadas de la Cruz Azul.” The University of Texas of the Permian Basin.  
8 F. Arturo Rosales, Private Papers on Mexican Repatriation, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.  
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In order to maintain political control after the 1928 assassination of president-
elect Obregón, Calles appointed himself as “Jefé Maximo” (his de facto reign as 
“chieftain of the Maximato” lasted from 1928 to 1934).  The next three presidents 
(Emilio Portes Gil, Pasqual Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo Lujan Rodríguez) owed their two-
year interim administrations to Calles.  As American unemployment soared during the 
first years of the Great Depression, ethnic Mexicans in the United States became one 
group of scapegoats for the economic crisis and often blamed for the inability of many 
Americans to find and keep jobs. 
President Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of Labor, William Doak eagerly attempted 
to rid America of foreigners and targeted Mexicans in large cities such as Los Angeles, 
California and Chicago, Illinois.  In 1931, Doak claimed that 400,000 aliens resided in 
the United States illegally and thousands of Mexicans lost their jobs.  Pressured to leave 
by community authorities, Mexicans and their children (many born in America) returned 
to Mexico.9 Abraham Hoffman examined the issue of repatriation with a clear and 
rational approach. 
 There is no argument here…that repatriation for many Mexican immigrants 
 was a traumatic experience or that repatriation could also involve coercion, 
            deportation, exploitation and racism.  However, to suggest that these elements 
            in equal parts add up to a clear definition of the repatriation movement is to  
            distort its history.  Repatriation was a complicated process composed of many 
            factors and nuances, most of which have been unexplored, neglected, omitted, 
                                               
9 F. Arturo Rosales, Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement (Houston:  Arte 
Público Press, 1997), 48-49.  Also, Camille Guerin-Gonzales,  Mexican Workers and American Dreams: 
Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 1900-1939 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1994) “Entire neighborhoods and communities were destroyed…when county and state agencies, 
with the blessing of the federal government, organized the mass removal of Mexican immigrants and 
Mexican Americans from towns and cities all over the United States” (2) and “U.S. authorities…did not 
simply “return” Mexicans to their home country, but sent many American citizens into exile in a foreign 
country” (94).   
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 or oversimplified.10  
 
Each of the interim Mexican presidents dealt with growing numbers of repatriates from 
the United States.11  President Portes Gil amicably discussed the repatriations with 
American ambassadors (Dwight Morrow and Josephus Daniels) and President Ortiz 
Rubio allowed repatriates to re-enter Mexico with exemptions from custom duties.12  
In 1930, the Mexican Migration Service of the Ministry of the Interior (with  
Andrés Landa y Piña as the presiding official) began negotiations with the U.S. Bureau of 
Immigration and scheduled annual conferences regarding the transportation of repatriates, 
the creation of communal colonies for the returned workers and proposed taxes on 
Mexican private property to fund the “colonias.”13 General Abelardo Rodríguez (a former 
Secretary of War and Navy) assumed the Mexican presidency in September of 1932 and 
like his predecessor, “expanded the list of articles repatriates could bring in duty-free.” 14 
Two months later, the newly formed Comité Nacional de Repatriación embarked 
on a campaign to raise a half million pesos for the establishment of agricultural 
communal colonies for repatriate farmers (the favored project of Landa de Piña).  The 
                                               
10 Abraham Hoffman, “Mexican Repatriation Statistics: Some Suggested Alternatives to Carey 
McWilliams,” The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Oct., 1972), 391-404.    
11 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in The Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939 (Tucson:  University of Arizona Press, 1974), 174.  According to Hoffman’s table, U.S. 
repatriations from 1929 to 1932 totaled 365, 518 people.    
12 Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal, Mexican Repatriation in the 
1930s (Albuquerque : University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 133.  
13 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, Second 
National (Mexican) Migration Conference (February, 1931), by Robert Frazier, Consul General, Mexico 
City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 812.55 No. 98, Washington, D.C., 1931.  In this 
report to the American Secretary of  State, Frazier recounts the conference meeting  held in Mexico City 
from February 2 through 9, 1931 (topics included: “Repatriation,” “Emigration,” “Immigration,” “Tourist 
Travel” and “Citizenship of Mexican-born Women”). See also Excélsior, 9 February 1931 and 11 February, 
1931.  
14 Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal, Mexican Repatriation in the 
1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 133. 
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Comité (under the provisional leadership of Sr. Federico T. De Lachica) enjoyed 
enthusiastic support in the Mexican press and after six weeks, collected almost 86,000 
pesos that included a private donation of 5,000 pesos from President Rodríguez and over 
17,000 pesos from government workers and officials.15 U.S. State Department officials in 
Mexico City noted a special “fundraiser bull-fight” scheduled with famed matador 
Alberto Balderas and radio announcements on stations XEW and XEB that requested 
public donations to the Comité.16 American Vice-Consul, John Littell observed the 
Comité’s enthusiastic reception by the Mexican newspapers. 
The campaign is being kept before the public by almost daily articles, coming 
from all parts of the country, published in the Mexico City press, and Mexico 
seems determined to do something in the near future for its repatriates from the  
United States.  It is estimated that over 250,000 persons have been added to the 
population of Mexico since the beginning of 1929 from this source alone.17 
 
President Rodríguez received many letters from influential businessmen, politicos, 
academics, artists, military men, friends and acquaintances who cheerfully sent their 
contributions to the Campaña de Medio Millón.   
However, on February 9, 1933, Vice-Consul Littell filed a “voluntary report” 
regarding the formation of the “Union of Mexican Repatriates” that urged “all Mexican 
workers’ organizations to work for the suspension of the present repatriation campaign, 
because the economic problems of the repatriates already in the country have not been 
solved.”  Littell also wrote that the “Union” wanted to control the number of repatriates 
                                               
15 Abraham Hoffman, “Unwanted Mexican Americans In The Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939” (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 138;  Excélsior, 10 January 1933.  
16 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, President 
of Mexico Aids Progress of Repatriation Fund Campaign (January, 1933), by John S. Littell, Vice Consul, 
Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/38, Washington, D.C., 1933. 
17 Ibid. 
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“allowed into Mexico,” complained that the 500,000 peso campaign “is being realized 
too slowly” and called for an accounting of the funds collected by the Comité for the 
repatriates.18   
 El Universal reported that during a February 3, 1933 meeting with the Comité, the 
“Union” representatives pressed the Comité to distribute the donated funds to the 
repatriate population.  The Comité members rebuffed the idea as an obstacle to 
“permanent relief” and decided the money was better spent on agricultural communities 
that developed Mexican rural areas and provided employment for the repatriates.19  The 
Comité initially announced that the first colony, “to accommodate six hundred families, 
is to be established in the State of Guanajuato…during the present month with funds 
already collected.”20   
 On the evening of February 15, 1933 the Comité de Repatriación provided the 
Mexican press with a statement that addressed the concerns of the “Union of Mexican 
Repatriates” and the public at large. 
 This Committee has received numerous congratulations for its decision to 
 disregard any suggestions which are not made directly by the repatriates  
 concerned and therefore avoiding outside intervention of all sorts. Regarding  
 the idea that repatriation must be suspended, this Committee declares that the  
 phenomenon of repatriation has not been provoked by the will of the nation, nor 
            can it be suspended whether we wish it or not.21 
 
                                               
18 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, “Union of 
Mexican Repatriates” Requests Suspension of Repatriation Campaign (February, 1933), by John S. Littell, 
Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/39, Washington, 
D.C., 1933. 
19 El Universal, 4 February 1933 and 9 February 1933. 
20 Ibid. 
21 El Universal, 16 February 1933. 
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The Comité also disclosed that the 500,000 peso repatriation campaign already realized 
104,742 pesos (deposited in the Bank of Mexico) with 100,000 pesos dedicated to an 
agricultural community in the State of Guerrero.  In addition, the Comité announced a 
repatriate work project in the State of San Luis Potosí, with the daily wage set at one peso 
and free railway fare for five hundred repatriates and their families.22   
 By March of 1933, the total collections of the Comité amounted to 154,062 pesos 
and the establishment of the colonias became its singular goal.  Much to the delight of 
President Rodríguez, a March 17, 1933 benefit concert for the repatriate cause (“A 
Beneficio de los Repatraidos Mexicanos”) featured the famed Spanish classical guitarist, 
Andrés Segovia (the guitar master was paid 1,435 pesos for his appearance at the Teatro 
Arbeu).23   
Abraham Hoffman noted that the Comité heeded the advice of leading Mexican 
intellectual Manuel Gamio who stated that “skills acquired by the repatriates in the 
United States were lost to the Mexican economy if the repatriados were scattered to all 
parts of Mexico.”24 The Comité also decided that workers sent to colonias located in the 
Mexican interior removed the repatriates from competition with other Mexicans seeking 
work (the concern of the “Union of Mexican Repatriates”) and the distance from the 
United States kept them from returning to el Norte. 
 In April 1933, the Comité established three colonias:  Colony Number 1, located 
at El Coloso, Guerrero remained an “experiment” and was perhaps used as a staging area 
                                               
22 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 139. 
23 F. Arturo Rosales, Private Papers on Mexican Repatriation, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.   
24 Ibid. 
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for repatriates on their way to other colonias. 25  Colony Number 2, near Minizo, Oaxaca, 
(known as “Pinotepa Nacional”) with its fertile soil, ample water resources and few 
inhabitants seemed at the onset, a perfect location.  In his April 20, 1933 “voluntary 
report”, American Vice Consul John S. Littell explained that 1000 repatriates and their 
families came to the Oaxaca colonia from Mexico City (400) and El Paso (600).  Andrés 
Landa y Piña traveled with repatriates that left from Guerrero and arrived in Oaxaca on 
the ship, “Bravo” (provided by the Ministry of War and Marine).  Littell further noted 
that a sanitary brigade awaited the repatriates as well as an engineer corps to demarcate 
land parcels for farming. Palm tree shelters served as temporary housing units for the 
repatriates.   
 El Universal reported on the March 15, 1933 meeting between Anastasio García 
Toledo (Governor of Oaxaca) and President Abelardo Rodríguez. 
Regarding the colonization of his state, García Toledo stressed the necessity for 
land allotment to the repatriates that was unencumbered by communal claims.  He  
informed the President of the Republic that his state would offer the Comité land 
free of all liens and without the prospect of any “agrarian problem,” on which it 
would be possible to raise two crops of corn a year.  The Governor stated the 
people of Oaxaca are willing to lend the repatriates (without charge) oxen, draft 
animals and cattle while they are raising their first crops.26   
 
Littell wrote that Colony 2 “will be a test of truth of the semi-official National  
Repatriation Committee” and whether repatriates trained in the United States can 
                                               
25 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican American In The Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939 (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1974), 140-141.  Hoffman claims “A group of about 
twenty repatriados from Detroit, Michigan, had arrived at the site as early as December 1932…” See also, 
United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, “One 
Thousand Families of Mexican Repatriates to Form New Oaxaca Colony” (April, 1933), by John S. Littell, 
Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/43, Washington, 
D.C., 1933.  Littell describes the Guerrero site as a “concentration point.”  
26 Excélsior, 16 March 1933 and 18 March 1933. 
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improve agricultural standards, the industrial production of Mexico and the promotion of 
its national industries.27  Colony Number 3, designated for construction at Santo 
Domingo, near Magdalena Bay, Lower (Baja) California prepared for the arrival of 1800 
repatriate farmers and Littell listed other planned colonias in Cóbano, Colima; Canton de 
Autlan, Jalisco (located on Mexico’s west coast between Acapulco and Baja California) 
and a future colonia near San Andrés Tuxtla, Veracruz on the Mexican east coast. 
 The Comité formally established Colony Number 2 in May of 1933.  Most of the 
Comité’s funds went toward the Oaxaca colonia and it was hoped that Pinotepa would 
serve as an example of progress and administrative success.  In August 1933, the 
Ministry of Interior commended Colony 2 in an inspection report that lauded Pinotepa’s 
Provisional Director, Sr. Andrés Landa y Piña (Chief of the Ministry’s Migration 
Department).  However, plans for the construction of a school for the repatriates’ children 
came to abrupt halt when Landa y Piña resigned his positions on November 4, 1933.28  
Vice Consul Littell’s report of May 28, 1934 (reviewed by Assistant Secretary of State 
Sayre) describes the total failure of Colony 1 in Guerrero and Colony 2 in Oaxaca. 
 It appears both colonies have been abandoned, the reasons given being (1) the  
 arbitrary government thereof and (2) the starvation rations given the colonists. 
                                               
27 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, “One 
Thousand Families of Mexican Repatriates to Form New Oaxaca Colony” (April, 1933), by John S. Littell, 
Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/43, Washington, 
D.C., 1933.  Also, United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican 
Affairs, “Statement of Mexican Minister of the Interior Regarding Repatriates’ Colonies” (May, 1933), By 
John S. Littell, Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/45, 
Washington, D.C., 1933. 
28 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Mexican Affairs Division, “Failure of 
Mexican Repatriation Colony in Oaxaca” (February, 1934), by John S. Littell, Vice Consul, Mexico City, 
Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group, 311.1215/50, Washington, D.C., 1934. 
  14 
The repatriates complained…of the directors of the Pinotepa Nacional colony, 
where life was stated to be unbearable since last October (1933)…on the pretext 
of imposing discipline, the directors were attended by six armed 
individuals…(and) the colonists…were being threatened with severe punishment 
in the event of disobedience.  They decided to abandon the colony en masse, 
making a painful 23-day journey to Acapulco.  There they lived on the charity of 
the people and…it was their good fortune that General Cárdenas, Presidential 
candidate of the National Revolutionary Party…supplied at his own expense, the 
busses necessary to take them to Mexico City. 29  
The repatriates at Pinotepa also learned that their harvested corn crop went to feed herds 
of swine instead of its promised distribution to the workers.   
The Colony 1 repatriates abandoned their colonia for similar reasons and both 
groups presented their grievances to the Ministry of the Interior in Mexico City in hopes 
of immediate assistance.  Tools, farm equipment and mules never arrived to the 
repatriates and the workers often resorted to threats of violence in order to provide for 
their basic needs.30  Several repatriates fell ill and some died (due to the hostile, tropical 
climate) without medicines and food in ramshackle lodging houses between the colonias 
and Mexico City.  Those that managed to make the trip hoped the Ministry of Agriculture 
considered their requests for land parcels near the national irrigation systems.  Most of 
the colonists, farmers by occupation, needed any type of assistance to restart their lives 
after the failure of the colonias under the auspices of the Comité de Repatriación. 
Allegations of graft and corruption hounded the Comité almost since its inception 
and a December 29, 1934 article in El Universal reported that unemployed repatriates 
                                               
29 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Mexican Affairs Division, “Further 
Details Regarding Failure of First Two Mexican Repatriation Colonies” (May, 1934), by John S. Littell, 
Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group, 311.1215/61, Washington, 
D.C., 1934. 
30 Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal, Mexican Repatriation in the 
1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 142. 
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asked the Ministry of the Interior for a strict accounting of the over 300,000 pesos that 
the Comité collected in the campaign for 500,000 pesos.  On February 9, 1934, the 
Ministry of Interior issued a statement deploring the dissentions in the Comité and the 
charges of misuse of funds.  After expenses, expenditures and the costs associated with 
the establishment of the colonias at El Coloso and Pinotepa, a balance of 101,407.09 
pesos remained in the Comité’s account at the Bank of Mexico.     
El Universal, a newspaper very critical of the Comité’s administration of the 
colonias, published two statements by Rafael González C., a representative of the League 
of Mexican Workers and Farmers (the organization that the repatriate workers joined at 
the Pinotepa colonia). 
The repatriates worked with all their strength and enthusiasm but it was useless in 
light of the poor system of administration.  Machinery was taken away before the 
colonists could make good use of it and that colonia resembled a slave colony 
rather a community of free workers.  Further, the colonia suffered from 
impoverished conditions.31 
An agent named Manuel Chávez threatened the colonists with a pistol and often 
said that          the life of a repatriate costs only 25 pesos.  No machinery or mules 
ever arrived and the repatriates worked with picks and hatchets.  They were told 
to leave the colonia if they didn’t want to work.32  
President Rodríguez dissolved the Comité de Repatriación on June 14, 1934 and turned 
over its monies and resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Development.  
 The decree made by President Rodríguez called for an accounting of the 
remaining funds left in the Comité’s charge and Rodríguez stated that the Comité had not 
“satisfactorily fulfilled the mission entrusted to it…and its continuance would be contrary 
                                               
31 El Universal, 2 June 1934  
32 El Universal, 6 June 1934  
  16 
to interests of the very people whom it was attempting to help.”33  Rodríguez, anxious to 
repair the damage done by the Comité’s lackluster fifteen months in operation, formed 
the official, “Mexican Repatriation Board” on July 26, 1934.  Outgoing President 
Rodríguez transferred 110,223.14 pesos and all agricultural implements to the Mexican 
Repatriation Board.   
Rodríguez also resettled the displaced repatriates from El Coloso, Guerrero and 
Pinotepa, Oaxaca to lands near Rio Verde, San Luís Potosí.  He supplied them with 
provisions and tools that amounted to 5,900 pesos.  The President contemplated the 
upcoming meeting that the Mexican Repatriation Board scheduled with the Assistant 
Superintendent of Charities from Los Angeles, California, Mr. Rex Thomson and 
reflected on the repatriates’ future. 
These colonies have as their purpose the immediate quantitative and qualitative 
improvement of the repatriates’ condition of life; material, intellectual, physical  
and so forth…for which purpose there will be better living quarters, food, clothing 
and farm cultivation.  The purpose attempted is not only that of obtaining the 
flourishing development of the colonists, but also and principally to make their 
model of living and working an influence to the farmers of the neighboring 
regions.34  
  
Thomson moved thousand of repatriates to Mexico yet did so with the cooperation of 
Mexican officials. He believed that large repatriations of large numbers of Mexicans 
from Los Angeles (over 12,000 Mexican families) “should be handled by a representative 
of the County rather than be made into an international question…in this manner, 
                                               
33 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Mexican Affairs Division, “Formal 
Dissolution of Mexican National Repatriation Committee” (June, 1934), by John S. Littell, Vice Consul, 
Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/63, Washington, D.C., 1934.  
34 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Mexican Affairs Division, “Formation 
of an Official Mexican Repatriation Board” (July, 1934), by John S. Littell, Vice Consul, Mexico City, 
Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/71, Washington, D.C., 1934.   
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responsibility for any difficulties which may later arise will not be attributed to the 
United States Federal Government.”35  Thomson wanted the Mexican government to 
resettle the Los Angeles repatriates in a West Coast colonia “with a view to future 
commercial interchange.”  Thomson also worked out the free railway transportation of 
repatriates not just to the border, but to the workers’ homes in Mexico.  His offer of travel 
assistance was welcomed as a remarkable gesture and in the last months of the Rodríguez 
administration, it seemed (at least to U.S. State Department officials) that four important 
benefits might occur: “1) a relief from the burden of thousands of Mexicans in Los 
Angeles dependent on the charity of Mr. Thomson’s agency, 2) the addition to the 
Mexican population of citizens with a higher standard of living, 3) profit to both 
countries from commercial interchange, and 4) the further strengthening of good-will 
between Mexico and the United States.”36  
 In an August 23, 1934 letter to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Josephus 
Daniels, commended the formation of the new Mexican Repatriation Board that “is 
discussing ways and means of taking care and handling the 12,000 Mexican families in 
Los Angeles County who are now being supported by Los Angeles Welfare 
Organizations and whom the Mexican government is endeavoring to bring back to 
Mexico…and it has been proposed that they be returned gradually…and that idle 
government lands be colonized with these repatriates.”  
                                               
35 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Mexican Affairs Division, “Interview 
With Mr. Rex Thompson Regarding Mexican Government Aid To Unemployed Mexicans In The United 
States” (May, 1934), by John S. Littell, Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, 
Record Group 311.1215/55, Washington, D.C., 1934  
36 Ibid. 
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 The Comité Nacional de Repatriación was not a total failure (as the Mexican 
newspapers often editorialized).  The obvious success was the fund-raising capability of 
the influential members of the Comité and their penchant for post-Mexican Revolution 
rhetoric.  At the onset of the Campaña de Medio Millón, the nation felt a unified duty to 
provide for the repatriados.  The combination of businessmen and government officials 
in the Comité gave the impression of a “societal” rather than a “governmental” 
responsibility toward those who, for a variety of reasons, found themselves in Mexico.  
Delegates from charitable institutions, industry and government ministries gave a public 
façade of limitless opportunity, unhampered by political favoritism and perhaps the 
opportunity to raise money in an unrestricted, more “freewheeling” manner. 
Serious academic interest on Mexican repatriation began in the 1970s.  Two 
books were published in 1974; one by an American scholar, Abraham Hoffman 
(Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression:  Repatriation Pressures, 1929-
1939) and another by Mexican-born, Mercedes Carreras de Velasco (Los Mexicanos que 
devolvió la crisis, 1929-1932).  Hoffman concentrated his study on Los Angeles and the 
bulk if his sources were Los Angeles County records, local newspapers and documents 
from the National Archives in Washington, D.C.  Carreras de Velasco’s Spanish 
language monograph contains a more panoramic view of the Mexican exodus. 
Unfortunately, her book provides little interpretation and glaring errors exist regarding 
the chronology of events and the role of the Mexican government and the establishment 
of resettlement colonies.  Both Carreras de Velasco and Hoffman touch only lightly on 
what happened to repatriates once they arrived in Mexico.  Carreras de Velasco drew 
primarily from an abundance of Mexican consular records available at La Archivo 
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Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (AHSRE) and a random body of 
Mexican newspaper stories; usually the articles mentioned in the archival documents.  
The influential 1982 monograph by Francisco Balderrama (In Defense of La Raza:  The 
Los Angeles Mexican Consulate and the Mexican Community, 1929-1936) also focused 
on Los Angeles.  His work was limited to how the counsels dealt with the problems of 
destitute immigrants who remained in California.  Like Carreras de Velasco, Balderrama 
also used AHSRE sources.   
 Since the 1970s, other scholars have published micro-studies on repatriation in a 
variety of journals.  The well-known Mexican historian, Moises González Navarro, 
treated the issue peripherally in a 1970 article regarding the effect of the depression on 
Mexicans (“Efectos sociales de la crisis de 1929”).  A few years later, two Indiana 
University historians, Neil Betten and Raymond Mohl and a graduate student from the 
University of Chicago, Daniel T. Simon, wrote articles on repatriation in the industrial 
suburbs of Gary and East Chicago, Indiana (“From Discrimination to Repatriation:  
Mexican Life in Gary, Indiana During the Great Depression”).  Their sources, although 
abundant and varied, were primarily local.   
In the mid-1980s, R. Reynolds McKay, in two successive studies, viewed 
repatriation from Texas, and also relied on local sources (“The Federal Deportation 
Campaign in Texas:  Mexican Deportation from the Lower Rio Grande Valley During the 
Great Depression” and “The Impact of the Great Depression on Immigrant Mexican 
Labor:  Repatriation of the Bridgeport, Texas Coal Miners”).  In 1994, Camille Guerin-
González used perhaps the most extensive collection of references - local documents and 
a variety of Mexican archival records from the AHSRE.  Guerin-González researched the 
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repatriations from California through the late 1930s (her work was her dissertation).  
Francisco Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez published the most often cited book on 
repatriation in 1995 (“Decade of Betrayal:  Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s”).  This 
volume revealed the many injustices associated with the repatriation drives. Although the 
numbers are exaggerated, the book revealed the plight of the repatriates.  The most 
exciting recent scholarship is by Mexican historian, Fernando Saúl Alanís Enciso from 
the Colegio de San Luis Potosí.  His publications are listed below in the bibliography and 
I presented my initial findings with him in a panel discussion at the Rocky Mountain 
Latin American Conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico.  Professor Alanís-Enciso has 
conducted oral interviews with repatriates and is a wealth of information regarding 
Mexican sources, historiography and demographics.     
Finally, the existing scholarship on President Abelardo Rodríguez is rather limited 
but the small scale provides several avenues to explore his life and career.  In Roberto 
Quirós Martinez’s 1934 biography, Abelardo L. Rodríguez: El major amigo del 
proletario, the narrative is effusive and congratulatory.  Martinez tracks the 
accomplishments of President Rodríguez in chronological order with many photos, 
interviews, quotations and copies of presidential decrees.  In 1938, Francisco Javier 
Gaxiola, Jr. published his biography, El Presidente Rodriguez, 1932-1934 which is a 
more generalized appraisal of Rodríguez, his rise to the presidency and the difficult 
political challenges he faced.  In that same year, Rodríguez published his Notas de mi 
Viaje a Rusia, a critical assessment of the Soviet system and its failure.  The ex-president 
also served as governor of Sonora in the early 1940s and wrote Ideario in 1949 that 
chronicled his achievements as a regional leader.  In his 1962 autobiography, 
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Autobiografía de Abelardo L. Rodríguez, the ex-president recounted his career as a 
professional baseball player, his days as a soldier/statesman, his focus on educational 
reforms in Mexico, and included a pull-out copy of his 1951 honorary Doctorate of Laws 
degree from the University of California, Berkeley.  
An influential book that contemplates Mexico’s fundamental question, the agrarian 
problem is Eyler N. Simpson’s, The Ejido, Mexico’s Way Out.  This 1937 classic 
evaluated issues of land reform and the future economic and social organization of 
Mexico.  Simpson’s research illustrates the problematic 1920s and 1930s that I will 
discuss in my dissertation. 
Another important article that examines the pre-presidential regional leadership of 
Abelardo Rodríguez is, The “Shame Suicides” and Tijuana by Vincent Cabeza de Baca 
and Juan Cabeza de Baca (included in “On the Border: Society and Culture between the 
United States and Mexico,” edited by Andrew Grant Wood in 2001). This article 
documents a period of great tension between American and Mexican officials over the 
“vice-industry” in Tijuana during the 1920s when Rodríguez was the provisional 
governor of Baja California.  All of these historical accounts support the fact that 
Abelardo Rodríguez was much more than an interim president.  His political savvy and 
diplomatic skill places him as an important actor in U.S./Mexican relations.  He had 
become a leading figure well before his tenure as President of the Republic. 
Sources/Methodology   
As mentioned above, the settling of repatriates is also linked land reform policies 
in the 1930s. Studies on the formation of ejidos (communal land grants), such as those by 
John Gledhill and Paul Friedrich, indicate that many returning expatriates became 
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chieftains in the struggle to wrest land from large hacendados (plantation owners).  The 
process accomplished with the help of the grantees themselves, armed by the 
government, required savvy and men accustomed to violence in order to defend newly 
acquired parcels from “white guards” working for the land owners.  The experience 
acquired by returning emigrants in their treks often provided just these characteristics.  
As the bibliography shown below indicates, much as been written on repatriation but the 
topic is dealt with as it affected Mexicans on this side of the border.  Significantly, 
Balderrama and Rodríguez, in Decade of Betrayal (a thorough compilation of the 
repatriation experience in the United States), treat this issue only peripherally.  In 
addition, these scholars did not view any of the following Mexican sources.  In Mexico 
City, from the El Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), the Archivo Hístorico de la 
Secretraría de Relaciones Exteriores (AHSRE), and at the Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de 
Tejada.  All these data deal primarily with the founding of repatriation colonies during 
the presidency of Abelardo Rodríguez and the federal government’s foray into this 
process after 1934.    
I am also aware of official materials and newspaper clippings from municipal and 
state archives in Guanajuato and Jalisco which detail the plight of newly returned 
Mexicans in temporary camps around cities like León and Guadalajara.   In this respect, a 
Master’s thesis (Sociology) written in 1934 by James Gilbert, a researcher from the 
University of Southern California, is invaluable. He interviewed a number of newly 
returned emigrants in 1933.      
      In my possession are coped materials from the National Archives in Washington, 
D.C, which have been the primary sources of previous monographs on repatriation.  But 
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other sources from the National Archives concern the almost successful efforts by the 
“Joint Immigration Commission”, a California nativist organization, to declare Mexicans 
ineligible for naturalization and as a consequence, unable to enter the United States 
legally.  This issue is important because it influenced Mexican government policy 
regarding foreigners in Mexico.   
I will orient the reader to the complex relationships that existed between the 
United States and Mexico in the early years of the twentieth century.  I will utilize a 
methodology of combining biography, cultural and intellectual history and literary 
studies to highlight the era that included the Mexican Revolution, World War I, and the 
Great Depression.  I will also provide a richer context between the two nations and argue 
that Mexican history is often overlooked as it is intertwined with American history.     
 I will examine the first and second waves of substantial Mexican immigration to 
the United States.  In order to understand the issues that the Comité Nacional de 
Repatriación confronted in the early 1930s, it is necessary to understand immigration 
trends and “push-pull” factors (labor contractors sent to Mexico to engage workers for 
American mining, railroad and agricultural enterprises.  I will also investigate the 
downturns and the upturns in the American economy which had a direct impact on the 
need for Mexican labor during this forty-year period.  
  This is an investigation of the historical role of repatriation, the complexities of 
U.S./Mexican diplomatic history (from 1848 to the 1930s) and how Mexican presidential 
administrations, religious authorities, consular officials and mutual aid societies 
addressed their compatriot’s well-being in America within the parameters of shifting U.S. 
immigration policies and labor demands.  At issue are the many Mexican-initiated 
  24 
repatriation campaigns for the purposes of nation-building, individual presidential control 
of national politics and the genuine feeling of responsibility Mexican leaders had for 
bracero laborers in the United States. 
After the Mexican American War (1846-1848) the United States government 
refused to honor the provisions in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that guaranteed the 
property rights of Mexican landowners.  Fearing more U.S. aggression, the Mexican 
government hoped to resettle their stranded compatriots along the new border regions as 
a buttress to potential American expansion.  However, the cost and planning of such an 
undertaking proved too large a task for the weakened Mexican state (Aguila, “The First 
Mexican Repatriation Campaign,” 3-5).  Although substantial funding efforts (from 1848 
to 1851) by Mexican Catholic church authorities and incentives from the state 
governments of Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Sonora (public land grants and tax credits) 
provided for moderate resettlement success, the demand for expatriate laborers in the 
California mining industry stalled this initial Mexican repatriation drive (Aguila, 5).  
Increased American racial prejudice galvanized Mexican religious and government 
officials “to aid their compatriots” (Aguila, 5). 
 In 1876, Mexican President Porfirio Díaz instructed his consular officials on the 
border to “protect their compatriots in the United States” (Aguila, “Mexican /U.S. 
Immigration Policy prior to the Great Depression,” 108).  By the century’s end, Díaz 
opened Mexico to foreign investiture, capitalist expansion and institutionalized a stark 
division between Mexican wealthy elites and the working class.  While Díaz 
amalgamated his power base and exercised almost total control of national politics, U.S. 
demands for cheap labor created a significant Mexican population in the United States 
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(over 125,000 by 1900).  Mexican communities constituted “México de afuera-Exterior 
Mexico” and expected the Díaz regime’s protection and assistance.  Díaz’s waning power 
in the mid-1900s prompted a contradictory, dual approach of worker repression in 
Mexico (the 1906 and 1907 violent suppressions of striking miners in Cananea, Sonora 
and textile workers in Rio Blanco, Vera Cruz) and the repatriation of compatriot workers 
in the United States who faced sudden unemployment due to the economic crisis of 1907-
1908 (Aguila, “The Porfirian Repatriation Process on the Eve of the Mexican 
Revolution,” 1-6). 
This elaborate repatriation drive funded Mexican consular authorities and 
religious groups with the necessary capital to pay for repatriate railroad passage to El 
Paso/Ciudad Juarez.  From there, Díaz directed the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations to get the workers back to the Mexican interior (Aguila, “The 
Porfirian Repatriation Process on the Eve of the Mexican Revolution,” 13-17).  In 
Aguila’s analysis, the Diaz repatriation “implemented a short term solution, but failed to 
consider long terms plans regarding the inconsistent demands for Mexican labor in the 
United States” (Aguila, 1).  However, as the United States government distanced itself 
from the issue, Díaz presented strength in leadership and by 1909 U.S. employers called 
again for Mexican laborers.  
 The U.S. involvement in World War I stepped up the need for Mexican laborers 
and exempted them from The Immigration Act of 1917.  Massive numbers of braceros 
arrived in the United States.  Unfortunately, the recession of 1920-1921 left thousands of 
braceros stranded in poverty.  Outraged by the indifferent attitude of American officials 
and employers, Mexican President Álvaro Obregón repatriated 15,000 Mexicans during 
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this crisis and formed the Department of Repatriation within The Ministry of Foreign 
Relations.  His concern for compatriot self-help and the return of these workers 
necessitated quick action and Mexican consular offices received increased government 
funding.  Through consular coalition building with the bracero communities, two mutual 
aid societies, the Comisiones Honorificas Mexicanos and the Brigadas de la Cruz Azul 
expanded the protective reach of the Mexican government (Aguila, “Mexican /U.S. 
Immigration Policy prior to the Great Depression,” 218).  President Plutarco Calles also 
committed government resources to the Comisiones and the Brigadas and encouraged 
their interaction with México de afuera.  As grassroots organizers, the dedicated men and 
women of the Comisiones and Brigadas were chartered under the consular offices and 
reported to the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Mexico City.  The advantage of these 
organizations was their formation within the México de afuera communities and they 
closed the “distance gap” between bracero concerns and consular offices located in larger 
population centers.  The Comisiones and Brigadas helped negotiate labor contracts, 
intervened in cases of racial discrimination, raised funds for schools, promoted Mexican 
nationalism, provided information regarding visas, identification cards, the immigration 
process and drafted applications for Mexican government assistance (Aguila, “The Origin 
of the Comisiones Honorificas Mexicanas and the Brigades de la Cruz Azul” 13-16).  
According to Aguila, mutual aid organizations “might still exist, if not for the devastation 
of the Great Depression” (Aguila, 18). 
     Indeed the long history of Mexican governmental involvement in the lives of braceros 
and their families in the United States addresses racism and prejudice against Mexicans 
in the United States.  The “presence of Mexicans in America” is a significant component 
  27 
of labor and diplomatic history between the two nations.  Ethnic scholarship (Mexican 
American History and Chicano Studies) often focuses on the victimization of the 
downtrodden bracero in the same way it demonizes the Porfiriato.  To do so, 
oversimplifies the discussion and one might as well rely on the “one-line sound bite” that 
most Americans rely on for immigration news. 
 In Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s (Albuquerque, 
University of New Mexico Press, 1995) Francisco Balderrama and Raymond Rodriquez 
assert that repatriates had agringado (Americanized) children and that the Mexican 
government did little to ease the transition back to Mexican culture and society 
(Balderrama and Rodriguez, 194-210).  The authors also suggest that the extended 
families of the repatriates resented their initial departure and perceived them as failures. 
Aguila contends that Chicano scholarship treats the Mexican government and the mutual 
aid societies as “exploitative to the repatriates” (Aguila, “Mexican/U.S. Immigration 
Policy prior to the Great Depression,” 208).  Aguila’s research disproves any such notion. 
 Another important source is Gunther Peck’s, Reinventing Free Labor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  Although Peck’s analysis does not deal 
specifically with Mexican governmental reactions to oppressive American corporate and 
padrone labor recruitment tactics, his work addresses the U.S. demand for cheap 
Mexican labor.  Peck’s conclusion that Mexican workers remained mobile and illusive to 
American corporate employers and their Mexican padrones suggests they also avoided 
the repatriation campaigns of Porfirio Díaz and Álvaro Obregón.                 
The presidential administration of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) also 
committed government resources to the Comisiones and the Brigadas as the controversy 
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over unrestricted Mexican immigration in America reached a “new urgency.”37  The 
Comisiones and Brigadas promoted Mexican nationalism, provided information 
regarding visas, identification cards, the immigration process and drafted applications for 
Mexican government assistance.38  An unsigned document dated February 15, 1928 
titled, “Emigration-Immigration-Repatriation,” expressed the concerns of Mexican union 
leaders regarding the mistreatment of expatriate workers in the United States and called 
for President Calles to promulgate “an organic law to end emigration of Mexican 
laborers.”  The document also described that consular delegations traveled to Mexico 
City, “and requested Government aid and assistance for the repatriation of groups of 
Mexican laborers and their families in the United States.”39     
In order to maintain political control after the 1928 assassination of president-
elect Obregón, Calles appointed himself as “Jefé Maximo” (his de facto reign as 
“chieftain of the Maximato” lasted from 1928 to 1934).  The next three presidents 
(Emilio Portes Gil, Pasqual Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo Lujan Rodríguez) owed their two-
year interim administrations to Calles.  As American unemployment soared during the 
first years of the Great Depression, ethnic Mexicans in the United States became one 
group of scapegoats for the economic crisis and often blamed for the inability of many 
Americans to find and keep jobs. 
President Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of Labor, William Doak eagerly attempted 
to rid America of foreigners and targeted Mexicans in large cities such as Los Angeles, 
                                               
37 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans In The Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939 (Tucson:  University of Arizona Press, 1974), 24-30. 
38 Jaime R. Aguila,  “Mexican Mutual Aid: The Origin of the Comisiones Honorificas Mexicanas and the 
Brigadas de la Cruz Azul.” The University of Texas of the Permian Basin.  
39 F. Arturo Rosales, Private Papers on Mexican Repatriation, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.  
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California and Chicago, Illinois.  In 1931, Doak claimed that 400,000 aliens resided in 
the United States illegally and thousands of Mexicans lost their jobs.  Pressured to leave 
by community authorities, Mexicans and their children (many born in America) returned 
to Mexico.40  In 1930, the Mexican Migration Service of the Ministry of the Interior (with  
Andrés Landa y Piña as the presiding official) began negotiations with the U.S. Bureau of 
Immigration and scheduled annual conferences regarding the transportation of repatriates, 
the creation of communal colonies for the returned workers and proposed taxes on 
Mexican private property to fund the “colonias.”41 General Abelardo Rodríguez (a former 
Secretary of War and Navy) assumed the Mexican presidency in September of 1932 and 
like his predecessor, “expanded the list of articles repatriates could bring in duty-free.”42 
When Abelardo Rodríguez assumed the presidency from Pascual Ortiz Rubio in 
1932, he formed the Comité Nacional de Repatriación (National Repatriation 
Committee), a private sector group that attempted to construct special colonies for 
returning Mexicans in the jungle regions of Oaxaca and Guerrero.  Former presidents 
Portes Gil and Ortiz Rubio, both considered tools of Calles, adhered to a policy that the 
                                               
40 F. Arturo Rosales, Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement (Houston:  
Arte Público Press, 1997), 48-49.  Also, Camille Guerin-Gonzales,  Mexican Workers and American 
Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 1900-1939 (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994) “Entire neighborhoods and communities were destroyed…when county and state 
agencies, with the blessing of the federal government, organized the mass removal of Mexican immigrants 
and Mexican Americans from towns and cities all over the United States” (2) and “U.S. authorities…did 
not simply “return” Mexicans to their home country, but sent many American citizens into exile in a 
foreign country” (94).   
41 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, Second 
National (Mexican) Migration Conference (February, 1931), by Robert Frazier, Consul General, Mexico 
City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 812.55 No. 98, Washington, D.C., 1931.  In this 
report to the American Secretary of  State, Frazier recounts the conference meeting  held in Mexico City 
from February 2 through 9, 1931 (topics included: “Repatriation,” “Emigration,” “Immigration,” “Tourist 
Travel” and “Citizenship of Mexican-born Women”). See also Excélsior, 9 February 1931 and 11 February, 
1931.  
42 Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal, Mexican Repatriation in the 
1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 133. 
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federal government should avoid direct involvement in resettling the returning emigrants.  
Thus, the burden fell on state and municipal governments, a task for which these entities 
were ill equipped.  This is when Rodríguez formed the Comité (see above discussion on 
the Comité itself).   
When Lázaro Cárdenas replaced Rodríguez, he implemented a more far-reaching 
program using federal pesos. During 1938, in the border state of Tamaulipas, the 18 de 
Marzo (March 18) colony (named after the date of the American and British oil 
expropriations) was formed as part of the land reform initiative which intensified during 
the Cárdenas administration.  Even though these efforts came too late, the gesture served 
to promote Cárdenas’ image as a “man of the people.”  In 1938, Mexican Foreign 
Minister Ramón Beteta, with much fanfare, traveled throughout the United States to 
offset the backlash surrounding the oil expropriation and to assure Mexican immigrants 
that their government was willing to help them return home.  
The settling of repatriates is also linked to the forming of ejidos (communal 
farms) by the Mexican government. Returning expatriates received land, along with other 
Mexicans, expropriated from large haciendas.  But landholders hired “white guards” to 
prevent them from occupying ejidos. As a consequence, grantees themselves, armed by 
the government, had to resort to violence. The experience acquired by emigrants in their 
sojourn abroad often provided them with leadership qualities in these struggles.    
Two theoretical issues will guide my writing.  One is to show the laissez-faire 
approach to the problem of repatriation during an era known as the Maximato (1929-
1934), when former president, Plutarco Elías Calles ruled behind the scenes in contrast to 
an interventionist approach taken by Presidents Rodríguez and Lázaro Cárdenas 
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(Cárdenas completely broke free from Calles’ grip after his election in 1934). This 
dichotomy reflects avenues taken in the 1930s in many other areas of public policy. The 
second is that returning immigrants themselves resolved more of their own problems than 
the government.  The bad experiences of repatriates stranded on the Mexican side of the 
border and the difficulty that the Mexican government had in providing them with 
transportation to the interior. Unable to keep up with a more efficient expulsion operation 
in the United States (which essentially abandoned unwanted Mexicans in border towns), 
this section will also detail the actual trek of the returnees from the border to their homes 
and/or families Mexico.  
Going past the scope of this dissertation, I will need to go further into the 
Mexicanist historiography.  In the context of the historiography on the ejido, which is 
very extensive: Why was the government unable to find a solution to the ongoing 
phenomena of return migration during economic cycles, while seemingly having more 
success with the ejido system—at least in some parts of Mexico?  John Gledhill’s book, 
Casi Nada, A Study of Agrarian Reform in the Homeland of Cárdenismo questions much 
of the triumphalism of the Cardenista era.  Furthermore, based on the books by Fernando 
Alanís Enciso, and to a certain extent the work of Casey Walsh, there seems to be some 
agreement that repatriates fared no better under Cárdenas than they had in previous or 
future administrations.  Did repatriates fare better under Cárdenas?  If yes, than why?  
What was different?   
How does the Comité Nacional de Repatriación fit within the larger 
historiography?  How does it complement, contradict, continue, or contribute to works 
like Balderrama and Rodriguez, Hoffman, Mercedes Carrera de Velasco, Alanis Enciso, 
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and other Mexicanists?  Finally, the issue of repatriation develops and is part of, a larger 
concept of “transborder” and “transnational” communities.  The subject, writ large, must 
explore the changing concepts of borders, border crossings, and borderlands as a way to 
understand the complexity of transborder communities. 
An understanding of colonialism and neo-colonialism can serve as starting points 
for further discussions on race and ethnicity in the transborder context.  Ethnic and racial 
hierarchies are often recast into nationalistic ideologies that dominate the headlines and 
complicate the discussions of contemporary migration and the historiography of U.S. / 
Mexico diplomatic relations.  To understand this transborder historical context, one must 
“replace a vision solely centered on each country as a separate entity and thinking of 
regions as a comprehensive whole.”43  Therefore, the challenge is to conceptualize 
structural conditions that frame migration to the U.S. and labor relations, human 
relationships, worker experiences, couples and families that cross borders. Transborder 
migrations are more than geographic treks and are comprised of narratives, memories, 
hopes and dreams and multifaceted discourses. 
In the historical context, the social fields of economics, politics, gender, and 
religion embrace relations between migrants and those of us who live in the United States 
and Mexico.  Mexico is re-created from those who bring Mexico to transborder spaces 
and import, la patria, beyond her national boundaries.  Whether the experience is 
grounded in the power dynamics of agribusiness, migratory policies, or the hiring of 
workers, the life histories and over-arching political nuances are all inserted into the labor 
structures of both Mexico and the United States.         
                                               
43 Lynn Stephen, Trans border Lives, Indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon.  (Durham 
and London;  Duke University Press 2007). 
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CHAPTER 2 
A SHORT HISTORY OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION SETTLEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Before 1848, Mexico included the present-day southwestern region of the United 
States.  After the U.S. victory in the U.S. / Mexico War (1846-1848), Mexican 
immigrants and their descendants found themselves in conquered territory.  Although the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo granted U.S. citizenship, land rights and tolerance of the 
Spanish language and Catholic religious traditions to between 80,000 to 100,000 
Mexicans that lived and worked north of the Rio Grande River, very few of these rights 
were ever realized by those Mexicans.44 It’s not surprising that at various times since the 
U.S. takeover (170 years ago), the immigrant Mexican presence has been labeled as, la 
reconquista (the reconquest).  However, this term (perhaps appropriated from the 
reconquest of Spain by the combined military might of the marital union of Ferdinand II 
to Isabella I - the ouster of the 700 year Moorish reign by the armies of Castile and 
Aragón in 1492), inadequately described the post-1848 racial subordination and labor 
exploitation that immigrant Mexicans and the U.S. born population of Mexican descent 
groups (today known as “Chicanas” and “Chicanos” or Mexican Americans) were 
subjected to in the mid to late 1800s.45 
                                               
44 Rudolfo Acuña,  Occupied America: A History of Chicanos  (New York:  Harper and Row,  1981)  and 
Mario Barrera,  Race and Class in the Southwest:  A Theory of Racial Inequality  (Notre Dame:  University 
of Notre Dame Press,  1979). 
45 See Addendum document number ?. 
  34 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Mexican workers had migrated to the U.S. 
in ever-increasing numbers and in a “revolving door” pattern of seasonal labor demands 
tempered by economic recessions in the U.S. economy.  This migratory trend played out 
in the railroad industry, agribusiness and mining enterprises.  Post-U.S. Civil War 
industrial expansion had created demands for Southwestern products, but the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1907 “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan, restricted 
Asian immigrant labor.  By the late 1800s, railroad industrialists had pushed into the 
western region of Mexico and hired enganchistas (labor recruiters) to offer employment 
contracts to Mexican workers.  These often very skilled Mexican laborers took the 
offered jobs, built and maintained railroad infrastructure, and subsequently found 
additional employment opportunities in U.S. mining interests and agriculture.46 While 
most of the Mexican laborers at this time were males, some Mexican women made the 
northward trek. However, women workers returned to their Mexican homes with greater 
frequency, after shorter stays in the U.S.47    
     Importantly, the frenetic economic boom in the Southwest (principally driven 
by railroad line extensions), complimented the economic aims of the “Porfiriato” (1876-
1911) and the capitalistic development schemes of president/dictator, Porfirio Díaz.  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, Díaz had encouraged heavy foreign investiture and 
export-led growth in the Mexican economy.  His utilization of the hacienda system 
severed the established communal land tenure system and turned a growing peasant 
                                               
46 Lawrence A. Cardoso,  Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1897-1931  (Tucson:  University of 
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population into landless workers. 48  Unable to find other jobs, these men and women 
began to seek employment in the United States.  Between 1900 and 1910, staggering 
inflation in the Mexican economy, coupled with U.S. demands for labor, accounted for 
growing numbers of Mexican nationals in the United States.  Lured to the Southwest by 
railroad work and agricultural jobs, still others made their way to the Midwest (especially 
Detroit and Chicago).  Demographically, by the late 1800s, thousands of Mexicans from 
the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Baja California migrated to California, Texas and the 
Arizona portion of New Mexico territory.  The cities of Guadalajara and Zacatecas 
witnessed huge flows of workers to the United States and by 1906, 22,000 “tapatíos” 
(people from Guadalajara) had left that city for job opportunities in the U.S.49   
Importantly however, ever since the mid-1800s, the Mexican government felt 
“duty-bound, morally and as a nation, to repatriate its citizens who had remained in the 
annexed territories (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Upper California and other northward 
regions).”50  As more and more workers and families searched for better opportunities in 
the United States, the Mexican government sometimes reacted to the plight of workers 
who reported and experienced impoverished conditions, racism, mistreatment, 
exploitation and were forced to toil in terrible conditions.  Although not a high priority in 
Porfirian politics, under the general language of the “Ley de Colonización” (an 1883 law 
                                               
48 Lawrence A. Cardoso,  Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1897-1931  (Tucson:  University of 
Arizona Press,  1980).  By the end of the Díaz regime (1910), 97 percent of rural families were landless and 
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50 Ibid., p. 18. 
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regarding the settlement of public and/or vacant land in Mexico), some Mexicans who 
returned from the U.S. did receive land ownership deeds, free of charge.51      
The U.S. Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 allowed the expenditure of federal 
funding for large irrigation development projects and the call for Mexican agricultural 
workers went out again. Additionally, Mexican skilled and unskilled laborers were 
needed in the mining districts of the New Mexico territory (including Arizona), 
Oklahoma and California.52 At the beginning of what is now referred to as, “The 
American Century,” Mexicans certainly helped forge the new U.S. economic clout.  On 
the U.S. – Mexico border in 1907, more than 1000 braceros travelled through the 
communities of Ciudad Juarez/El Paso, Ciudad Porfirio Díaz and Matamoros.  By 1908, 
Mexican settlements appeared around railroad camps and especially along the South 
Texas border; so many that the enganchistas (labor recruiters) found it unnecessary to 
cross the border in search of fresh recruits.53 In El Paso, nearly 16,000 Mexicans were 
contracted for the railroad industry which prompted Victor S. Clark (a U.S. Department 
of Labor official), to claim that over 100,000 Mexicans were poised to come northward 
annually from Mexico.54 In 1910, the Mexican Minister of Development, Colonization 
and Industry was more conservative about the trend and figured the amount at “above 
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50,000” per year.55  Using either statistic, Mexican migration to the U.S. doubled in the 
first decade of the 1900s. 
However, in 1907-1908, an economic downturn/depression in the U.S. sent 
hundreds of Mexican factory workers and miners were back to Mexico. Accomplished by 
U.S. immigration authorities and labor leaders in mid-1908, thousands of braceros were 
left stranded at the border in Ciudad Juárez. Mexican state and federal governments sent 
funds in order to repatriate these workers to their villages and communities.  Enrique 
Creel, the governor of Chihuahua, repatriated up to 150 braceros a day and offered the 
returning workers jobs as miners.56 Remarkably, newly elected President Francisco 
Madero in 1910, instructed his Ministry of Foreign Relations (Secretaría de Relaciones 
Exteriores, SRE) to distribute circulars to Mexican consuls in the U.S. promoting the 
return of Mexican nationals.  In 1913, the Ministry of Development sent another circular 
to Mexican consulate offices in the U.S., “explaining that they needed to repatriate 
Mexican nationals working in that country so the latter could help develop Mexico. (:) 
“According the ministry, repatriation needed to be undertaken as soon as possible, 
though  the urgency applied only to those migrants with skills that would be 
advantageous to the nation.  Nothing would be gained by hastening the return of 
workers who lacked such skills.  For this reason, preference should be given to 
those who had accumulated some capital, gained work experience, and possessed 
intelligence – qualities and conditions Mexico needed for its development – and 
who also had the will and desire to become small landowners.  The ministry 
proposed to offer them land at low cost, to be financed on easy payment terms, 
located in “healthy climes,” and near railway lines or close to populated areas 
with buying power.”57 
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As the Mexican Revolution entered the Constitutionalist phase under President 
Venustiano Carranza (1917-1920), the Mexican government became concerned that 
Mexican citizens might be drafted for U.S. military service and arranged for their 
repatriation.  An “immigration office” was opened in Ciudad Juárez and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Development requested that those returning could “bring in their 
personal effects duty free.”58  Further, the ministry also worked to create “colonization 
projects” so that repatriates might return in greater numbers as “settlers.”59 
The mayhem, danger and violence of the conflict convinced tens of thousands of 
Mexicans from all over the nation to flee northward.  As many as 25,000 Mexicans made 
for the border and whether legally or “illegally,” these immigrants were “genuine 
refugees.”  Most demographers and scholars agree that about 1 million Mexicans crossed 
the border into the U.S. between 1900 and 1930.      
     The outbreak of World War I through to the Great Depression brought a huge 
wave of Mexican immigration to the United States.  Initially welcomed due to wartime 
labor shortages (especially in agriculture), many Mexican males worked with enforceable 
contracts.60 From 1917 to 1921, 72,000 Mexicans swelled Southwestern and Midwestern 
rural fields as temporary contract workers, while thousands more Mexican migrants 
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worked without papers, documents or contracts.  They also found work in meat 
packinghouses, restaurants and factories in Midwestern and Eastern cities.  By 1918, the 
contract-labor programs expanded and included non-agricultural workers.  During the 
two years that the United States engaged in the Great War, 72,000 Mexican workers were 
admitted to work in industries, “critical to the war effort.”61  However, until the 1920s, 
most Mexican workers remained in the agricultural rural areas.62  
In Mexico, the upheaval of the Mexican Revolution, and the Cristero Rebellion in 
the central-western area of the nation (1926-1929), accounted for even more northward 
migration.63  The Cristero Rebellion took place mostly in the states of Jalisco, 
Michoacán, Durango, Guerrero, Colima, Nayarit and Zacatecas.64  The most recent 
scholarship has examined both U.S. and Mexican sources and claims that annual Mexican 
“illegal” immigration during the 1920s was estimated at around 100,000 people per year 
(this figure failed to include legal entry).  Demographic sources in Mexico (The National 
Statistical Agency) estimated that 331, 602 Mexicans from 1925 to 1934.65 Of these 
people, 26 percent listed agriculture as their primary occupation, 23 percent were wives 
of emigrants, 19 percent were children of the emigrants or “minors without occupations, 
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and the remaining 22 percent were listed in “other categories of work.”66  As the surging 
U.S. economy called for even more Mexican workers in urban and rural areas, more 
Mexican families populated the barrios of San Antonio, El Paso and Los Angeles.  Again, 
these Mexican communities became labor-distribution centers, especially for much-
needed Mexican laborers recruited to the rural Southwest and Midwestern states.67  
In the 1920s, U.S. employers contemplated ways to ensure a more stable and 
steady immigrant work-force.  Sugar-beet growers in the Midwestern states and Colorado 
began to hire extended Mexican families for fieldwork.  Keeping families together 
brought stabilization to the workforce.68 In Texas, cotton growers incorporated Mexican 
women into a system of family tenant farming that soon relegated these women and their 
children to low wage work.  Consequently, Mexican men accompanied by their families, 
tended to stay and work for low wages as well.69 During the 1920s, family immigration 
became a normal pattern of Mexican immigration to the United States.  Although almost 
70 percent of “legal” immigration to the United States was comprised of Mexican men, 
many wives and families entered “illegally” to avoid entry fees and preserve family 
cohesion.70  
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Also during this decade, the influential Mexican anthropologist, Manuel Gamio, 
published information on Mexican immigrant communities in the United States.  His 
research was based on immigrant postal remittances (money orders) sent to extended 
family networks in Mexico. Gamio concluded that most Mexican migrants planned to 
return to Mexico.71 Paul Taylor, an economist who studied Mexican immigrant labor 
patterns in the 1920s and 1930s, argued that the decline in winter remittances to Mexico 
signaled seasonal patterns of agricultural work and the desire of Mexican immigrants to 
settle permanently in the United States.72  Still other studies concluded that by the 1920s, 
family immigration surpassed individual male migration and that more and more family 
groups were attracted to large U.S. cities.73  
However, by the mid-1920s, contractions in the U.S. economy and rising 
unemployment numbers prompted revaluations of American immigration policy.  
Beginning in 1919 and through 1922, a deportation campaign targeting Mexican workers 
was in place.  The administration of General Álvaro Obregón was faced with relocating 
100,000 conationals.  Obregon was successful in the repatriation of more than 50,000 
Mexicans.  Obregon’s administration covered the repatriates traveling expenses and 
relocated the many thousands to their villages of origin to their villages in Mexico.  It 
was during this time that Eduardo Ruiz, the Mexican counselor official in Los Angeles 
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was given the duty to oversee and evaluate “the situation of Mexican nationals in the 
United States.”74  Obregon’s government essentially financed all aspects of this 
repatriation project and created a separate Repatriation Department within the federal 
government.75  Obregon made it possible for thousands of compatriots to comfortably 
return to Mexico.  However, these exigent circumstances resolved and the matter was no 
longer considered a crisis point. 
In the United States, the Border Patrol was established in 1924 and some U.S. 
Congressmen called for limits on the entry of foreign nationals that culminated in the 
Immigration Act of 1924.  Attitudes toward Mexicans became more polarized as 
businessmen advocated for more laborers and lenient entry restrictions, while nativist 
politicians led by Congressman John C. Box (D-Texas) introduced legislation that would 
curtail the influx of Mexican workers and their families.  The American Federation of 
Labor sided with Congressman Box’s efforts.76 
During 1927-1928, the SRE’s response to the many Mexican who sought 
repatriation funds was that it could no longer provide financial assistance.  Instead, the 
agency informed them of a Mexican worker program that would utilize repatriate labor 
for those who would dedicate themselves to farming on Mexican public lands (SRE 1928 
b, 855).  This plan promoted the return of the best prepared laborers who could farm 
successfully and utilize the techniques they had learned in the United States.  However, 
the SRE didn’t have money for transportation, nor could it “identify any suitable parcels 
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of land.”77  This was a particularly “nagging issue” because anthropologist Manuel 
Gamio had long advocated that successful repatriation would extol the qualities of the 
repatriates, and that they would be of great service to the Mexican nation. 
He (Gamio) believed that they would help educate the Mexican people and would 
leave their imprint on Mexican culture.  In his judgement, the time that migrants 
spent in the United States had given them useful experience in agriculture and 
industry.  They had learned to use machinery and modern tools and had acquired 
discipline and good work habits.  In addition, Gamio believed, they had made 
more subtle character strides, rising to a higher level of culture and learning to 
modulate their temperament and save money.  For Gamio, the return of these 
people boded well for Mexico.78 
 Further, Gamio believed that repatriates from the U.S. represented a prosperous 
life and good work habits.  Through nucleos progresistas (centers of progress), the 
general Mexican public would “come to each other’s aid as they had done in the United 
States”.  Gamio reasoned that the Mexican Government had a singular opportunity to 
instill amongst millions of uneducated and unskilled Mexicans a solution to Mexico’s 
problems.  The repatriates learned modern farming and irrigation techniques and had 
“stored up” many agricultural techniques and good money-saving and money-making 
habits.  Gamio’s proposals and suggestions seemed to establish a low cost opportunity to 
infuse and rejuvenate the Mexican economy.  Even President Francisco Madero noted 
that the best repatriation occurred when it was, “composed of the better element of 
Mexicans.”79  Another leading intellectual expressed a similar viewpoint.  Alfonso 
Fabila, a social anthropologist affiliated with the World Worker’s House wrote, El 
problema de la emigración de obreros y campesinos- that government must repatriate 
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laborers (especially mechanics and agricultural workers), “the better elements who had 
developed expertise in fields and industries then unknown in Mexico.”80  However, some 
Mexican leaders worried that once in Mexico, repatriates could become rebellious types, 
as well as competitors with other Mexicans in the job market.  There was also the notion 
that those repatriates who failed to reintegrate successfully would make their way back to 
the United States and criticize the repatriation efforts.  In fact, Quijano Aguilar, the 
Mexican Consulate official in Denver Colorado, stated that the government’s repatriation 
funding was wasted since most repatriates eventually returned to the United States.  The 
Mexican Counsel in San Antonio, Texas, Enrique Santibáñez criticized the Mexican 
government’s efforts and claimed it added nothing to the market place, nor to the 
improvement of national production, “because his compatriots failed to learn any type of 
skill that could be useful to Mexico, and that repatriation could move forward only when 
the country reached a highly advanced level of organization. “81 
By decade’s end, the grinding economic duress of the Great Depression triggered 
deportation and repatriation drives.  Amidst the “The Brown Scare,” as many as a half a 
million people, many that were legal permanent residents, undocumented immigrants and 
U.S. citizens of Mexican descent, were “sent back” to Mexico.82 According to the U.S. 
National Archives and Professor Abraham Hoffman, approximately, “423,026 Mexican 
nationals, in a mass movement that lacked any advance planning or control, made their 
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way back to Mexico.”83  These deportees and repatriates included increased numbers of 
women and children which reflected the 1920s trend toward family immigration.84 In 
1931, municipal and county governments (especially the Los Angeles County Charities 
and Public Welfare Department) along with relief organizations ended public welfare to 
Mexican families and even paid for these many families to return to Mexico.  Led by 
President Herbert Hoover’s, Secretary of Labor, William N. Doak, U.S. Immigration 
Agents pursued their objective with zeal: to detain and eventually expel migrant 
workers.85  Mexicans gathered their belongings, packed their cars and trucks and boarded 
trains for the border.86 
As the economic effects of the Great Depression widened, Mexican repatriation 
was no longer sporadic or “simply the object of study and analysis.”  Certainly by 1929, 
the Mexican government was required to act and support the stream of its exiled 
nationals.  From 1929 until 1923, the Mexican government received thousands of 
requests from repatriates for money.  A difficult and perhaps insurmountable task of 
relocation was presented to a range of government agencies: the SRE, the counselor 
service, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), and the Ministry of the 
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Interior.  Even though the U.S. and Mexico are neighboring countries, planning for the 
repatriates’ was very difficult.  Mexican government aid had to employ the use of its 
national railways, establish negotiations and cooperation from American railroad 
companies and locate jobs for those who returned. These agencies also had to plan for 
settlements and housing for the returning conationals. 
Mexican consulate offices in the United States were given the task of facilitating 
transportation.  These officials and minor officials provided the “nuts and bolts” of the 
return trips.  They did fundraising and often obtained transportation vouchers (secured by 
Mexican American charitable organizations and benefactors).  To their credit, they also 
gave out information about job prospects in Mexico. 
From July 1930 to June 1931, the Mexican government together with committees 
set up by the consulates and individual Mexicans acting on their own, underwrote 
the cost of repatriation for 60,207 men and 31,765 woman, or 91,972 Mexican 
nationals in total, the majority of them from Texas and California.  The 
corresponding total of people repatriated in the following year-July 1931 to June 
1932- was 124,894, or more than one-third higher.  In this latter period, the 
government’s outlay for food relief alone was 73,404 pesos.87 
By now, a full-fledged crisis and the largest repatriation of people in history, the 
Mexican railway industry allowed for special discounts at the border, accepted donations, 
and in some cases even allowed free passage to repatriates.  The Mexican Customs 
Administration (a unit of the SHCP) exempted duty fees on personal belongings brought 
into Mexico.  At the international border, the Mexican government, as well as local 
charitable organizations set up cafeterias and shelters for the thousands returning to 
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Mexico.  Assistance was afforded to thousands of Mexican nationals, the majority of 
whom were hungry, peso-less, and destitute. 
By the onset of Abelardo Rodriguez’ presidential appointment to office 
(September, 1932-1934), the repatriation problem had reached “crisis-level” for the 
Mexican government.  Rodriguez, along with the Interior Ministry, created the National 
Repatriation Committee which institutionalized the concept of repatriation into Mexican 
society.  The Committee (El Comité de Repatriación) envisioned that repatriates would 
work in agricultural colonies (colónias) as a form of “self-settlement.”  Thus began 
discussions about the establishment of repatriate colonies in the Mexican states of 
Guerrero, Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Baja California, Coahuila, Veracruz, and Oaxaca.   
By 1940, the Mexican immigrant population decreased to half of what it was in 
1930.  Mexican immigration to the United States has been assigned to a group of 
“economic” migrations which, like the Mediterranean migration to Western Europe and 
the Rhodesian migration to South Africa, occurred as a result of disequilibrium between 
two neighboring regions.  To most migration researchers no other explanation seems 
more plausible to explain movements of people from “less developed” to “more 
developed” regions.  A description of two important theories on international migrations 
must be presented as background to a more detailed examination of the Mexico to U.S. 
migration. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEXICAN IMMIGRATION THEORY THROUGH THE EARLY 1930S 
The Push- Pull Theory of Migration 
The push-pull theory of migration stated that the combined “push” and “pull” 
forces in the sending and receiving countries, respectively, were the main imputes for 
migrations across international boundaries.  Economic migrations motivated by “push-
pull” factors, occurred because there were vast economic advantages in the country of 
destination when which compared to the country of origin, acted as a magnet for both 
legal and illegal immigrants. 
The Mexican economy throughout the twentieth century was essentially, state 
regulated capitalism.  In such an economy the benefits of industrialization usually 
accrued disproportionately to a small upper income sector and a slightly larger “middle 
sector.”  Therefore, although Mexico slowly entered the “middle income” category of 
nations, it continued to endure massive and widespread poverty. 
The migration of lower-income Mexicans to the U.S. accordingly represented for 
the Mexican government, a “safety valve” to reduce the possibility of internal problems 
that arose from unequal distribution of income and the existence of a surplus labor force.  
The “push” factor leading to Mexican migration is quite clear.  Mexico in the 1920s and 
1930s continued to be an underdeveloped country, if development included the goal of 
raising the living conditions of the Mexican people. Unemployment rates in Mexican 
cities that bordered the U.S. consistently remained at the 30% to 40% range.  
Underemployment became a way of life, with many farmers working only an average of 
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100 days per year.  For many decades in the twentieth century, the minimum wage in 
Mexico’s border cities was never more than one-third of the minimum wage across the 
border in the U.S.  Proponents of the “push-pull theory” argued that as long as this 
economic imbalance persisted between the two bordering nations, the flow of immigrants 
would continue. 
The second reason for out-migration is attributed to a willingness of employers in 
the receiving country to hire foreign laborers due to those industries’ inability to attract 
domestic workers at prevailing low wages.  This side of the equation became known as 
the “pull” factor.  A large surplus of foreign labor has been identified as a major force of 
many developed nations.  It is not surprising that the major “pull” factor in Mexican 
immigration to the U.S. was the availability of low-wage employment in the U.S. and the 
active efforts on the part of U.S. employers to secure access to this labor. 
However, authors and proponents of the “push-pull” explanation of migration 
differed over the main structural conditions leading to immigrations from Mexico.  Some 
emphasized the “push” factors as the root of the problem while others believe that the 
“pull” factors are the major underlying motive for out-migration. 
Scholar Richard Fagen stressed the need for, “very large scale and carefully 
designed programs of rural development and job creation” in Mexico to make the North 
and Central plateau of Mexico, “at least minimally attractive to the tens of thousands of 
new job seekers who enter(ed) the labor market.”88  Advocates of such development 
stressed the worthlessness of any other policy, especially any other American policy, 
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when trying to curb migration from Mexico.  In other words, the Mexican migration flow 
became a natural consequence of the imbalance between the two economies and could 
not be stopped unless the imbalance was corrected. 
Usually the proponents of this line of reasoning imply that the U.S. made attempts 
to solve the problem at its root.  They believe that U.S. support in the form of capital, 
technology and revised tariff schedules was essential because of America’s desire to keep 
Mexico economically dependent on the United States. 
In opposition to the view that the “push” factors leading to migration are stronger 
than the “pull” factors, was the view, usually attributed to Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Professor Michael Piore, that the major force in initiating and maintaining 
migrant flows was the developmental process in the industrialized region.  By his view, 
the demographic and economic pressures in underdeveloped areas were by themselves 
insufficient to initiate or maintain migrations movements.  The evidence according to 
Piore rested on the fact that “such differentials have existed for long periods of time 
without generating migration.”89  Migrants, in this view, are seen as “temporary 
sojourners” who dislike the industrial regions and are only interested in accumulating 
enough savings to return to their country. 
The receiving country initiated the flow by creating the jobs which were attractive 
to migrants, while it often maintained the flow through deliberate recruitment by 
industrial and agricultural employers or agents.  One implication of this reasoning was 
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that existing characteristics of migrant jobs were in some way critical to the 
socioeconomic system of the receiving country and these jobs would not be improved 
because there was already a steady and controlled access to low-cost labor.  Society then 
could be expected to look for other means of maintaining the labor supply (such as 
deliberate recruiting methods).  According to Professor Piore, “in the process, the society 
may actually seek to curtail the upward mobility of other domestic groups filling those 
jobs.”90 
Dependency Theories 
  The “dependency” school in political science and economics suggested an 
interesting global perspective on immigration and the role of capitalism in these 
movements. Dependency scholars argued that underdeveloped areas of the world had 
been historically linked to the developed world in an unbalanced relationship, usually to 
the detriment of less-developed countries.  The “dependentistas” believed that the main 
function of the world “periphery” has been to enhance the economic development and 
well-being of the “core” areas.  The dependency relationship had its roots in the early 
Mercantilist periods and persisted through Colonialism, Imperialism, and Neo-
Colonialism.  The “dependency” school placed the migration phenomenon in the context 
of an exploitative historical domination of the “periphery” by the “core”.91 
The “dependentista” advocates believed that the scarcity of labor (usually 
unskilled) in the developed countries was an important characteristic of societies in the 
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advanced stage of capitalism.  Consequently, when traditional colonial rule was 
abandoned, labor, the object of exploitation, was transferred to the “core” itself through 
the importation of foreign workers.92  This applied particularly to those industries, like 
agriculture, which could not export themselves abroad.  At the same time, the search for 
new sources of low-cost labor was achieved in other industries by exporting production 
to wherever such labor was found.  Therefore, the historical function of labor 
immigration paralleled the “Neo-Colonialist” practices of multinational corporations and 
served mainly to defend the rate of profit by the increased supply of cheap labor. 
In sum, the “dependency” theorists placed an enormous emphasis on the “pull” 
factors of migration, but went a step further by making the process appear to be a 
conspiracy of sorts by the receiving country to maintain and perpetuate the dependency 
relationship between itself and the sending country.  The “push” factor, often in the form 
of surplus labor in the sending country, was described as the, “result of the low 
accumulation of capital and allied economic backwardness due to the sending country’s 
past formal and informal dependence on imperialism.”93  Therefore, the migratory 
mechanism was designed to achieve not just the balance between supply and demand of 
labor (as the “push-pull” theory claimed), but the perpetuation of a dependency 
relationship between the “periphery” and the “core.”  
Overview of Economic Theories 
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What evidence is there that the forces at work behind the migration flow from 
Mexico to the U.S. were of the “push-pull” nature?  How did the “dependentista” 
interpretation apply to Mexican immigration to the U.S.?  To be sure, both views make 
arguments which fit the facts of migration from Mexico; however, they also made strong 
assumptions that do not. 
“Push-pull” theorists regarded the example of Mexican immigration as a perfect 
case of the “push-pull” forces at work: the Mexican “illegal alien” entered the U.S. 
primarily to obtain employment and escape poverty for themselves and their families, and 
U.S. employers often sent agents to Central Mexico to secure “a good group of illegals, 
ready to work.”  To the extent that capital attracted labor and labor attracted capital, it is 
true that the migration phenomenon was “natural.”  In the Mexican case, the proof of this 
became obvious.  However, the “push-pull” theory was not by any means, a complete 
explanation. 
One clear example of the deficiency of the theory in explaining international 
migrations in general and the Mexico-to-U.S. immigration in particular, could be made 
by comparing rural to urban internal migrations across international borders.  As in 
international migrations, internal rural to urban migrations are motivated by the forces of 
supply and demand.  But unlike international migrations, rural to urban migrations cannot 
be effectively deterred without either massive coercion (South Africa) or, in its absence, 
insurrection.  International migrations on the other hand, can and have been effectively 
deterred because there were laws governing, controlling, and enforcing compliance at 
national borders.  Legal immigration was defined, and in this manner, influenced the 
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conditions under which migration occurred and created a politically controlled and 
limited market. 
When problems in controlling or enforcing compliance occurred, as they did in 
Mexican migration to the United States, it was usually due to anomalies in the law.  In 
the case of Mexican migration, the anomaly is in the fact that the United States 
encouraged an almost “case by case” application of laws which amounted to a set of 
contradictory tenants.  The most profound was the example of laws that made it illegal to 
seek employment in the U.S., but not illegal for an employer to hire an “illegal alien.” 
The major criticism of an economic “push-pull” theory is that it did not consider 
that migrations which occurred across international boundaries were controlled, regulated 
and monitored by policies on both sides of the border.  A major assumption of this theory 
was that the immigration process obeyed the laws of demand and supply and that the 
response to demand and supply is immediate.  Indeed, the history of United States 
immigration policy toward Mexico is one in which American policy consistently made 
exceptions for Mexican workers to enter the U.S. for employment purposes.  Therefore, 
while “official” U.S. immigration policy continued to be obscured in “quotas,” the 
unofficial position toward Mexico always managed to be a workable one which made 
emergency accommodations for wartime requirements and peacetime booms. 
 As stated above, the flaw in “dependency theory” is that unified action existed 
among those in the “core” (the industrialized countries) and in the United States.  The 
actions of the “core” kept the “periphery” economically dependent.  However, close 
observers of the American political system noted that power disaggregated and dispersed 
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among many interest groups.  Though the system of checks and balances at the national 
agency level had not always worked to prevent single actors or groups from exerting 
influence over policy, the mechanism had not quite collapsed to allow global conspiracies 
to take its place.  In many other respects, it is difficult to argue against some of the 
precepts set forth by “dependentista” theorists either because there is insufficient 
evidence to disprove them or simply because the evidence seems to stack up on their side.  
The first of their arguments which has proven so difficult to disprove is the 
argument that capitalism, by its very nature, requires a “link” to other markets, especially 
a dependent market. The dependency and linkage of the Mexican market to the United 
States can hardly be denied if by dependency we mean a high measure of sensitivity to 
external forces.  However, by this definition, rich nations are dependent on the poor, at 
least for export markets, investment outlets and for sources of raw materials.  The 
“dependentista” school emphasized only the negative aspects of the dependent 
relationship between rich and poor.  Benjamin Cohen, a scholar of international relations, 
noted that dependency implied an irreversibility of the dependent relationship.94  Mexico 
has always needed to export to the United States in order to continue its “growth pattern,” 
whereas, the opposite is not necessarily true or “a given.” 
A second argument of the “dependentistas” stated that having reached a certain 
level of capitalist development, unskilled labor became a scarce factor of production.  
They argue that a combination of government “disincentives” to work (such as “relief” 
programs) coupled with the greater expectations of workers for better jobs prevented 
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would-be domestic unskilled laborers from taking low-wage jobs in which they could 
have earned an equal amount or less than that which they could receive by “living on 
charity. 
Unemployment due to natural causes (such as illness or shifts in types of 
employment) coupled with unemployment due to the displacement effect of “illegal 
aliens,” created serious public reaction.  From this situation and from extensive media 
coverage (beginning in the 1920s), the general public’s position became that immigrants 
threatened the U.S. economy by displacing native-born American workers in the job 
market.  The debate over whether immigrants were an asset or a burden to the U.S. 
economy became the subject of many studies and several reached opposite conclusions.  
The “dependentista” argument claimed that the lack of skilled labor was peculiar to the 
stage of capitalism that the United States was in.  It raised an interesting economic 
question because if true, it explained why the U.S. had been so “dependent” on Mexican 
labor, and for so long. 
     Another related “dependentista” argument pertained to the domestic sphere.  
Accordingly, even in internal U.S. matters, economic interests always prevail over other 
interests.  The notion that economic transactions occurred in a real-world situation 
without much government intervention, stemmed from laissez-faire and “the invisible 
hand.”  Adam Smith’s idea of this “invisible hand” concluded that unbridled pursuit of 
individual self-interest automatically contributed to maximization of the social interest.  
Accordingly, the government’s role, assumed to be passive, interfered in private business 
only to the extent that its intrusion was damaging to society.  While no one argued that 
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strict conventional laissez-faire existed in any contemporary society, the assumption of 
the “dependentistas” is that government sanctioned all business actions and favored its 
own interests over other concerns.  In the “dependentista” view, immigration from 
Mexico occurred mainly as a result of the capital’s need for cheap labor and the process 
of laissez-faire was assumed to be “at work.”  Policy then, in this view, had a 
complimentary effect, strengthened the position of business, or was altogether 
nonexistent.   
     Policy, whether complimentary to business interests, non-existent, or contrary 
to business, has been essential in stimulating migration from Mexico, and influential 
interest groups continued their a major role in this process .  The question of interest 
group influence on policy formation became of crucial importance.  Author Grant 
McConnell and an observer of “private organizations” observed that the “attack on the 
system” which characterized the “dependentista” argument had been: 
(A) stock-in-trade of radical dissenters for much of our history.  This kind of 
explanation is partly the result of a craving for simplicity, for reducing the 
diversity of things to clear-cut moral issues on which clear-cut judgments 
could be passed.  In one way or another, “the system” was rarely considered 
that normal and to be expected web of institutions and relationships by which 
men are governed and their work is given meaning.  The idea was, that there 
existed a coherent, carefully thought out and coordinated achievement of a 
singularly gifted and selfish band of plotters.95   
 
What do we answer to the “dependentista” claim that capitalist governments made 
deliberate decisions to safeguard the interests of capital?  Only the unfolding of events 
surrounding the role of interest groups in the formulation of U.S. policy can adequately 
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answer this question.  The interplay of interest groups and policy formation had been an 
important component of U.S. immigration policy toward Mexico.  However, a 
dependency explanation, whatever its truths, became insufficient to explain why U.S. 
policy toward Mexico had been different from its policy toward the “peripheral” world.  
The answer can be weeded out by an explanation of the interest groups historically 
involved in the issue of Mexican immigration. 
Political Theories 
Most of the debate over Mexican immigration assumed the accuracy of economic 
explanations of migration regarding the flow of people from Mexico to the United States.  
Sometimes the political explanations assumed a secondary role in the discussions.  Public 
discussions in both countries inevitably led to controversial discourse regarding domestic 
conditions in the other country.  American scholars reacted to Mexico’s customary 
indictment of the U.S. for her economic problems by turning the dependency theory 
around and charging that Mexico’s political system was in a state of, “perpetual 
corruption and inequity…the principal determinant of Mexico’s problems.”96  Similarly, 
Mexicans charged the U.S. government with overriding concern in maintaining the 
interests of capital, and that U.S. policy allowed American agribusiness to hold 
undocumented Mexican workers in conditions of peonage.97  
A Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making 
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Of course, immigration is a phenomenon that should be examined from an 
international perspective.  However, in the case of U.S. - Mexican migration, attention 
was mainly focused on the domestic effects, particularly in the United States.  
Nonetheless, the relevance of migration to foreign policy is major.  First, the U.S. (and 
most other receiving countries) became signatories to multi-lateral agreements on 
refugees.  Second, the United States fostered a worldwide respect for human rights, 
which included the right to immigrate.  Third, important bilateral agreements were 
established with the major immigrant sending countries.98  Its relevance to foreign policy 
brings us now into the realm of decision-making in foreign policy. 
One widely accepted theory of citizen involvement in foreign policy distinguished 
between “intellective” and “social” processes of foreign policy decision-making.99  The 
intellective process of decision making provided fewer access points to citizen 
participation than did the “social” process.  Whether a decision tended to be resolved 
through “intellective” or “social” processes depended on the size of the decision-making 
group and on their perception of the weightiness of the task.  Most issues pertaining to 
foreign policy were of the “intellective” type, primarily because it remained an issue that 
did not directly touch on the personal lives of citizens, and secondarily, because the core 
of decision-makers became tightly-knit and concentrated at the highest levels of 
government.  If a decision involved many decision-makers who, in turn, listened to their 
their advisors, it was mainly through the “social” process, no matter how much 
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importance was attached to the decision.  Thus, “social” process decisions involved 
groups of the non-governmental type. 
Yet, decisions that pertained to immigration required a much wider decisional 
system, and the number of people, for example, that the U.S. President received advice 
from included advisors in the State, Labor, Agriculture and Treasury Departments.  
However, in the formulation of immigration policy, Congress mandated overall 
jurisdiction.  Thus, the possible access which interest groups or interested parties had in 
the case of immigration policy became hundreds of times greater than for diplomatic or 
security decisions in foreign policy.  Since the legitimacy of their concern became more 
obvious, interest groups became part of the decisional system. 
In the case of Mexican migration, the issue has been dealt with both as a foreign 
policy concern and as a domestic issue.  This tendency competes with the overall effect 
of legislation.  Consequently, the foreign policy decision makers do not emphasize efforts 
to correct discrepancies in the law and practice of immigration, claiming that the matter is 
not their responsibility.  Likewise, Congress shirks from its responsibility on the domestic 
side.  In essence, the degree of disaggregation characteristic of immigration policy has 
the effect of obscuring responsibility. 
As pointed out above, the issue of Mexican immigration has significant attributes 
of a foreign policy issue.  However, to the public, it is historically been treated as a 
domestic issue.  One of the major factors in making immigration a domestic concern has 
to do with the lack of any mechanisms at the international level to resolve disputes 
regarding immigration.  The second factor that keeps the immigration issue more in the 
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domestic sphere is that it affects the lives of many U.S. citizens.  These citizens then form 
specialized groups with special demands to which Congress must be responsive to. 
Regarding the issue of Mexican immigration, the influence of these groups has 
loomed large.  In particular, organized labor and agribusiness have played important 
roles.  Any simplistic theory about international migrations, therefore, would not be 
relevant in this brief discussion of Mexican immigration.  These group access points to 
the decision makers are many and varied and have an immense influence on 
policymaking.  Because of the disaggregated nature of power in this instance, it is 
essential to examine the phenomenon of Mexican immigration from an interest group 
perspective. 
Bureaucratic Politics Theory 
The bureaucratic politics model of analysis treats U.S. policy as the product of, “a 
series of overlapping and interlocking bargaining processes within the American 
system.”100  A strict bureaucratic approach would examine U.S. government agencies, its 
tasks and duties, and relations with the other agencies comprising the entire governmental 
scope.  This mode of analysis has been successfully used as an alternative explanation to 
dependentistas or radical theories.  Recall that to dependentistas, U.S. government action 
appear to be the result of “a single entity (the U.S. government) assumed to be capable of 
having ideals, perceiving interests, reacting to events, laying plans, having purposes, 
making decisions, taking actions and following policies just as might an incorporate 
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individual.”101  What the bureaucratic alternative attempts to show is the opposite: that a 
given U.S. policy emerges from the interplay of these bureaucratic actors. 
The bureaucratic approach is not a static model. It implies an intensity of activity 
between and among the bureaucratic actors not characteristic of routine relations.  Almost 
by definition, it applies to crisis issues to which only the rapid, informed and 
sophisticated expertise of the top levels of government can respond.  
The issue of Mexican immigration escaped easy categorization, but one of its 
most important characteristics was the fact that it was not a “crisis issue.”  A true “crisis 
issue” is one which, not having been planned, usually demanded the attention of those 
most able to arrive at an immediate solution or response.  As a “non-crisis issue,” 
immigration never warranted special or immediate attention.  In fact, it was historically 
considered as one of the lowest priorities in Congress.  Therefore, the opposite aspects of 
a crisis usually characterized the immigration issue. 
Immigration and the particular “problem ”of“ illegal Mexican immigration 
became characterized in the 1960s and 1970s by immense public and special interest 
group participation and by relative inactivity in higher levels of government.  In the 95th 
Congress (January 3, 1977-January 3, 1979) more than 65 bills relating in whole or in 
part to “illegal aliens” were introduced in response to the proliferation of public and 
interest group concern over the issue.102 Certainly since that time, a general state of 
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confusion about the immigration issue has existed among the general public and 
congressional leaders because of the extreme politicization of the issue.  However, 
interest group politics seems to “call the shots” regarding policy decisions in Washington, 
D.C. and explaining the immigration flow from Mexico.  The power to influence the 
Mexican migration issue has become so dispersedly allocated among various interest 
groups, that a strict bureaucratic approach does not seem appropriate. 
If neither the push-pull theories, or the dependency theories, nor the bureaucratic 
or the foreign policy approaches seems to accurately fir the intricacies of the Mexican 
migration issue, how can one explain the almost 170 year old process?  Gilberto 
Cardenas, a scholar of U.S. immigration toward Mexico described it as something with 
no particular pattern: 
Mexican aliens in the United States have entered at the behest and through the 
active solicitation and encouragement of many of the same economic interests 
that today proselytize for their expulsion and exclusion through the rigorous 
application or change in immigration laws.  For example, serving as open 
invitations to Mexican migration have been bracero type programs throughout the 
twentieth century, allow-ing commuter aliens and utilization of illegals.  In these 
forms, Mexican aliens have been told that their labor is welcomed by the U.S. and 
they have responded accordingly.  The “illegal alien” problem is therefore one 
whose seed has been planted time and time again by the U.S. when it has been in 
need of Mexican labor.  When expediency better serves, however, immigration 
laws have been administered and changed in response to a problem perceived as 
having been created by illegal aliens, when in fact it is largely of the United 
States’ own making.103 
Whatever orderliness can be made out of the inconsistent immigration policies, it 
is clear that it will not lie in a simplistic explanation of the types discussed above.  The 
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explanation and especially the interplay of interest groups and policy is now where this 
analysis now turns. 
The “Pull” Effect of a Special Policy Toward Mexico 
In this section, I examine the history of Mexican immigration in the context of 
U.S. immigration policy from the beginning of the twentieth century.  What was U.S. 
immigration policy in general?  What was U.S. immigration policy toward the Western 
Hemisphere?  Is there a link between the present illegal alien flow of migrants and past 
U.S. policy Mexico?  What are the effects of U.S. policy on Mexican immigration?  The 
following analysis attempts to show that U.S. immigration policy toward Mexico, and at 
the beginning of the century, the crucial absence of policy has been inextricably tied to 
what is now an established pattern of migration from Mexico to the United States. 
The southwest United States, including the states of Texas, New Mexico, 
Colorado, Arizona, and California, was taken by the United States following the 
U.S./Mexico war of 1846-1848.  Under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, codified on 
February 2, 1848, all Mexican citizens living within the ceded territory were to become 
citizens of the United States if they did not leave the newly acquired territory within one 
year.  Most elected to remain on the land of their ancestors.  Many believed that their 
land was only temporarily “occupied”104  During the remainder of the nineteenth century 
fewer than 30,000 Mexicans immigrated into this region, even though a relatively open 
border prevailed until the early part of the next century. 
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In 1882, the U.S. enacted its first measure to restrict immigration – a measure 
providing “for a head tax of 50 cents and barring admission of convicts, mental 
incompetents, and persons otherwise considered likely to become public charges.”  All 
immigration laws since have kept these general provisions. 
Most early immigration laws, such as the Chines Exclusion Act of 1882 and the 
Japanese Exclusion Act of 1906 tended to address people coming from Asia and Europe.  
The Chinese Exclusion Act was passed in response to a large increase in Chinese 
immigration which began after the 1850 famine which struck the Canton region of China.  
Their large presence in California was particularly unfavorable to large numbers of native 
workers who settled in California due to the discovery of gold.  In contrast, the doors 
were wide open for willing Mexican workers who began to replace Asian labor. 
The pattern of sparse Mexican immigration significantly changed in the early 
twentieth century.  Between 1910 and 1930, an estimated 750,000 Mexican immigrated 
to the United States.105  It is generally agreed that the short-term “push” factor in this 
immigration was the extreme violence that accompanied the Revolution in Mexico 
between 1910 and 1919.  The expansion of the railroad network in Mexico greatly 
facilitated northward immigration from the Central Plateau region of Mexico. 
The immediate “pull” factors leading to immigration was the immense 
agricultural expansion that occurred throughout the American Southwest and the 
domestic labor shortages that occurred during the First World War.  In particular, 
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improved methods of irrigation as well an increase need for agricultural products by a 
rapidly growing population served as an imputes for increased immigration from 
neighboring Mexico.  Demand for Mexican labor further increased as a result of the 
internal U.S. migration of poor white and black laborers to the Northern region of the 
U.S.; passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act which created a shortage of Chinese “coolie” 
labor; and passage of the Immigration Act of 1917 which further curtailed the entry of 
European immigrants.106 
A much more selective immigration legislative act was also passed in 1917.  In 
that year, an act was adopted which included the earlier exclusions of certain 
“undesirable” aliens and also barred the entry of immigrants from an area known as the 
“Asiatic Barred Zone.”  Additionally, the Act required that immigrants be able to read 
and write English and it also set up a system of deportation for aliens who entered the 
U.S. illegally or committed certain crimes.  The highly controversial literacy test 
functioned as an immense barrier to entry. 
The main piece of legislation that dominated the immigration issue in the 
twentieth century became known as “the National Origins Quota System,” a measure 
which was not extended to immigrants from the Western Hemisphere.  Adopted in 1924 
and continuing in effect until 1965, this law was based on a system which set for each 
nationality a quota consistent with the percentage of foreign-born of that nationality 
residing in the United States in 1920.  Prior to this law, all restrictions on immigration 
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had been qualitative rather than quantitative.  That is, there had been no restrictions on 
the number of aliens who could enter, provided they met certain criteria.  This act 
assigned no-transferrable quotas on Eastern Hemisphere countries, with a total limit of 
approximately 150,000 per year.  These restrictions however, were not extended to the 
natives of the Western Hemisphere thus, the Act of 1924 had relatively little impact on 
those crossing the southern border. 
Although Mexican immigrants were still subject to general eligibility 
requirements, countless exceptions were made to facilitate their entry.  For example, at 
the insistence of grower associations and industrial companies, Mexican immigrants 
wishing to work in the sugar beet fields, on railroad gangs, and other contract labor jobs, 
were granted exceptions from the literacy test and head tax imposed by the Immigration 
Act of 1917.107 
Encouraged by the exceptions granted them and the continued prosperity of the 
1920s, Mexican immigrants continued their treks northward until the process was 
abruptly reversed in the 1930s.  The economic recessions that followed the First World 
War set in motion a movement (especially in the Southwestern United States) to 
“repatriate” Mexicans working and living in the region.  That economic considerations 
were the motivating force for the massive repatriation drives was indicated by the fact 
that little else seemed to matter, 
The fact that many of these people had married American citizens, or were 
eligible for citizenship but had not formally completed the immigration process 
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was no barrier to those who believed it was necessary to reduce the regional labor 
pool.  Numerous whites     from the “dust bowl” areas of Texas and Oklahoma 
were pouring into the agricultural labor market in California, making a new 
source of cheap labor available.108 
The massive repatriation campaigns that followed were the first large-scale efforts 
to apprehend “illegal aliens.”  Although the repatriation drives affected aliens of a 
number of ethnic groups residing in the United States, the group most affected was 
composed of Mexican aliens and United States citizens of Mexican descent.  The idea 
was widely promulgated that aliens held good-paying jobs and by ridding the country of 
these people, native-born Americans would take these jobs and unemployment could be 
curtailed.  On January 13, 1931, The Los Angeles Times quoted Los Angeles County 
Supervisor, John R. Quinn: 
If we were rid of the aliens who have entered this country illegally…our present 
unemployment would probably shrink to the proportions of a relatively 
unimportant flat spot in business.109 
The repatriations (sometimes referred to as “deportation campaigns”) coincided 
with the worst depression in U.S. history (truly an international economic spiral).  As 
such, repatriation became a nationally approved necessity.  Those who might have 
thought it unfair to “send back” those workers that the United States desperately needed 
during the First World War were noticeably silent during this process.  However, perhaps 
this reversal in policy should have been foreseen, for between the United States and 
Mexico, the “special relationship” had been built on temporary and reciprocal economic 
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necessity.  Up to this point, the U.S. need for labor and Mexico’s need for American 
capital constituted the stabilizing mechanism between the two countries. 
For many farmers and ranchers in the Southwest, cheap Mexican labor was a 
commodity worth defending.  They needed those Mexican laborers and fought hard to 
prevent any regulation of the flow.  When Congressman John C. Box, a representative 
from East Texas, introduced a bill to amend the 1924 Immigration Act and shut down the 
flow of Mexican immigrants, the farmers and ranchers flexed their political power.  The 
proposed bill was never enacted.  Congressman John N. Garner (also a Texas 
Congressman) spoke for the farming and ranching interests: 
Mr. Chairman, here is the whole problem in a nutshell.  Farming is not a 
profitable industry in this country, and in order to make money out of this, you 
have to have cheap labor…In order to allow landowners to make a profit on their 
farms, they want to find the cheapest labor they can, and if they get the Mexican 
labor, it enables them to make a profit…That is the way it is along the border…110  
 Foreign policy considerations in Congressional and Executive debates often 
swirled around the issue of an imposition of a numerical ceiling on immigrants from the 
Western Hemisphere.  In the 1920s, those who attempted to restrict immigration from the 
Western Hemisphere were unsuccessful due to the strong state Department opposition led 
by Secretary of State, Frank Billings Kellogg: 
The vital factor in defeating the restrictionist cause was the opposition of the State 
Department.  Appealing to the traditional ideal of Pan-Americanism, a principle 
which was to develop into the Good Neighbor Policy in the next few years, the 
officials of the State Department presented a powerful case against Western 
Hemisphere restrictions.  Thus, it was the considerations of foreign policy, based 
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on a long-standing idea, that prevailed over the previously dominant ideas of race 
and nationalism to halt the restrictionist surge.111  
Proponents of restrictive immigration argued that immigration was a domestic issue and 
that it was foolish to consider other countries’ views in the determination of U.S. policy. 
An October 1976 issue of Readers Digest contained an article by the then-
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Leonard Chapman.  The 
Commissioner recited the decades-old rhetoric and the charges aimed at “illegal aliens.”  
He described the situation as, “critical…threatening to become a national disaster.”112  
Chapman estimated their numbers to be at 8 million and claimed that together they were, 
“milking the U.S. taxpayer of $13 billion annually by taking jobs from legal residents and 
forcing them into unemployment; by illegally acquiring welfare benefits, public services 
and by avoiding taxes.”  Certainly, this 40-plus year-old opinion piece mirrored the 
general and widespread sensationalism of public sentiment that had been around since the 
1920s.   
 The various “deportation and repatriation rounds” that have scattered the history 
of Mexican immigration to the U.S. has been a source of extreme resentment in Mexico, 
yet have rarely accomplished much in “keeping the illegals outs.” While the roundups of 
the 1930s were considered numerically successful and helped to reassure public concern 
over the economy, the inevitable always followed: again, there arose a need to turn to the 
Mexicans for cheap labor.  After the Depression of the 1930s, World War II brought a 
renewed interest in Mexican labor (The Bracero Program).  The long-term explanation 
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for the cyclical pattern of demand for Mexican labor appeared to be economic: periods of 
greatest migration coincided with times of trouble in Mexico or with boom years in the 
United States.  The short answer is largely one of political interest group pressure on 
immigration policy. 
 If one imagined an “open border” in which only the “push-pull” forces were the 
only mechanism regulating migration movements between the two countries, what would 
the differences be between those conditions?  Certainly, the continued demand for cheap 
labor would attract millions across the border.  Yet in this “open border” scenario, would 
these laborers return to Mexico or settle in the United States?  Studies done at Harvard 
University by Wayne Cornelius showed that amongst families with a history of migration 
to the U.S., temporary migrants to the U.S. outnumbered those who settled permanently 
in the U.S. by a margin of 8 to 1.113 Cornelius argued that the only attraction that the U.S. 
held for Mexican aliens was the job market.  Accordingly, if there was an “open border” 
policy, Mexican migrants would continue to enter the U.S. on a temporary/seasonal basis. 
However, even forty years ago the opposite view, posited by President Ford’s,  
“Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens” (1976) and then Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Professor of Economics, Michael Piore reminded us that in the initial 
stages of migration, mostly young, single males settle in the “host” country.  Over time, 
however, the young male workers tended to be joined by their families.114 The formation 
of “family migration” created a broader array of “impacts” to the U.S. education system, 
healthcare and housing considerations. 
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Cornelius observed that the main difference between these two views is that the 
latter was based on observations derived from the U.S. experience with European 
immigration in the early part of the twentieth century.  Cornelius pointed out that 
proximity has much to do with the “permanency” of migrants, but that this point of view 
alone didn’t determine if given an “open border,” that Mexican migrants would choose to 
return to Mexico.  The backlog of applications of Mexican citizens seeking permanent 
residency in the U.S. disproved that argument. 
 However, there has traditionally been something special about the migration flow 
from Mexico to the U.S.  What is different about this migration is not that these particular 
groups of migrants behave any differently from other groups of migrants throughout U.S. 
history, but that policy regulating this group has always differed from immigration policy 
applying to other countries.  In this respect, Gilberto Cardenas wrote that: 
Since 1918, the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture and the State 
Department, operating under various mandates and in conjunction with American 
interest groups, have involved departmental policies and practices that have 
effectuated specific migration patterns of Mexican nationals and Mexican labor 
on both sides of the border.  These migration patterns have taken various forms – 
be they legal immigration, bracero, commuter or illegal - and they are sufficiently 
interrelated to be considered as part of the overall United States immigration 
policy toward Mexico.115   
 From the history presented here, it is clear that economic “push-pull” factors have 
not been the sole determinant of the pattern of established migration between Mexico and 
the U.S.  Would the mere economic “push-pull” factors have accomplished the successful 
negotiation of a program for Mexican laborers?  Were the various bracero programs just 
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the result of an organized, determined effort by growers to institutionalize a system that 
guaranteed controlled and ample access to Mexican labor. 
 In the transborder context, it is also helpful to include a discussion of 
“networking” or “social networking” which views Mexican migration as an ongoing 
social process.  Recent scholarship explores a continuum in the complicated migration 
process which includes “geographic, social and historical interconnections between the 
two countries.”116  In the case of Mexican migration to the United States, the process has 
long been attributed to a search for a better life, prior journeys within Mexico, actual 
arrival in the United States, and how the course of integration into the new country is 
guided by, “the shadow of the homeland.”  Resultant settlement patterns in the U.S. are 
also influenced by these factors and help expose the complexity of immigration, “as a 
process, rather than an event.”117   
 More than other foreign-born populations, Mexicans are above all, economic 
immigrants.  They came to the United States because of the grinding poverty in Mexico 
and throughout the decades have sought to improve their economic conditions.  
Compared to other immigrants and to Mexican Americans, Mexican immigrants have 
much lower educational, occupational and income levels.118 In 2004, statistical 
information revealed that only 31 percent of Mexican immigrants completed high school 
training, only 6 percent were in professional or managerial occupations, 31 percent were 
in the laborer occupations and almost 35 percent lived below the poverty level, the 
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highest rate of any foreign-born population.119  The precarious economic situation of the 
Mexican immigrant has been an important aspect of their overall migration experience.  
In order to find how social networking has influenced where immigrants choose to live, 
“feminist theory conceptualizes migration as a survival strategy and more closely 
examines the effects of labor market trends on households and their concomitant 
strategies for survival in the face of disadvantage.”120  Recent studies of female migration 
to the U.S.-Mexico border indicate that movement across the border by men has always 
been closely related to work, while women’s travel is more frequently associated with 
family.  Therefore, female migration experiences have been motivated by traditional 
familial concerns, and their new economic roles in America. 
 The borderlands environment or the “Frontera,” is a connecting point between the 
United States and Mexico.  Rather than separating the two countries, the U.S./Mexico 
borderlands is a regional entity that, “encompasses two peoples, two countries, two 
languages and everything that falls in between, and at the border, these two halves meet 
and interact as one, or a transborder region.”121 This idea of regionalism encompasses 
business dealings, norms, practices and family ties from both sides of the border.  The 
Frontera region is a transnational community that also brings undesirable factors to its 
inhabitants such as, “social and political isolation within their own countries, and the 
brunt force of a divisive, international boundary.”122  Yet, the interconnected aspects of 
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the immigration experience and the struggle for economic advancement also help explain 
the historic social relations of the region. 
 Along the border and even further north, the mechanism for agribusiness 
expansion and industrial profits banked on the labor of the poor and unskilled Mexican 
workforce (especially Mexican women).  Collectively, the Mexican immigrant was kept 
in cyclical poverty (due to language, limited educational opportunities and racial/ethnic 
barriers).  The borderlands became a successful economic region because of the abundant 
and cheap Mexican labor force that continually occupied the lower rungs of the economic 
and social ladder.  In recent years, various points along the U.S./Mexico borderlands are 
the most accessible destination points for those who are trying to relocate from the 
Mexican interior. 
From the macro-level, global events, such as the integration of capital-intensive 
industrialization into Latin American economies, have increased inequalities in 
countries like Mexico.  Furthermore, gender inequality for Mexican women has 
been heightened by urbanization and industrialization, key issues that have 
spurned women’s migration from Mexico’s interior to the borderlands.  Women 
moved to the border seeking to improve their lives… (p)ay at these plants 
(maquiladoras) is relatively good by Mexican standards, but the high costs at the 
border offset the few gains the women earn.  Poverty runs high where newcomers 
settle, and the region’s infrastructure struggles to meet the demands of a constant 
influx of arrivals.  Often, migrating to the U.S. side of the border is the next step 
for these women.  What women who settle on the U.S. side find, are that they face 
similar conditions as they attempt to integrate into their new communities.123 
In the face of these challenges, some women hesitated to move north to the Frontera 
region.  Many expressed the positive aspects of remaining in Mexico, such as, the  
maintenance of Mexican voting rights, access to the Mexican social security system and 
the freedom to move about freely in Mexico.  However, as in prior decades, women and 
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families began to achieve limited “institutional integration” into U.S. society, “did occur 
in that their children attended local public schools.”124  School attendance allowed 
women and families to gain limited, but important access to public and social 
organizations within the context of elementary and middle school educational programs 
(geared toward the children, but based on volunteerism and parental involvement…an 
important aspect of social networking). 
 This most fundamental aspect of social involvement (parental participation in 
school programs) leads to heightened participation in community centers. The taking of 
English classes, immigration procedure and visa renewal classes, health care instruction, 
and other additional life-skill classes all serve as “survival strategies,” but are also 
creative and adaptive ways to network and make decisions in the new borderlands 
environment.  Importantly, family issues require input from both men and women and the 
networking process helps to also express personal, individual successes in the settlement 
process.125 
Social networking also helps immigrants negotiate bi-national collaborative 
efforts designed to assist them in the transborder environment.  Two very important 
social service programs that assist immigrant families (and are transnational in character) 
are the United States-Mexico Border Health Association and The Colonias Program.  
The United States-Mexico Border Health Association advises clients/patients along the 
U.S.-Mexico border through reciprocal medical and technical cooperatives through the 
dissemination of information and bilateral medical networks, it also supports multi-city 
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relationships through its Binational Health Councils.  The U.S.-Mexico Border Health 
Association also partners with the public and private sectors.  The Colonias Program is 
specific to those immigrants living in colonias. The programs’ mission is to organize 
residents and create access to social services.  The program is designed to work in 
partnership with local government, state and federal agencies, nonprofit organizations, 
and promotes he active involvement of residents.  Furthermore, the program helps 
residents access health and human services, job training, educational programs, youth and 
elderly programs, which are available in their areas. 
Integration on the border (and in the borderlands) of recent arrivals requires social 
networking in order to fully adapt into U.S. society.  Consequently, specific barriers need 
to be addressed; legal status, low education and job skills, and access to public and social 
institutions.  Services such as citizenship programs, classes in English as a Second 
Language, and other outreach programs are important to this transborder, transnational 
community. 
These issues highlight the importance and the necessity to consider policy in a 
general sense, the influence of interest groups in the formation of policy itself, and the 
special treatment which Mexican immigration has received in the history of U.S. 
immigration policy.  It is the interplay of these factors and forces, interest groups and 
policy that I turn to in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 
HERBERT HOOVER PRESIDENCY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Herbert Clark Hoover was the son of a Quaker blacksmith and brought to the 
presidency an international reputation as an engineer, administrator and humanitarian.  
The first president born west of the Mississippi River, (West Branch, Iowa in 1874), 
Hoover grew up in Oregon and enrolled at Stanford University when it opened in 1891.  
Hoover graduated as a mining engineer and married his Stanford sweetheart, Lou Henry, 
also an engineering student.  Hoover travelled the world as a mining expert and made his 
name in Australia before moving his young family to China.  He worked for a private 
corporation and became China’s leading engineer.  When the Boxer Rebellion broke out 
in 1900, the Hoovers were marooned in Tientsin for one harrowing month as the city fell 
under siege.  The U.S. Marines called upon his local knowledge as they attempted to 
quell the conflict.  As Lou worked in hospitals, Herbert directed the building of 
barricades in the city streets and often risked his life saving and rescuing Chinese 
children. 
A week before Hoover celebrated his fortieth birthday in London, Germany 
declared war on France.  The American Consul General enlisted Hoover’s help in 
securing safe passage home for stranded tourists.  In only six weeks, Hoover’s committee 
facilitated the return of 120,000 Americans to the United States.  Hoover’s calm, tactical 
astuteness and his flair for organization ensured that no Americans were stranded in 
Europe without travel documents, food and/or money.  After the United States entered 
World War I in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson appointed Hoover as the head of the 
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Food Administration.  Hoover was put in charge of feeding war-torn Belgium which had 
been overrun by the German army and faced a starvation crisis.  His great success was 
limiting food consumption in the United States without rationing, and supplying badly 
needed foodstuffs to the Allies in Europe.   
Herbert Hoover became a household name in the United States and was firmly 
established in American politics.  He became an international figure and Wilson privately 
mused that Hoover might become his successor as president.  After the German defeat 
and the Armistice, Hoover became a powerful humanitarian influence on the world scene.  
As a member of the Supreme Economic Council and head of the American Relief 
Administration, Hoover organized food shipments to millions of starving central 
Europeans.  His reach even extended to famine-stricken Soviet Russia in 1921, and when 
criticized for “helping Bolshevism,” Hoover responded, “Twenty million people are 
starving.  Whatever their politics, they shall be fed.”  
Hoover’s administrative experience extended well past the Wilson administration 
and he served as Secretary of Commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge.  Ever 
the efficiency expert and a champion of American opportunities at home and abroad, 
Hoover introduced innovative policies including long-term mortgages that ensured 
outright home ownership.  His swift and decisive efforts to bring aid and comfort to those 
Americans hit by the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 demonstrated his credentials as, “a 
man of the people.”  After Coolidge’s decision not to seek reelection, Hoover was riding 
high and became the Republican presidential nominee in 1928.  Always a man of great 
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hope and resolve, he stated, “We in America today are nearer to the final triumph over 
poverty than ever before in the history of any land.” 
Religion and Prohibition dominated the 1928 presidential campaign.  Hoover’s 
democratic opponent, Alfred E Smith was governor of New York, and the first Roman 
Catholic to be nominated by a major party.  Smith was an active, progressive governor 
and brought about such labor reforms as the 8-hour work day, minimum wage, 
workmen’s compensation, and state labor arbitration.  He also promoted the rights of 
women and immigrants, cleared slums, extended medical services to rural areas, built 
schools, hospitals, prisons, parks, and established a state budget system.  In an effort to 
unite “Wet” and “Dry” (anti-Prohibitionists and Prohibitionists) behind him, the 
Democratic platform promised “an honest effort to enforce” Prohibition while taking no 
real position for or against it. Smith himself long opposed Prohibition.  The platform also 
dropped the party’s traditional call for lower tariffs and favored reduced taxes, creation of 
a federal Farm Board to assist farmers and stock raisers in marketing their products, 
international disarmament agreements, abolishment of executive agreements with foreign 
powers that circumvented the constitutional requirement of Senate ratification, improved 
waterways and flood control projects, exemption of labor from antitrust laws, public 
works projects in times of unemployment, public disclosure of campaign finances and 
federal aid to education. 
Smith defended his Catholicism in a major address in Oklahoma City, but his 
appeal for religious tolerance did little to allay fears that a Catholic president would 
become a tool of the Pope.  Scurrilous pamphlets distributed without Secretary Hoover’s 
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knowledge predicted that as president, Smith would annul Protestant marriages and make 
Catholicism the state religion.  The issue especially hurt Smith in the traditionally 
Democratic South, where Protestant fundamentalism ran deep.  Smith’s long-standing 
opposition to Prohibition also alienated the South and West, while Hoover defended the 
law as “a great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in 
purpose.”  Hoover campaigned on the record of Republican prosperity.  A GOP circular, 
though apparently not Hoover himself, promised “a chicken in every pot and a car in 
every garage.”  Both candidates agreed on the need to provide relief to farmers, develop 
water power, maintain the protective tariff, and conduct a non-interventionist foreign 
policy. 
Smith was colorful and quick-witted, celebrated for his brown derby and cigar.  
Hoover in contrast, was conservative and lackluster.  Smith’s campaign song, “The 
Sidewalks of New York,” heralded the Democrat’s humble origins, although critics noted 
that Smith enjoyed the support of Herbert Lehman and other Wall Street executives far 
removed from Lower East Side.  The Republican slogan, “Let’s Keep What We’ve Got,” 
warned voters not to tamper with economic success.  Noted social worker Jane Addams 
endorsed Hoover for his record against poverty and for (pro) labor.  Labor divided its 
support between the two candidates.  Hoover closed his campaign with a speech in New 
York City on October 22, 1928, in which he declared that the election offered voters a 
critical choice between, “the American system of rugged individualism,” set in place by 
Republicans after World War I, and “doctrines of paternalism and state socialism,” 
popular in Europe and advocated by Democrats. 
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Hoover’s landslide election to the presidency over Smith had all the earmarks of 
great prosperity.  Hoover was a reformer who envisioned a partnership between the 
private and public sectors whereby each entity would support the other and strengthen the 
economy.  To Hoover, all this could be achieved without centralized, federal intervention.  
He had great plans to continue the economic prosperity that Calvin Coolidge had begun 
and hoped to ensure world peace through harmonious foreign relations.  It was a bitter 
irony that when Hoover took the oath of office on March 4, 1929, his credentials as the 
world’s most successful relief administrator would serve him so poorly. Within months 
of Hoover’s victory, the stock market crashed, and the nation spiraled into a deep 
economic depression.  The new President’s humanitarian genius became almost 
unnecessary during a time when speculative investment swept the country,  for the 1922 
through 1929 boom was fed by unprecedented securities speculation. 
Hoover surrounded himself with a very capable and renowned inner circle.  Vice 
President Charles Curtis was one-quarter Kaw Indian and was born on Indian land at 
North Topeka, Kansas and grew up on an Indian reservation.  He was an attorney, a U.S. 
Congressman and Senator.  A conservative and faithful party regular, he advanced to 
Republican whip in 1915 and majority leader in 1924.  He was a candidate for the 
Republican presidential nomination in 1928, but settled for the number-two spot. 
Hoover’s cabinet was considered the cream of the Republican crop.  Secretary of 
State, Henry L. Stimson had served as war secretary in the Taft administration.  He 
headed the American delegation to the London Naval Conference in 1930 and the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932.  In response to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria 
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in 1931, he promulgated the “Stimson Doctrine,” by which the United States refused to 
recognize territorial changes brought about by aggression.  He later served as War 
Secretary in the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  The Secretary of the 
Treasury, Andrew W. Mellon was a holdover from the Harding and Coolidge 
administrations.  He continued his pro-business policy popular during the 1920s boom 
years, but was called into question during the Great Depression.  He underestimated the 
depths of the Depression and was among those who predicted eminent recovery.  
Promoted from Undersecretary of the Treasury, he helped draft the Emergency Banking 
Act of 1933 curbing speculative banking practices, which established a temporary deposit 
insurance program.  Secretary of War, James W. Good was Hoover’s western campaign 
manager, but died in office.  Patrick J. Hurley served out Good’s term.  Hurley was also 
promoted from Undersecretary of War and directed the military confrontation with the 
Bonus Army in 1932.  He dedicated the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in 1932 at 
Arlington National Cemetery. 
Attorney General William D. Mitchell served his full term from 1929 through 
1933.  He had served as Solicitor General in the Coolidge administration.  He reorganized 
the federal prison system and attempted to strongly enforce Prohibition.  Secretary of the 
Navy, Charles Frances Adams was the great grandson of President John Quincy Adams, 
and a delegate to the 1930 London Naval Conference.  Postmaster General Walter F. 
Brown expanded airmail service.  He was derisively dubbed “High Hat Brown” when it 
was revealed that he had ordered a government limousine, custom-made with sufficient 
head room for him to wear a tall silk hat.   
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Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur upgraded health care and education 
among Native American people.  He also promoted conservation and founded the “Save 
the Redwoods League.”  Secretary of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde attempted with little 
success to control agricultural surpluses through the Federal Farm Board.  Secretary of 
Commerce Robert P. Lamont served from 1929 to 1932.  He also dismissed the stock 
market crash of 1929 as a temporary glitch that would do little more than, “curtail the 
buying power, especially of luxuries of those who suffered losses.”  Lamont’s successor, 
Roy D. Chapin served from 1932 to 1933.  He tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
industrialist Henry Ford to leave his money in Michigan banks, which might have helped 
them to stay open.  Toward the end of Hoover’s term, several bank closures in Michigan 
prompted bank runs in other states. 
James J. Davis served as Secretary of Labor from 1921 to 1930.  A holdover from 
the Harding and Coolidge administrations, he encouraged collective bargaining.  William 
N. Doak served as Secretary of Labor from 1930 to 1933.  Doak was long active in the 
“Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen” and pressed for a crackdown on illegal aliens 
competing for American jobs. 
In 1929, the Great Depression hit.  Prices soared, and it was revealed that fortunes 
were pyramided.  However, the pyramid was inverted.  In October 1929, the pyramid 
tumbled and crashed from its own weight. Life savings were wiped out and long-standing 
businesses failed along with their solvent reputations.  Widespread unemployment and 
pathetic breadlines became prevalent nationwide.  The Wall Street stock market crash 
(October-November) was the overt inception of the worldwide Great Depression.  Severe 
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breaks occurred on October 24 when 13 million shares changed hands and on October 29, 
when 16 million shares were traded.  By November 13, 1929 about $30 million in the 
market value of listed stocks had been wiped out and by mid-1932, these losses increased 
to $75 billion.  The U.S. was mired in the depths of a long Depression.  Yet, the 
Depression was not confined to the United States.  It spread all over the world, “like fire 
eating through tinder.” 
 With all his years of experience, particularly the World War I years, in meeting 
emergencies and crises, Hoover fought hard to stem the tide of the Depression.  Hoover’s 
relief policy opposed direct Federal intervention for those unemployed persons suffering 
from genuine distress.  Instead, he advocated a policy of decentralized work relief.  In 
October 1930, he formulated a relief program that called for Federal leadership of a 
national voluntary effort by agencies operating on a self-help basis in state and local 
communities. Hoover’s object was to “preserve the principles of individual and local 
responsibility.”  On December 2, 1930, Hoover requested an appropriation of $100-$150 
million for the construction of public works.  Still un- able to offset the deepening 
Depression, Hoover created national emergency relief organizations.  In spite of these 
efforts, unemployment rose to 10 million in 1932 and Hoover approved the “Relief and 
Construction Act.”  One year before, in the summer of 1931, Hoover announced his 
famous moratorium - a suspension of payment on all war debts for a year.  However, U.S. 
banks were closing and foreign nations were taking their gold out of America.  To offset 
this, he recommended to Congress the creation of the “Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation,” with a capital of $500,000,000 and the authorized power to borrow 
$1,500,000,000 more.  He also created the Farm Board to aid farmers who desperately 
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needed relief.  While these measures did some good and alleviated some suffering, the 
momentum accumulated by the spiraling descent of the world’s markets could not be 
counteracted. 
 President Hoover advocated an economic recovery plan based on the assumption 
that government loans to banks and railroads would check deflation in agriculture and 
industry and ultimately restore the levels of employment and purchasing power.  On 
December 8, 1931, Hoover proposed to Congress the creation of a government lending 
agency with authority to issue tax-exempt bonds and with wide powers to extend credit.  
The Senate (on January 11, 1932) and the House (on January 15, 1932) passed the 
measure establishing his “Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” which was capitalized at 
$500 million and authorized to borrow to the extent of almost $2 billion more to provide 
emergency financing for banking institutions, life insurance companies, building and loan 
societies, railroads, and farm mortgage associations.  The RFC was also empowered to 
extend capital to government-owned corporations.  The measure was signed by President 
Hoover on January 2, 1932, and within six months it had authorized a total of $1.2 billion 
in loans to about 5,000 life insurance companies, agricultural credit corporations, and 
other financial institutions.  However, as the Depression deepened, and unemployment 
rose to over 10,000,000, President Hoover approved the “Relief and Construction Act.”  
This act extended the scope and the functions of the RFC and authorized it to incur a total 
indebtedness of $3 billion.  The RFC was empowered to provide $1.5 billion in loans for 
the construction by state and local agencies of public works of a self-liquidating 
character, and to furnish $300 million in short-term loans to states unable to finance the 
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relief of economic hardship.  The act also broadened the powers of the RFC to assist 
agricultural businesses.  
 On July 22, 1932, President Hoover recommended that Congress pass the 
“Federal Home Loan Bank Act.”  This act established a five-man Home Loan Bank 
Board and created a series of streamlined banking institutions for home mortgages that 
provided services similar to that provided for commercial interests by the Federal 
Reserve.  It established eight to twelve banks set up in different parts of the country with 
a total funding capital of $125 million.  Eligible for membership in the program were 
building and loan associations, savings banks, and insurance companies.  The measure 
was designed to reduce foreclosures, stimulate residential construction (and thus increase 
employment), and encourage home ownership by providing the procedures for long-term 
loans, payable in installments.  
  At President Hoover’s almost exasperated request, the American Red Cross 
appropriated $5,000,000 and began a collection of $10,000,000 more for direct relief, but 
despair and gloom had settled over the country.  Even the “Great Humanitarian” could 
not lift the malaise.  Hoover tried to use government leadership to stimulate recovery 
through voluntary methods.  He urged businesses not to cut payrolls, labor not to ask for 
higher wages, and farmers to practice “crop control.”  He also announced that while 
keeping the budget balanced and currency sound, he would cut taxes and increase 
spending on public works, such as the Hoover Dam, constructed on the Colorado River. 
 When Hoover asked Congress to enact his unprecedented program, the giant 
federal loan agency (the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) to aid businesses, help for 
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farmers facing mortgage foreclosures, banking reform, state loans in order to feed the 
unemployed, further expansion of public works, and a drastically increased governmental 
economy, he knew that the program had a difficult course ahead.  With a hostile 
Congress dominated by Democrats and progressive Republicans, the legislative branch 
only slowly passed part of the measures and Hoover, never one for political maneuvering, 
would not budge or waiver from his principles, 
“I was convinced that efficient, honest administration of the vast machine of the 
Federal government would appeal to all citizens.  I have since learned that 
efficient government does not interest the people so much as the dramatics.” 
While proposing his positive program to fight the Depression, Hoover reiterated that 
caring for the homeless and hungry must be primarily a local and voluntary 
responsibility. 
“If we start appropriations of this character, we have not only impaired something 
infinitely valuable in the life of the American people, but have struck at the roots 
of self-government.” 
Hoover’s opponents in Congress roundly criticized him and made him the 
scapegoat for the Great Depression.  His position led his critics to conclude that he chose 
to distance himself at his country’s time of need. 
The Crash caused businesses to close down and as unemployment soared, 
thousands of borrowers defaulted on their loans.  Americans lost their homes and shanty 
towns (ironically named, “Hoovervilles”) appeared throughout the nation as the homeless 
desperately searched for low-budget housing.  Hoover attempted to enact financial 
measures that would help the hardest hit.  However, he always maintained that the 
disenfranchised in a community were not the federal government’s responsibility, but the 
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responsibility of local government.  President Hoover announced that while he keeping 
the federal budget balanced, he would cut taxes and expand spending for public works.  
The causes of the Great Depression included: (1) A chronic surplus in agricultural 
products had been depressing farm prices. (2) Lack of credit restraints, especially in the 
securities industry, where stocks could be purchased on a 25 percent margin and spurred 
a ferocious round of speculation. (3) High tariffs discouraged world trade. (4) 
Acceleration of corporate profits at the expense of higher wages stunted purchasing 
power. 
By the spring of 1930, 4 million people were unemployed; the figure more than 
tripled by 1933, the worst year of the Depression.  The national unemployment rate 
peaked at 25 percent in 1933.  Some 25 percent of all banks in the United States failed 
during 1929 through 1932.  Farmers were among the hardest hit as crop prices (already 
depressed), fell another 30 percent during 1930-1931.  Compounding the problem were 
dust storms in the Midwest and Southwest that blew away the top soil of entire farms, 
forcing thousands to abandon their barren fields in an aimless exodus, portrayed in John 
Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath.   
Hoover and his advisors failed to grasp the enormity of the Depression.  In March 
of 1930, Hoover declared, “All the evidences indicate that the worst effects of the crash 
upon unemployment will have passed in the next 60 days.”  Two months later, Hoover 
expressed confidence that, “the worst was over.”  Hoover limited government assistance 
to business, believing that such aid would eventually “trickle down” to the people.  He 
refused to engage in massive programs of direct federal aid to the unemployed.  Instead, 
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he established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which by the time Hoover left 
office had loaned nearly $2 billion to ailing banks, insurance companies, and other 
financial institutions as well as to businesses and state governments.  As the crisis 
deepened, Hoover became the symbol of the Depression.  At public appearances the man 
once hailed as the Great Humanitarian for his war-efforts drew rude jeers.  The homeless 
huddled in makeshift dwellings of cardboard and scrap metal and called their shanties, 
“Hoovervilles.”  Newspapers came to be called “Hoover blankets.”  Empty pockets 
turned inside out were dubbed, “Hoover flags” and jackrabbits slaughtered for food were, 
“Hoover hogs.”126 
Within the narrative of vast unemployment during the Great Depression, there is a 
widespread but unfounded myth that President Hoover ordered the deportation or 
repatriation of large numbers of Hispanics, primarily Mexicans, during his 
administration.  The popular misconception is that he “ordered” the deportation and /or 
“repatriation” of tens of thousands of foreign workers.  “Deportation” is the legal process 
for formally expelling a non-citizen of the United States; “repatriation” is a term that 
refers to various methods for persuading or forcing individuals to leave the country 
outside of the legal process.  Hoover allowed his Secretary of Labor, William Doak, to 
initiate “repatriation drives,” there is no evidence that Hoover formally took such an 
initiative.  Matthew T. Schaefer, an archivist at the Hoover Presidential Library in West 
Branch, Iowa recently stated that, “President Hoover never issued a statement, executive 
order or proclamation ordering the deportation of illegal immigrants.”  
                                               
126 William A. Degregorio,  The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents, (New York:  Barricade Books, Inc., 
1993), p.473. 
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A viral email circulated last year (2017) and since debunked by the organization, 
factcheck.org claimed that as President, Hoover ordered the mass deportation of all 
illegal aliens and other immigrants as a means to make jobs available for Americans 
during the Depression.  This is simply not true.  During Hoover’s presidency, 
immigration quotas already existed as provided by the Immigration Act of 1924.  Those 
quotas did not apply to Mexico or any other country in the Western Hemisphere.  This 
was due to the fact that many U.S. business interests (especially in agriculture) needed 
“near-by” Mexican workers to complete seasonal labor demands.  The Hoover 
administration did support the deportation of criminal illegal migrants.  Statistical 
information kept by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (part of the Department 
of Labor at that time), revealed that the total number of deportations was around 72,000 
during President Hoover’s four years as President.  An additional 49,000 immigrants left 
“voluntarily” rather than try their luck at a deportation hearing.  Therefore, according to 
this “official record,” approximately 121, 000 people were deported or induced to leave 
during Hoover’s term. 
The years of the Great Depression saw an exodus of many people of Mexican 
heritage.  Some of these people were U.S. citizens.  Perhaps as many as 400,000 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans left the U.S. during the Depression because of 
dwindling job prospects and their fear of federal immigration officials.  Sometimes these 
officials used questionable tactics to encourage out-migration.  A report to the 1931 
Wickersham Commission described immigration officials who detained those whom they 
thought were “aliens,” whether lawful or illegal, without any arrest warrant or court 
sanctioned search documentation.  Importantly, it was the Hoover administration that 
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appointed the Wickersham Commission and brought many abuses to the light of day.  
Many of these questionable and objectionable actions were carried out by state and local 
officials, labor unions, and even private employers.  However, according to historian 
Marian Smith, “There is no evidence that Herbert Hoover ordered the deportation of 
illegal aliens.”                     
In the late 1920s, about 60,000 people entered the U.S. annually from “non-
quota” countries, primarily Mexico and many of them stayed for years (The 1924 
Immigration Act established strict quotas for immigration from Europe, Asia and Africa, 
but did not limit immigration from North or South America).  As long as migrants had a 
visa and a job, they could stay as long as they wished.  Any migrant without a valid visa 
could be deported at any time, and any migrant, temporary or permanent, could be 
deported if they became a public charge.  Local law enforcement agencies were the 
primary means for apprehending illegal immigrants, and the burden of proof was on the 
migrant to show a valid visa and employment confirmation.  The Labor Department’s 
Bureau of Immigration was responsible for issuing official deportation warrants, and in 
most cases paid for the deportee’s transportation out of the country. 
There was an important loop hole, if migrants left the country voluntary, there 
were no repercussions and they could return in the future, but if they were officially 
deported and returned to the U.S., they would be denied a visa and could be charged with 
a felony for attempting illegal entry.  As a result, law enforcement at all levels 
encouraged or even forced non-citizens (and even citizens of foreign heritage) to 
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“repatriate” to their country of origin rather than “take a chance” with a deportation 
hearing. 
As unemployment climbed during the Great Depression, most U.S. citizens 
believed that jobs and charity should be reserved for “native-born” Americans, and that 
“non-citizens” should return to their home countries.  State and local law enforcement, 
with the encouragement of the Bureau of Immigration, stepped up their efforts to 
apprehend criminals and public charges for deportation, which resulted in modest, tough 
well-publicized increases in official deportations.  Official deportations to all countries 
were 16,631 in 1930, 18,142 in 1931, and 19,426 in 1932. 
President Hoover’s only official action was to eliminate inward migration by 
reducing the number of visas to almost zero, on the grounds that most applicants would 
likely find no work and become public charges.  As the Depression worsened, private 
businesses and industry often took matters into their own hands.  In Detroit, auto makers 
fired many of their Hispanic workers, including legal migrants and even American 
citizens of Hispanic descent.  Without jobs, many chose to leave the country rather than 
“roll the dice” a deportation hearing.  In other parts of the country, state and local 
officials began considering large-scale “voluntary repatriation” projects to reduce the 
financial burden on local welfare and charity organizations. 
The specifics varied, but the results were the same: illegal immigrants and even 
legal migrants left the country “voluntarily” and in large numbers.  In some cases, they 
left after being threatened or detained by local law enforcement or Bureau of Immigration 
officials.  Others were alarmed by anti-immigrant rhetoric or hostile community attitudes.  
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Sometimes, local or state governments, or even private charities, would pay the 
transportation costs for the repatriates to leave the country.  The largest such repatriation 
project took place in Los Angeles, organized by the City of Los Angeles with the 
cooperation of the Department of Labor and Los Angeles County officials.  In 1930 and 
1931, tens of thousands of Mexicans were rounded up and put on trains, often with their 
American-born children and shipped to and across the border.  Los Angeles County 
estimated that the cost to send one train-load of 6,000 Mexicans back to Mexico was 
about $77,000, but if they stayed, unemployment relief would have cost the County about 
$425,000 per year. 
Some of the out of work repatriates actually welcomed the opportunity to return 
to their home country.  Others were unaware of their rights or lacked the means to defend 
themselves at a deportation hearing.  By and large, the Mexican government was eager to 
bring workers back to Mexico, paid for their transportation from the border to the 
interior, and supported charitable organizations that helped repatriates find jobs in 
Mexico. 
Hoover’s Secretary of Labor, William Doak, was much more enthusiastic than the 
President about repatriation and used every means at his disposal to encourage 
repatriation projects like the one in Los Angeles.  Some historians have suggested that the 
Immigration Bureaus’ activities were unscrupulous, unfair or even illegal, but at the time 
they were very popular with most Americans, and no serious legal challenges were 
raised.  While true that the President could have told Doak to back off, but it would have 
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ignited a political firestorm.  Hoover’s critics and even his supporters would surely have 
accused him of taking jobs and unemployment relief away from “real American citizens.” 
In total, perhaps ten times as many people may have left the country “voluntarily” 
during the Hoover administration than were officially deported, but because the 
departures were “voluntary,” an accurate estimate is impossible to determine.  President 
Hoover believed that the Federal government’s role should be limited to prosecuting 
official deportations and enforcing the laws limiting legal immigration.  In his address 
accepting the Republican Presidential renomination in 1932, he stated, “I favor rigidly 
restricted immigration.  I have by executive direction, in order to relieve us of added 
unemployment, already reduced the inward movement to less than the outward 
movement.  I shall adhere to that policy.”127 
For Mexicans, the late 1920s and the early 1930s became especially difficult 
times.  Nativist sentiments emerged in the press, in Congress, and in cities and towns all 
over the United States.  Massive unemployment brought out the worst fears and 
privations in the American populace, and much resentment was directed toward Mexican 
immigrants and Mexican Americans.  Francisco Balderrama noted the difficulties, 
Like other ethnic minorities serving as laborers for industry and agriculture, 
Mexican nationals and American citizens of Mexican descent were especially 
hard hit.  They faced not only unemployment, but also legal obstacles and 
prejudice which further restricted their opportunity to work.  Mexican nationals 
were categorically denied assistance because of a ‘citizens only’ policy, while 
                                               
127 https://hoover.blogs.archives.gov/2016/0804/Hoover-on-immigration/  Accessed October 3, 2017 
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Mexican Americans were also frequently refused help by public officials who did 
not recognize their citizenship.128 
Mexican workers became the first to be laid off from their jobs, and especially 
during the first years of the Depression, thousands became unemployed.  Any 
advancement of their collective “standard of living” while employed in the United States 
was eradicated and a thing of the past.  Professor Abraham Hoffman wrote, 
In an age where neither the United States nor Mexico provided any meaningful 
supervision for laborers recruited by large companies, the Mexican worker might 
find himself stranded in a town whose mines had closed or laid-off during a slack 
period in railroad maintenance or harvesting.  When this occurred, Anglo 
Americans were quick to complain about the presence of Mexicans on local relief 
roles.129 
Many U.S. relief agencies disparaged unemployed Mexicans as unnecessary and 
burdensome.  Often Mexican workers were denied access to these relief agencies and not 
given relief money for food purchases.  In many parts of the Midwest and Southwest, 
these stranded Mexican immigrants found themselves hundreds of miles from the Mexico 
border.  By the early 1930s, Congressional leaders intent on immigration restrictions 
failed to secure additional immigration quotas as amendments to the Immigration Act of 
1924.  However, they did achieve partial victories as the U.S. State Department began to 
enforce the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917.  This process was achieved 
through cooperative consular officers in Mexico who began limiting the number of visas 
granted to Mexicans.  President Hoover was amenable to these measures as a convenient 
way to appease restrictionist Congressmen without initiating a quota on Mexico which 
would be perceived as an affront to the Mexican government.  In addition, the 
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Immigration Act of 1929 made illegal entry into the U. S. a misdemeanor, punishable by 
a $1,000 dollar fine or a year in prison.  The Immigration Act 1929 gave the U.S. 
government the ability to carry out “federal deportation campaigns” which were at first 
directed against all foreigners who were in the U.S. illegally. 
As the federal deportations intensified, repatriation programs were initiated by 
private and public agencies in efforts to send Mexicans, “back to Mexico.”  The objective 
of reducing unemployment for “native-born” Americans soon led to events that became 
unrelated to that goal.  Questionable tactics by immigration officials and relief workers 
(to convince Mexicans to return to Mexico) included the dissemination of false legal 
information and contradictory administrative policies that sparked controversy in some 
U.S. newspapers and angered government officials in Mexico.  
Hoover’s Secretary of Labor, William N. Doak made headlines when he 
announced in January of 1931 that “400,000 Aliens (are) in U.S. Illegally”- Only 25 Per 
Cent Can Be Deported, He Informs Senate, and Six Years Would Be Needed to Do So.”  
The Washington Post’s reporter Edward T. Folliard wrote of Doak’s ambitious plans and 
concerns, 
There are about 400,000 aliens unlawfully abiding in the United States, Secretary 
of Labor W. N. Doak has notified the Senate.  He submitted the estimate in 
response to a request contained in a Senate resolution adopted early in December. 
The resolution, introduced by Senator Hayden (Democrat), of Arizona, was in the 
interest of America’s unemployed, the thought behind it being that if aliens could 
be deported faster, there would be more jobs for Americans. 
Regarded from an employment standpoint, Secretary Doak’s report to the Senate 
is not very encouraging.  He estimates that only about 25 per cent or 100,000 of 
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the aliens are deportable, the remainder, for one reason or another, being beyond 
the deportation provisions of the immigration laws. 
And while Secretary Doak doesn’t say so, it stands to reason that a good 
percentage of the 100,000 are themselves out of work, or else earning a living 
through crime. 
Moreover, it would take nearly six years to get rid of the 100,000 aliens at the rate 
deportations are now being carried out, the number last year having been 16,631.  
This number, Secretary Doak tells the Senate, represents a maximum of the 
results which can be accomplished with the present appropriation and 
immigration force. 
With an increase in the appropriation and the force Secretary Doak’s said, the 
number of deportations might be boosted 25 per cent, or to a total of 
approximately 20,000 the first year. 
In his report, Secretary Doak points out that prior to 1921, when the first quota 
limit law went into effect, there were few incentives for aliens to come in without 
permission.  Up until then all aliens, with the exception of certain Oriental 
peoples, could gain entry if they were able to meet the physical, mental, moral, 
and economic tests.  Consequently, those who did come in unlawfully were 
Orientals and the diseased, the illiterate and the criminals. 
The quota law of 1921, with its limitation on the number of aliens that could come 
from each country, provided the incentive that lead thousands to come in illegally.  
The quota law of 1924 was even more drastic than that of 1921. 
Since 1924, Secretary Doak said, the number of immigration officers along the 
borders and at the seaports has been increased, with a reduction in the number of 
aliens who have gained illegal entry. 
The number of aliens who come through Mexico and Canada has been materially 
reduced, he said, as has the number who desert ships at American seaports.  The 
number of these ships’ deserters, he said, is slightly less than 11,000 a year. 
The number of aliens who come in as visitors and then stay here unlawfully was 
estimated by Secretary Doak as from 5 to 7 per cent. 
Responding to the Senate’s invitation that he recommend changes in the 
immigration laws that would facilitate deportations, Secretary Doak suggested 
that field officers be allowed to sign warrants for the arrest of aliens.  At present, 
he alone may sign such warrants, and the result is that many aliens who have been 
located by the field officers manage to escape pending the arrival of a warrant. 
He also made these recommendations: 
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That the law with respect to burden of proof be clarified so as to permit the 
deportation of certain classes of undesirables, anarchists and the like, who now 
are safe just so long as they can show that they came in lawfully. 
That the law be amended so that alien criminals may be deported for crimes other 
than those involving moral turpitude, which now is the sole ground for 
deportation. 
That the department be authorized to prosecute deportation cases in the judicial 
district in which the alien is located, rather than being forced to remove him to the 
district in which he gained entry. 
That the law covering the harboring of aliens be made more drastic so as to reach 
those persons, though having had no part in bringing the alien in, yet have 
knowledge of the aliens unlawful act and help to conceal him. 
With regard to deporting aliens connected with organizations advocating the 
overthrow of the United States Government, Secretary Doak pointed out that the 
Fish committee now has this problem under consideration.130 
Secretary Doak’s charisma on this issue was remarkable and even ridiculed by 
Washington D.C. elites who referred to his zealous behavior as a “gladiatorial spectacle.”  
His infectious, sensationalism supercharged his agents and they raided public places, 
communities, and homes from Los Angeles to New York City.  Some media outlets 
began to criticize Doak’s policies.131   
 Charles P. Visel, the Chief of the Los Angeles Committee for the Coordination of 
Unemployment Relief agreed with Doak’s high-profile tactics.  Visel suggested that 
Doak begin his immigration raids in the Mexican and Mexican American “barrios” of 
Los Angeles and southern California.  Visel’s objectives were more focused on the 
removal of illegal Mexican immigrants (along with Mexican Americans) and their 
expulsion to Mexico. Visel’s modus operandi was to use scare tactics to get his desired 
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results, an effective way to ease the unemployment crisis in the region.  Through press 
releases in Los Angeles newspapers, Visel targeted the illegal immigrant population and 
informed them that deportation campaigns would begin on January 26, 1931.  The print 
media savored Visel’s rhetoric and the announcements created substantial anxiety within 
the Los Angeles Mexican and Mexican American community. 
 Francisco Balderrama noted the culture of fear within the Hispanic community,  
The relationship between the Los Angeles “colonia” and the Anglo American 
community became explosive with the …deportation and repatriation drives.  
Many southern Californian Mexicans and Mexican Americans had already 
returned to Mexico and others were planning to leave in an effort to secure 
employment.  In 1931, the federal deportation campaign and the Los Angeles 
County repatriation program, the former aimed at illegal residents and the latter at 
relief recipients, unleashed a mass exodus to Mexico.132 
 La Opinión, the most influential Spanish language newspaper in the Los Angeles 
region, editorialized that the deportation campaigns were specifically aimed at those of 
Mexican descent and ignored illegal aliens of other nationalities in the region.133  The 
situation reached an apex point midafternoon on February 26, 1931, when three dozen 
Los Angeles policemen, reenforced by federal immigration agents, encircled a downtown 
plaza in Los Angeles.  The authorities detained 400 people at the scene.  Five Chinese, 
one Japanese, and eleven Mexicans were placed in custody.  The next day, nine of the 
Mexicans were released.  La Opinión further reported that Mexican immigrant 
associations spoke out against the raids and provided legal advice. 
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 The Mexican Consular official in Los Angeles, Rafael de la Colina lodged his 
ardent protest.  However, de la Colinas’ excoriation of the federal and county strategy 
was unsuccessful in curtailing the exodus from California to Mexico.  Colina however, 
narrowly interpreted his diplomatic duties.  He kept his superiors informed and solicitated 
pledges of fair treatment from U.S. officials.  Colina was also handicapped by his Mexico 
City superiors.  Perhaps a protest from the Secretary of Foreign Relations might have 
stopped the massive raids.134 
The deportation campaigns in Southern California accomplished voluntary 
repatriation to Mexico amongst Mexicans and Mexican Americans.  The Comité 
Mexicano de Beneficencia (a Los Angeles relief organization), helped finance the return 
trip of many to Mexico.  The Mexican government also help repatriate those who 
expressed a voluntary desire to return.135 
Mexico officially stated that the government would help the repatriates once they 
arrived back in Mexico.  Indeed these announcements convinced many to return.136  
Many Mexican officials endorsed the repatriation policy that began under the 
administration of Álvaro Obregón.137  Meanwhile, the assistant chief of the Border Patrol 
in McAllen, Texas, John Peavey, had achieved great success in capturing thousands of 
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undocumented Mexicans in the lower Rio Grande Valley.138  In his study of repatriation 
from Texas, R. Reynolds McKay noted that repatriation had increased during, 
the latter part of 1931 and coincided with the aftermath of the federal deportation 
campaign so highly publicized in Los Angeles and elsewhere, and the beginnings 
of the organized repatriation programs in that county and across the nation.  The 
Los Angeles campaign, however, was actually an extension of an intensive, well-
organized, and effective campaign that had been in operation in Texas since the 
summer of 1928.139 
  The effort to drive out undocumented agricultural workers had begun in the lower 
Rio Grande Valley, and soon expanded to San Antonio and Houston.  In Houston, 
deportations were not as prevalent as in Los Angeles and the Mexican immigrants there 
did not experience the initial grip of the Great Depression.  This was due to Houston’s 
booming oil industry, which provided availability of greater job opportunities.  Houston’s 
proximity to the Gulf of Mexico and the construction of oil refineries in the 1920s and 
1930s somewhat shielded Houston from the initial downturns in the U.S. economy.  
Slowly however, the Great Depression worked its way to the Houston area and 
unemployment numbers began to rise.  As in other regions throughout the United States, 
attention became razor-focused on the Mexican and Mexican American population and 
the competition for jobs.140  Similar nativist feelings that took place in Los Angeles began 
to manifest in the Houston area and immigrants families were barred from benefits from 
public relief assistance and relief agencies. 
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 In the Texas State legislature, relief funding was all but depleted since the 
requisite appropriations bills had failed.  The legislature also failed to pass a state 
constitutional amendment which would have issued bonds in order to fund relief agencies 
in the state.  The Houston Chronicle reported on May 8, 1933, that the state coffers could 
only provide a few more days of financial support.  Basic necessities for the increased 
number of unemployed persons cast a shadow over Houston and the situation darkened 
for the Mexican immigrant population as they were the first to be denied.141   
 During the tough times of the Hoover Administration, destitute Mexican families 
could usually rely on mutual aid societies and Catholic and Protestant religious 
organizations for food assistance and shelter.  Many preferred these organizations over 
public entities because they thought government sponsored aid organizations would 
expose their whereabouts and make them more susceptible to the repatriation process.  
 Conditions in San Antonio were about equal to those events that transpired in 
Houston.  Deportations, repatriations, mass unemployment, nativism, and disqualification 
from assistance programs impacted the San Antonio “colonia” as well.  The Great 
Depression affected millions in the United States, however, many Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans felt the humiliation of being systematically singled out, denied public aid, and 
deported to Mexico. 
 Karnes City, Texas, located in Karnes County was an area where many Mexican 
workers and their families gathered prior to deportations or voluntary repatriation to 
Mexico.  In that area of Texas, and with the assistance of the Mexican Consul of San 
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Antonio, hundreds of families were organized into caravans, composed of automobiles 
and trucks for the exodus back to Mexico.  On October 18, 1931, the first such caravan 
left for Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. 
 By the summer of 1931, the economy in South Texas was in the full grip of the 
Depression.  Hundreds of Mexican Americans and Mexicans lost their agriculture jobs.  
Thousands more were evicted from their lands as tenant farmers.  Whether they were 
born in Mexico or the United States, many of these Hispanics were caught in the 
economic crash.  If they were lucky enough to find other farm work, the wages were 
lower than ever, and almost impossible to live on.  These exigent circumstances were 
heightened by the fact that many of the aforementioned relief agencies (even religious 
relief associations) had no offices or distribution centers in rural areas.  Also, the U.S. 
Immigration Services undertook large scale operations to find undocumented Mexicans 
throughout the South Texas region.142  Given these circumstances, many Mexican 
families hoped conditions would improve once they arrived in Mexico. 
 Fundraising became an effective way to help ease the burden of financing return 
trips to Mexico.  With most of the proceeds going toward the effort, movie theaters 
presented films and variety shows to assist in the repatriation process.  The Mexican 
Consul in Harlingen, Texas arranged with local movie houses to fundraise for penniless 
repatriates.  Most theater owners only kept “twenty-five percent of the door” to offset 
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their expenses.  Such fundraising efforts were made in other South Texas communities 
and greatly helped those stranded families that awaited repatriation to Mexico.143 
 The crisis of the Depression hit the Texas coal mining industry as well.  In Wise 
County (north Texas), the Bridgeport Coal Mines employed hundreds of Mexicans.  
Dependent on Mexican laborers, most mining operations in Texas came to an almost 
complete shutdown in the early 1930s.  Mexican miners and their families faced almost 
complete financial ruin due to increased unemployment.144   
After January 1931, the mines were operated intermittently; however, most 
Mexican miners remained with Bridgeport, where they averaged two days work 
each week during 1931.  By the end of July many of the miners and their families 
were experiencing financial difficulties.  In an effort to alleviate the situation, the 
Mexican Consul from Dallas, Juan E. Anchondo, met with the miners to discuss 
the possibility of their returning to Mexico.145  
In December of 1931, the coal miners and their families began leaving Bridgeport 
in cars, trucks and on trains.  Unlike their repatriate counterparts in Karnes City, these 
people departed southward in smaller groups and not in caravans.  Most of the Mexican 
miners left Bridgeport for Mexico by January, 1932. 
The same unfortunate scenario played out in several Southwestern mining 
communities in the Southwest.  Once prosperous copper and silver mining districts in 
Colorado, New Mexico and Colorado became ghost-towns as these production centers 
came to a standstill.  Only a fortunate few kept their jobs in Globe and Miami, Arizona 
while the rest voluntarily repatriated to Mexico.  The case of the Miami, Arizona mining 
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district of Inspiration Copper Company worked with the Mexican Consul and the 
Comisión Honorífica Mexicana to cover gasoline and oil costs for out of work, stranded 
laborers.146 These events played out in the mining districts of Silver City, New Mexico 
and Silverton, Colorado as well.  Of course, the demand for copper, coal, and silver had 
declined to record lows. 
 The economic crisis affected urban centers as well.  In Tucson Arizona, many 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans traveled to California in search of better opportunities.  
Like many others in the Southwest, the choice became waiting out the Depression or 
repatriation to Mexico.  In Phoenix, Arizona, and in the surrounding Salt River Valley, 
thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans sent back to Mexico as a part of federal 
deportation efforts between 1930 and 1932.  Many in this group opted for voluntary 
repatriation back to Mexico.147  Interestingly, Mexican nationals from Baja California 
joined repatriates from California and Arizona and did so by entering the United States.  
This was the only way to get to Mexico’s interior by train, since there was no railroad 
connecting Baja to the rest of Mexico.  This was an arduous task to accomplish in 1931 
and 1932, but the U.S Bureau of Immigration supervised this immigrant flow through 
Nogales and El Paso. 
 California sent the largest number of repatriates back to Mexico. The 
Southwestern states accounted for the second largest number, but the Midwestern states 
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were the most successful in the removal of Mexican families from the relief rolls.148  The 
well-worn rationale that Mexican and Mexican American workers were a burden to relief 
assistance and were to blame for mass unemployment had played well in the Southwest 
and in Southern California.  But in the Midwest, the nativist alarm rang strong and was 
added to the mix to auger fear and push for Mexican repatriation.149  In East Chicago, 
Illinois and Gary, Indiana, the executives at Inland Steel and U.S. Steel supported the 
repatriation process.  In 1932, Horace A. Norton, the superintendent of U.S. Steel’s Gary 
plant and the President of the Gary Chamber of Commerce remarked that, 
The kindest thing which could be done for these people would be to send them 
back to Mexico.  They do not assimilate and are unhappy here.  They want to go 
back and Mexico welcomes them.  I personally know that no Lake County 
industrial concern made any effort to get them to come here.  The majority just 
drifted in.150 
Superintendent Norton denied that U.S. Steel had recruited Mexicans to the Gary plant 
through labor contractors sent to Mexico. 
 Chicago railroad executives laid off thousands of Mexican employees.  
Consequently, the Mexican Consulate in Chicago struggled to arrange for train tickets, 
food, and gas money for those impoverished Mexican immigrants and Mexican 
Americans hoping for passage to Mexico.  La Cruz Azul Mexicana, the Mexican 
counterpart of the American Red Cross, provided some assistance but it was woefully 
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inadequate.  Due to the harsh winter climate, the problems of transportation and basic 
provisions for the repatriates were intensified.151 
 In Detroit Michigan, similar attitudes from corporate, local, and civic leaders did 
not bode well for Mexicans and Mexican Americans.  A Michigan social worker 
described the condition of these people in 1930, 
 
On October 10, 1931, Mexicans left.  It was the Detroit Department of Public 
Welfare, in cooperation with the Mexican government that made their return 
possible.  The Welfare Department paid their fares to the Mexican border, and the 
Mexican government undertook to do the rest.152 
 
 Thousands of Detroit’s Mexican residents returned “back to Mexico” as they were 
fired from their jobs in the steel and automotive industries.  As in East Chicago, Gary, 
and in Chicago proper, Detroit executives endorsed Mexican repatriation.  They had 
forgotten the contributions these workers made during World War I, when they filled jobs 
in the auto industry created by the military’s call to service.  Also, Mexican labor was 
paid substandard wages and they were often used as strikebreakers. 
 For the thousands of repatriates, a new start in Mexico, and even the vaguest 
promises of land granted from the Mexican government signaled a second, and perhaps a 
third chance for prosperity.  The return trip, though difficult, was not the biggest obstacle.  
It was the uncertainty of their future, once they arrived in Mexico.  The American writer, 
Robert N. McLean summed up their situation with melancholy, 
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He goes because of the economic depression.  For months he has listened to the 
patter of people who brought him, assuring him that there would soon be work for 
everyone.  As he has hungered and waited, he has seen municipality after 
municipality pass ordinances restricting work on public improvements to citizens.  
He has always known that if he became a citizen, he would still be a Mexican in 
the eyes of everyone except his own consul, whose help and protection he would 
immediately lose.  He has seen social pressure brought to bear upon corporations 
to fire Mexicans and hire Americans.  Once (he) was needed, and had a welcome; 
now he gets the cold shoulder everywhere.  His heart is sick, and he wants to go 
home. (H)e is going home drawn by the land hunger in his heart.153 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE REPATRIATE EXODUS TO MEXICO 
The most efficient method of repatriating Mexicans was via American railways.  
Secretary of Labor William Doak, a long-time member of the Brotherhood of Railway 
Men and used his influence with U.S. railroad companies to initiate large repatriation 
drives using commercial passenger trains.  This was especially important from distant 
embarkation points in the Midwest.  Doak’s connections with railroad executives 
facilitated his campaign to send Mexicans back to Mexico in significant numbers.  In 
fact, trains were used throughout the United States to transport individuals and families to 
the southern border and sometimes into the Mexican nation itself.  The process was a 
sensational one and many newspapers throughout the United States covered the boarding 
and tearful sendoffs of Mexican American families and Mexican immigrant families who 
for one reason or another, were compelled to make the return trip.  Editors, reporters and 
other journalists found many examples of painful goodbyes that “tugged at the 
heartstrings” for some, but for others, the reports of Mexican departures were welcomed 
and enthusiastically supported.  A social worker who was concerned about the fate of the 
repatriates wrote, 
By chartering special trains, Mexicans were transported to the border at an 
average cost of fifteen dollars a person.  This low price, which includes food, was 
made by cooperation with railroads.  By the end of 1932, 1,500 Mexicans had 
been sent from Michigan, and lesser numbers went back from other nearby states.  
Most of these removals were made as voluntary repatriations.  In the winter of 
1933 it was estimated that $75,000 to $100,000 would have been expended in the 
removal of several thousand Mexicans under the repatriation plan.154  Throughout 
the Midwest, Mexicans left in huge numbers.  Nearly 50,000 repatriates were on 
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the move in 1933 from Mexican population centers in Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, 
Michigan; East Chicago, Indiana and Gary, Indiana.  The advantages to travelling 
by train were many.  Fewer incidences mechanical failure and breakdowns 
compared to automobiles and trucks, and of course, the journey to the border 
could be accomplished in a matter of days not weeks.  The streamlined railroad 
process cut gasoline, oil and food costs for those who opted to return and for those 
who had no transportation, the train trek eased fears and apprehension about what 
could have been an arduous journey. 
 The Mexican consul in Chicago, Illinois, Rafaél Aveleyra, worked with the Union 
de Sociedades de Caridad (a local association of charity groups) and was able to procure 
train tickets for those wishing to return.  Letters of “free passage” were generated from 
Aveleyra’s consular office so that the repatriates could negotiate connecting train travel 
within Mexico.  Through consular efforts, the Delegado de Migración de Mexico (The 
Migration Delegation of Mexico) helped secure these rail connections to pueblos and 
villages which reunited repatriates with family, friends and potential employers.  
Hundreds if not thousands of repatriate travelers took full advantage of these consular 
efforts, and as a result, the huge human convergence at cities such as El Paso and Nogales 
reached almost insurmountable proportions.  The Mexican government and the Mexican 
railroad companies were not prepared to handle the thousands of repatriates now waiting 
at the border.  Consequently, the consular offices of Rafaél Aveleyra were instructed by 
the Mexican government not to distribute anymore free passage letters. 
 There was also confusion and long waiting lines in the Chicago and Chicagoland 
area as hundreds waited for the train passes and/or letters of passage from Aveleyra’s 
office.  Even when he was prohibited from distributing more passes and letters, the 
hopeful travelers were encamped at and around the Mexican Consulate offices.  For 
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some, this long wait was the start of a “hardship journey” and as they waited their 
collective situation only became worse. 
 The International Institute in Gary, Indiana was also able to obtain free passage 
for Mexicans who repatriated themselves voluntary.155  In the summer of 1931, The 
International Institute claimed that hundreds of repatriates had already left Gary, Indiana 
in trucks, cars, and some even on foot, 
…a goodly proportion of those remaining in Gary would return to Mexico if it 
were financially possible…many who have no savings and have no work or 
prospects of any, are very anxious to leave before another winter sets in.156 
 The Institute further noted that because there were so many people traveling, the 
trucks were “standing room only.”  The organization mentioned that because of the 
overcrowding in one of the many trucks, a traveler was squeezed out, fell to his death.  
This fatal accident occurred before the vehicle made it to the border.  After that, the 
Institute focused on obtaining free train transportation from the Council of Social 
Agencies in Gary, Indiana.157 
 In Gary Indiana, a community-wide repatriation program was founded by several 
organizations that included businessmen, who wanted lower tax rates, city and town 
officials who hoped to lower the costs of relief, nativists who wanted to rid the region of 
Mexicans, and the membership of the International Institute who along with their 
Mexican and Mexican American client base, envisioned new economic opportunities in 
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Mexico.  However, by the end of 1932, private funding sources for the repatriation effort 
were effectively depleted.  In spite of this funding shortfall, business leaders, civic 
organizations, working class professionals, and rich citizens of Gary, Indiana came up 
with a plan to continue the repatriation process, 
In May, 1932, Calumet township trustee Mary Grace Wells (whose office had 
responsibility for public assistance), announced a plan to transport all of Gary’s 
remaining unemployed Mexicans back to Mexico.  Based on similar practices 
elsewhere, the Wells plan urged local business to provide her near-bankrupt office 
with repatriation funds.  In turn, the business interests would be reimbursed with 
“scrip” which they could use to pay local taxes with.  Businesses would lose 
nothing, and as Wells pointed out, ‘it will mean a great savings to the 
township.’158 
Due to the success of the Wells Plan, the International Institute was able to distribute 
more letters of free passage to repatriates.  So many that Consul Aveleyra begged Mary 
Wells to curtail her repatriation funding activities until the bottleneck-crisis at the border 
could be alleviated.159 
 Indeed, the disorder at the border created a deteriorating and deepening situation 
in Ciudad Juárez and other urban centers. Ciudad Juárez became the largest and most 
active repatriation depot and The New York Times reported in 1931 that, “twenty-six 
Mexicans died in Ciudad Juárez from pneumonia and exposure and many tragic accounts 
have reached here regarding the condition of the repatriate groups.”  Stories of repatriate 
abuse and apathy began to circulate.  Temporary housing for male and female repatriates 
was often nothing more than livestock corrals without roofing.  When the rains came, 
often thousands of people were herded into warehouses and/or custom houses.  The 
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Survey, a left-leaning social justice and welfare magazine, described women who were 
warehoused and felt lucky to have shelter and were able to gather individual beans off the 
floor that had fallen from stored sacks.160  
 The sheer numbers of repatriates milling about at border depots prompted 
Mexican consular officials like Rafaél Alveleyra to complain about “well-meaning” civic 
leaders like Mary Grace Wells.  Mexican consular officials surmised that nativism was 
the guiding philosophy behind many regional repatriation programs.  Therefore, 
Mexicans were repatriated, not because they were public charges, but because they were 
Mexicans.  Perhaps the eagerness demonstrated by business and community leaders in 
Gary, Indiana provided all the proof needed to Mexican officials that nativism was indeed 
the root core behind the repatriations.  The Gary Post-Tribune reported that,  
Repatriation advocates raised transportation money through a “stag party” 
featuring gambling and other attractions.  The Knights of Columbus provided 
facilities for the occasion.  Housewives and others who might object to all the 
men in town devoting a part of this night to community uplift, will be urged to 
make the sacrifice as a civic and patriotic duty, and proceeds will go to a worthy 
cause that of unofficially deporting Mexicans from Gary, to reduce the amount of 
relief for the poor.161 
  Other Midwestern cities, such as East Chicago, Indiana and Detroit, Michigan 
witnessed the success of Gary, Indiana and began repatriation programs of their own.  
Community and business leaders in East Chicago, were quick studies to Gary’s 
repatriation program.  In short order, thousands of East Chicago’s Mexican population 
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boarded trains to Mexico.162  In Detroit, the famous Mexican muralist/artist, Diego 
Rivera was working on commissioned pieces paid for by the Detroit Art Institute.  
Sympathetic to his compatriots’’ misfortune, he advised them to “go home.”163  Rivera 
made his announcement in several area newspapers that was his ardent desire that all 
Mexicans in Detroit return to “Mexico Lindo.”  Rivera founded the League of Workers 
and Peasants of Mexico, whose mission it was to organize and financially assist 
Mexicans in the Detroit area.164  The world renowned artist contributed at least $700 of 
his own money to pay for repatriate train passage back to Mexico.  In addition, The 
League of Workers and Peasants of Mexico worked to secure funding of the repatriate 
settlement colony at the Hacienda de la Burga near Zihuatanejo in Guerrero, Mexico.  
The League of Workers and Peasants purchased agricultural tools and other supplies to 
begin their new lives as colonists and settlers.165  The League of Workers and Peasants 
claimed success in their repatriation efforts and insisted that their efforts did not portray 
the repatriates as “job steelers and/or scapegoats for the Depression. 
 The mass exodus went through Texas.  Caravans crossed into Mexico at border 
stations and depots located in Del Rio, McAllen, Eagle Pass, Brownsville, Laredo, and El 
Paso.  The repatriates streamed into the Mexican border towns of Villa Acuña, Reynosa, 
Piedras Negras, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Juárez.  Deaths, illness, and 
crowded living spaces plagued the repatriates at these unprepared borders stations and 
thousands flooded into the border cities looking for food and shelter.  The 1932 Karnes 
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City caravan that made their way toward Laredo, Texas, became infamously known as 
one of the most onerous and difficult treks en route to Mexico.  That particular port of 
entry had never experienced such a vast movement of people through its city and through 
its international gates.166  
 Although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, Mercedes Carreras de Velasco 
estimated that perhaps as many as 800 families or 4,000 individuals were a part of the 
Karnes City southward caravan.  This mass movement of repatriates was a direct result of 
the deepening economic conditions in South Texas.  The spiraling downturn in cotton 
prices brought lay-offs and firings to Mexican and Mexican American workers.  Without 
any other available employment opportunities, the thousands of affected unemployed 
workers and their families believed their only course of action would be to walk to 
Mexico (a two-hundred and fifty mile journey).  News of the Karnes City caravan 
reached the Mexican Consul in San Antonio, Texas, Eduardo Hernández Cházaro. 
 Consul Hernández Cházaro relayed several dispatches to the Mexican authorities 
and asked them to provide urgent assistance to the Karnes City caravan, which was 
limping and struggling toward Nuevo Laredo.  However, the Mexican government’s 
policy denied financial assistance until the repatriate caravan reached the Mexican 
border.  Hernández Cházaro quickly pled for emergency financial assistance within the 
community.  Part of this effort was his call for citizens to donate their cars and trucks in 
order to transport repatriates to Laredo/Nuevo Laredo.167 
                                               
166 Ibid., p.95-103. 
167 Ibid., p.95-103. 
  117 
 The Comisión Honorífica adopted Hernández Cházaro’s call for transportation 
assistance in Donna, Texas.  In a remarkable gesture, the executives of the Laredo Bridge 
Company allowed the caravan to cross over the international bridge to Nuevo Laredo, 
free of charge.  By this time, the Karnes City caravan had become the largest collection 
of vehicles used for the purposes of repatriation.  The Karnes City caravan took over two 
months to reach its destination.  Among the tragedies that occurred, was the death of a 
man who was killed while changing a truck tire.  The truck collapsed on him.  His burial 
service in Hebronville, Texas, was attended by hundreds of Karnes City caravan 
members.  On a more positive note, five babies were delivered by midwives along the 
way, in three Texas towns.168 
 On October 28, 1931, the caravan arrived in Laredo, Texas.  Throughout that 
afternoon, trucks, tractors, trailers, and automobiles crowded with repatriates, made their 
way into the border city.  The repatriates exited the vehicles provided by volunteers on 
the American side.  Along with their suitcases and bundles of clothing, some had kitchen 
utensils and agricultural tools.  R. Reynolds McKay wrote, 
Volunteers moved among the returning Mexicans with water and food for adults, 
and milk for the babies.  All appeared weary and exhausted from their 250 mile 
trip, from interior Texas…  Large sacs of food, designated to provide the self-
expatriates for their journey south into interior Mexico…  were distributed by 
citizens here.169 
 After crossing the international bridge into Nuevo Laredo, the Karnes City 
caravan members entered a city teaming with repatriates from Gary, Indiana, East 
Chicago, Indiana, Detroit, Michigan, Chicago, Illinois, and many cities in Texas, 
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including Bridgeport.  These many thousands of people stood in long lines, while 
Mexican authorities processed them, and arranged connecting train transportation to their 
villages, cities, and pueblos.  Others, who were less fortunate tried to hitchhike in order to 
make their way back to remote rural communities in the Mexican interior. 
 Many of these repatriates sought employment in Mexico’s nascent irrigation 
projects under construction in the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Hidalgo, Durango, 
Aguascalientes and Coahuila.  Interestingly, many were asked to help colonize 
resettlement “colonias” in the hinterlands of Mexico, where few towns or cities existed in 
Baja California, Guerrero, and Oaxaca.  The irrigation projects and the resettlement 
“colonias” were holdovers from the presidency of Álvaro Obregón and his repatriation 
policies from the early 1920s.170  These Mexican projects had the potential to employ 
thousands of Mexican repatriates. 
 Of course, repatriates also returned from the American states of Arizona, New 
Mexico and Colorado.  Although the number of repatriates was far fewer from these 
other areas, Mexican people from these states entered Mexico through border crossings in 
Texas.  El Paso, Texas was one of the busiest border crossings regions, but thousands 
from Arizona and California also returned through Douglas, and Nogales, Arizona, as 
well as through Agua Prieta and Nogales, Sonora.171 
 Repatriates from Arizona found themselves in Chihuahua, Ciudad Juárez, Sonora, 
Agua Prieta and Nogales.  These people represented all areas of the state, including 
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Phoenix, Tempe, Tucson, the Salt River Valley and the mining districts of Globe-Miami 
and Jerome.  Those from more expansive regions such as New Mexico and Colorado, 
entered Mexico at Ciudad Juárez.  They came from the mining districts of Silver City, 
New Mexico, the agricultural communities of southern Colorado, Silverton, Colorado 
and the urban center of Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
 Newspapers in Mexico reported that the condition of the repatriates crossing into 
Mexico from Nogales, Agua Prieta, and Ciudad Juárez was deplorable.  However, the 
Mexico City newspaper, Excelsior wrote that food was at least distributed to families and 
individuals as they applied for employment and/or waited for transportation into the 
Mexican interior.  The hunger issue was a predominant, painful and recurring theme that 
Mexican newspapers reported on almost daily.  Destitute caravan members asked for 
public charity, begged in the streets, and even ate plants in city parks.  Although the 
Mexican government tried to get repatriates to locations where they could most likely 
find employment, the effects of the world-wide depression had hit Mexico hard, and job 
opportunities were few and far between.  Newspaper articles reported that the situation 
worsened every day, and as they competed with other Mexican workers for few jobs, the 
situation would soon became intolerable.172 
 The newspaper Excelsior reported that deportations and repatriations were 
conducted in the most deplorable ways.  The reporting alleged that repatriates were 
imprisoned, beaten and robbed of their personal possessions.  In addition, the newspaper 
claimed that false information was often disseminated to the repatriates about Mexico’s 
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“stronger economy,” available land, and improved social conditions.  Excelsior 
editorialized that roadways, bridges, and other infrastructure south of the frontera were in 
terrible condition, and in serious need of repairs.  These conditions made it very difficult 
for repatriates who attempted the return trip by truck or automobile.  In some Excelsior 
editions, the reporters and editorial staff even suggested that repatriates turn back.173 
The Mexican and Mexican American community in Phoenix was almost 45,000 
strong.  Of this number, almost 6,500 voluntarily returned to Mexico.  Local charities 
were tapped out of financial resources, and this accounted for much of the voluntary 
repatriation.174  Most of the Mexicano laborers had once enjoyed agricultural jobs in the 
Salt River Valley area that surrounds Phoenix.  The economic conditions in Phoenix 
paralleled those that took place in south Texas.  The steady decline in cotton prices forced 
growers in Phoenix and the Salt River Valley to greatly reduce their labor force. 
At the time, the southward route from Phoenix and the Salt River Valley through 
Tucson afforded only three possible paths to the repatriates.  They could either travel 
toward Nogales, Douglas or El Paso, crossing open desert terrain with few stops for water 
and nourishment.  This was an incredible obstacle to those who were traveling on foot.  
Disorientation played a major role, as the hot, dry environment in both the desert 
southwest and northern Mexico was often dangerous and perilous.  In Chihuahua, 
Bachimba Canyon was an area where caravans of repatriates often had to leave personal 
belongings behind, or on the side of the road due to the peril of traversing the canyon.  
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Excelsior reported on April 25, 1931, that the dangerous conditions caused outright 
madness amongst the travelers.175  Of course, travelers from the Tucson area traversed 
the same routes as those from Phoenix, and the Salt River Valley, as they made their way 
to El Paso, Douglas and Nogales. 
Due to the declining demand for copper and other raw materials, Inspiration, 
Kennecott and Phelps-Dodge laid off thousands of Mexican workers.  Those who worked 
in the mines of Globe and Miami, were essentially forced to Mexico and traveled through 
miles and miles of mountainous, curved roads, as most of the mining districts are located 
in elevated regions.  The documentary “Los Mineros,” produced by The American 
Experience, for the Public Broadcasting System, depicted Mexican miners who travelled 
in broken down trucks, loaded down with all their worldly possessions. 
Relocated miners from New Mexico and Colorado endured similar situations.  
They also left due to firings and lay-offs, due to decreased production demands for silver, 
copper and other raw materials.  Excelsior reported that these repatriates made their way 
from Silver City New, Mexico east toward Las Cruces, and then southward toward El 
Paso/Ciudad Juárez.  Those traveling from Albuquerque travelled south from Las Cruces 
to El Paso. 
Mexican workers from the silver mines of Silverton, Colorado, and others who 
were fired from their jobs in the sugar beet industry in southern Colorado made the 
journey back through Albuquerque and Las Cruces to El Paso.  The seldom travelled 
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roads were hazardous, and the conditions proved very dangerous.  Heavy snow and icy 
roads were often encountered in dilapidated vehicles that had unsafe tires.  Excelsior also 
reported that repatriates succumbed from pneumonia or by freezing to death.  Of course, 
many others died in automobile accidents when their vehicles slid off icy roads, or 
collided with other vehicles. 
Some, who planned to enter Mexico through the Arizona routes to Douglas and 
Nogales, made their way into the interior of northern Mexico along the Pacific coast.  If 
they were lucky enough to make the journey to cities such as Guaymas, Mazatlán and 
Guadalajara, they might find employment in the tourist industry or continue through to 
Chihuahua, San Luis Potosí and Monterey.  Excelsior began reporting that the arrival of 
repatriates began causing resentment amongst the general public due to the competition 
for jobs in the cities of Monterrey, Guadalajara and Chihuahua.  Articles to this effect 
appeared in the April 4, 1931 and April 12, 1931 editions.  The April 4 article reported 
that 200 repatriates had arrived the night before and were given a full-course meal.  The 
repatriates were also reportedly promised jobs in local agricultural industries since the 
area had experienced surprisingly good profits at that time of year.176   
U.S. and Mexican train companies were fully at work and in the business of 
transporting repatriates.  The Missouri Pacific, Southern Pacific, St. Louis, Brownsville 
and Mexico Railroads maintained busy schedules all over the southwest and in northern 
Mexico.  In New Mexico, Colorado and Arizona repatriates were whisked back to 
Mexico on the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe Railroad lines.  The heightened railroad 
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activity began to cause dangerous conditions and congestion on the tracks themselves, 
especially when the U.S. railway system began to converge on the smaller, less 
maintained Mexican train system.177  
However, the most sensational repatriation stories came from the California 
region.  On April 25, 1931, Excelsior reported that, “the pendulum of migration which 
took Mexicans northward during the Mexican Revolution, had now swung southward.”178  
Furthermore, the Mexican Consul official in Los Angeles, Rafaél de la Colina was quoted 
as saying that approximately 3,000 families (nearly 15,000 individuals) had asked for 
assistance from the Consul to repatriate.  Unemployment was the major reason they listed 
for their decision to return to Mexico.  As the end of April 1931 approached, over 35,000 
had left southern California for the return trip to Mexico and in the four prior to this 
staggering number, an additional 5000 individual had also made the decision to 
voluntarily repatriate themselves “back to Mexico.” 
Excelsior also reported on the many fund drives launched to aid the repatriates on 
their exodus.  Several articles appeared that expressed the need for between $10,000 and 
$20,000 in donations (quite a hefty sum to ask for during the initial throws of the 
Depression!)179  Toward the end of April 1931, approximately 1,150 people left Los 
Angeles for Tucson and on through to Tucson.  They took advantage of almost $18,000 
in donations that had been collected for the repatriate cause.  Secretary of Labor William 
Doak and Charles Visel had succeeded in their efforts to rid the nation of thousands of 
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Mexican immigrants through scare tactics, American unemployment concerns, nativism 
and threats of deportation hearings. 
Thousands of other agricultural workers from California’s rural areas such as the 
Imperial Valley and the San Joaquin Valley also left for, “a better life” in Mexico.  The 
reasons were the same, the downturns in agricultural production that befell Mexican 
laborers in the Texas cotton industry and in the mining districts of the greater southwest.  
Caravans formed from all reaches of California as hundreds departed for “la patria.”  The 
entry points through Mexicali and Tijuana experienced heavy traffic as did the crossings 
at Douglas and Nogales, Arizona and the saturated border cities of El Paso and Ciudad 
Juárez.  As they arrived in Mexico, the repatriate population had resettled from almost all 
parts of the United States (the Midwest, Southwest and California). They then began their 
search for employment opportunities and renewed connection with family members.  
However, the mass movement of conationals presented vast and immense political 
challenges for the Mexican government.  Resettlement colonies and integration of 
repatriates into the lackluster Mexican economy became priorities for President Abelardo 
Rodríguez, his inner circle, and his administration. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRESIDENT ABELARDO L. RODRÍGUEZ AND THE REPATRIATION 
COMMMITTEE 
The repatriation drives reached their highest levels in 1931 and 1932.180  
According to Mexican government statistics (El Departamento de la Economía 
Nacionál), from 1930 to 1935, 345,839 Mexicans were sent back to Mexico from the 
United States.  President Rodríguez and his interim government encountered many 
challenges, as the government attempted to bring the repatriates back to their villages and 
pueblos in Mexico.  However, the most difficult issue was how to reintegrate these 
workers and their families into the Mexican economy.  In 1931, former President Pasqual 
Ortíz Rubio stated that it was not the federal government’s responsibility to find work for 
the repatriates.  Ortíz Rubio’s position was that it was local government’s responsibility 
to find work for these people.  Further, Ortíz Rubio stated that the federal government’s 
responsibility ended with the transportation of the repatriates to their cities and towns.181 
General Abelardo Rodríguez took power from Ortíz Rubio in 1932, and initially 
hoped to follow his predecessor’s position on the repatriate issue.  However, by this time, 
thousands of repatriates were streaming back to Mexico, and the Rodríguez 
administration faced tremendous pressure.  Rodriguez, himself a provisional governor of 
Baja California, expected that the governors of Mexican states, as well as private 
organizations and influential private citizens, would help the government address the 
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repatriation issue.182  Also during that year, the former anarchist Enrique Flores Magón 
communicated to President Rodríguez that he would be willing to participate on a 
committee (a “congress”) to discuss general repatriation issues.  In his communication to 
President Rodríguez, Flores Magón included a newspaper article describing the tragic tale 
of return to Mexico by Macario Reyes, his wife and five children.  The Reyes family was 
abandoned in the Mountains of San Luis Potosí by an angry bus driver, because Macario 
had no more money to pay him for the trip.  Before the family was able to walk out of the 
mountain pass, one of the small children died from exposure.183 
By 1932, the Mexican press had turned highly critical of the government’s 
handling of the repatriation issue.  The press criticized the government’s failure to 
provide transportation for the repatriates, and their failure to resettle them.  Of course, 
Mexico experienced the same economic downturns of the world-wide Great Depression, 
which severely limited its ability to deal with the returning repatriates’ unemployment 
and their housing needs.   The leading newspapers in Mexico, including Excelsior and 
Universal frequently published negative articles regarding the deplorable condition of 
repatriates in Mexico, as well as the condition of Mexicans in the United States.  The 
print media often condemned the government’s inaction, and challenged Rodríguez to 
initiate more effective programs and pressured him to take charge of the situation.184 
President Rodríguez and his administration received hundreds of letters from 
destitute immigrants in the United States, and all over the world, asking for financial 
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assistance in order to repatriate.  The repatriates requested employment, railroad and/or 
airline fare, and any available land.  In one such letter, the Zamarripa family asked 
President Rodríguez for travel funding due to the racist attitudes they experienced in 
Illinois.  A more elaborate request came from an El Paso married couple who wanted the 
government to provide them with not only a tract of land, but a “small, but comfortable 
house.”185   
Both President Rodríguez and President Hoover struggled with the severity of the 
economic downturns brought on by the world-wide Depression.  In Mexico, Presidents E. 
Portes Gil (1928-1930) and Pasqual Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932) found the crisis too 
insurmountable to initiate any real results.  When President Rodríguez assumed power, he 
(like Hoover) hoped that the private sector would assist the government to deal with the 
many and varied issues that confronted the government.  In Washington D.C., President 
Hoover, 
(Hoover) called for an expansion of state and local relief programs, and urged all 
who could afford to give more to charity…  Hoover rejected classical economics.  
Indeed, many laissez-faire theorists attacked his handling of the Depression…  
Numbers of “liberal” economists, on the other hand, praised the Hoover 
program…  Hoover resisted proposals to shift responsibility from state and local 
agencies to the federal government, despite the fact - soon obvious - that the 
lesser governmental bodies lacked the resources to cope with the emergency, … 
Unfortunately the Depression was drying up the sources of private charities, just 
as the demands on these organizations were expanding.  State and municipal 
agencies were swamped at a time when their capacities to tax and borrow were 
shrinking… (Hoover) set up a committee to coordinate local relief agencies, but 
insisted on preserving what he called ‘the principal of individual and local 
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responsibility’… for the federal government to take over relief would ‘lead to the 
super-state and real liberty would be lost.’186 
Hoover’s committee, the President’s Emergency Committee for Employment 
(P.E.C.E.), was formed in the fall of 1930 when unemployment was only at 11 per cent.  
The objective of P.E.C.E was to rally charitable organizations to greater action and asked 
Hoover and Congress to increase spending for public works.  However, in 1931, P.E.C.E. 
was replaced by another commission-type entity called POUR (The President’s 
Organization on Unemployment Relief).  Some progress was made in expanding, 
improving and coordinating relief efforts, but unemployment continued to rise.  Hoover 
had signed a public works initiative, The Wagner-Graham Stabilization Act, and funding 
did begin to trickle down.  Yet, the Act never received the sizeable appropriations needed 
for a complete attack on the unemployment numbers.  By 1931, the Congress was still 
adverse to federal relief of any kind and even the National Council of Social Workers 
refused to endorse federal relief principles.  President Hoover held firm to his economic 
policy and to the concept of a balanced budget and Congress almost passed a national 
sales tax.  As the Depression continued, Hoover slowly changed his mind and argued for 
higher excise taxes on luxury goods and higher income taxes on the rich.  Hoover also 
claimed that increased estate taxes were crucial for an economic recovery and resultant, 
Revenue Act of 1932 included most of Hoover’s “reforms.”187 
In frequent conversations with the late Professor F. Arturo Rosales, he 
commented that President Rodríguez (and his two presidential predecessors) might have 
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emulated Hoover’s policies as they turned to local and regional leaders (governors) and 
to the private sector for help with the repatriate situation.  Further, Hoover’s creation of 
the P.E.C.E and the POUR predated the formation of the National Repatriation 
Committee (El Comité de Repatriación) and La Campaña de Medio Millón (The Half-
Million Peso Drive).  Professor Rosales often speculated that Rodríguez and his inner 
circle may have watched the American president very closely as they contemplated these 
two quasi-governmental agencies. 
Primarily, the Comité de Repatriación was organized as a way to re-settle 
repatriates from the United States.  La Campaña de Medio Millón was established as a 
fundraising arm under the Comité’s supervision.  The conceptual framework was that 
both entities would work together to establish two colonies in the Mexican states of 
Oaxaca (Pinotepa Nacional) and Guerrero (El Coloso) self-sustaining, agricultural 
communities.  The Comité and The Campaña presented their aims and objectives as a 
part of a national campaign to assist repatriates, but also wanted to deflect mounting 
criticism pointed directly against President Rodríguez and his inner circle.  The Mexican 
press and political opponents used the repatriation issue to attack the Rodríguez 
presidency.  As the Comité and La Campaña rolled out to accomplish their important 
work, critics thought the project was too ambitious and could never really provide 
employment for the thousands of repatriates that had now arrived in Mexico. 
Professor Rosales stood by his analysis that the two entities were essentially 
illusory.  The founding of the Comité and the fundraising efforts of La Campaña (for the 
purposes of establishing the resettlement colonies) for a while pacified the press and 
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labor leaders who envisioned only lackluster results.  The first order of business was to 
find solutions to the border transportation crisis.  Theoretically, collected funds would be 
used to alleviate the repatriate congestion in cities such as Ciudad Juárez and Nuevo 
Laredo.  Mexican trains would take repatriates to the new resettlement colonies 
constructed in the interior provinces of Mexico.  Unfortunately, though was not a smooth 
process, but it did help repair the administration’s image, if only in terms of laudatory 
rhetoric. 
Even the governors of the Mexican states began to exert pressure on the 
Rodríguez government.  Concerned about the “bottlenecks” in border cities, the scant 
progress made by the federal government allowed Rodríguez and his administration to 
claim minor logistical victories as some repatriates made it out.  Additionally, the 
government could claim that government funds were not used to alleviate the border 
crisis since transportation expenses and the resettlement colonies themselves were taken 
care of through the Comité and La Campaña. 
The newspaper, El Universal reported on November 24, 1932, that the National 
Repatriation Committee formed  as a result of a meeting held at the Ministry of the 
Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación) on the previous day, November 23, 1932.188  On 
January 9, 1933, President Rodriguez met with the “directors” of the Comité, “held a 
lively discussion and expressed a keen interest in the Committee’s work and made a 
personal donation of 5,000 pesos to the Chairman of the Comité Federico de la Chica (see 
photo in Addendum).  President Rodríguez hoped to keep a close watch on the Comité’s 
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progress, so two government officials were appointed to the Committee, but “acting in a 
private capacity.”  These two individuals were Jorge Ferretis, who was the Secretary 
General, and Andrés Landa y Piña, who was Director of the Bureau of Immigration.  
Other members included influential leaders from the private sector.  Fernando Sordo 
represented the Spanish Chamber of Commerce, Luís Ludert y Rul and Alfredo Levy 
represented the National Chamber of Commerce.  Other important members of the 
Comité were Spanish Industrialist, José González Soto, and Juan B. Amezcua, who was 
Secretary General of the Beneficencia Pública (Public Charities). 
All of the members of the Comité received this statement from Presidente 
Rodríguez, I hope that all the authorities and inhabitants of the country will give 
an example of unity and patriotism, and cooperate with the National Repatriation 
Committee. 
The Comité collected funds from private individuals, industrialists, corporations, 
newspaper organizations, politicians, diplomats, theater directors, actors, singers, 
musicians, and government workers.  The great Spanish cellist Pablo Cassals performed 
at the Mexico City Teatro Arbeu as well as the innovative classical Spanish guitarist, 
Andrés Segovia.  Both concerts were advertised that “proceeds would go to the Comité 
de Repatriación and the Campaña de Medio Millón.189  
 In just six months, the Comité de Repatriación boosted the collection of 250,000 
pesos for construction of the two resettlement colonies.190 Camile Guerin-Gonzalez noted 
the following,  
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The land in the two locations was fertile and the water, plentiful.  A small group 
of repatriates from Detroit comprised the first colonists in the program.  They 
settled at Hacienda El Coloso, Acapulco on December 1933, forming a small 
experimental colony.  A larger number of repatriates settled at Pinotepa, Oaxaca.  
By the end of 1933, 800 repatriates lived at Pinotepa.191 
 José González Soto, the Spanish industrialist and member of the Comité de 
Repatriación remarked on the benefits of establishing resettlement colonies on coastal 
lands, especially in the states of Oaxaca and Guerrero.192 Perhaps González Soto foresaw 
the great potential of both of these areas that were virtually untouched and undeveloped.  
He stated publicly that other members of the Comité also saw the tremendous potential of 
the two areas.  The Comité as a whole expected that the Pinotepa colony might 
accommodate at least 500,000 repatriates.193  
 The Comité planned to sell land to each family on a long-term repayment basis, 
give them tools, farm machinery, oil, gas, soap, and at the beginning of their stay, food 
provisions.  The Comité would also provide each family three cartons of cigarettes and 1 
peso each week.  The Comité had spent a large part of its funds on the establishment of 
the Pinotepa colony, and consequently had few funds to establish other colony.194 
The repatriates who settled at Pinotepa Nacional, told that all types of crops could 
be grown at that location.  Corn, beans, rice, vegetables and ajonjolí (sesame) proved to 
be staple crops.195  The native Indians and blacks who lived there easily cultivated 
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bananas, pineapples, mangos and watermelons and other vegetables.196  However, the 
newly arrived repatriates, the majority who were from West Central Mexico (via their 
recent stays in the United States) were not used to a tropical environment.  An important 
repatriation study was conducted by a sociology graduate student at the University of 
Southern California.  James C. Gilbert turned his field work among the repatriates in 
Mexico into his 1934 Master’s thesis.  His is a contemporary record with insightful, 
personal observations. 
Many people died and others left.  Sixty people died in twenty days.  The insects, 
disease, and poisonous snakes are very bad there.  Lots of paludismo (malaria).  
Most of the people in the colony got it (contracted the disease)…  There was 
another very bad disease called vómito prieto (black vomitus).197 
 James Gilbert’s study included interviews directly from repatriates.  However, in 
his section on the Pinotepa colony (Chapter V, Failure and Success in Colonization), he 
quoted Dr. Manuel Gamio, 
The trouble is that the repatriados are scattered about throughout all the 
population.  They are not kept together in groups and (have no) opportunities 
provided for them to use what they know.  When they go back among the people 
of the towns and villages, where there is a somewhat lower level of living than 
that which they were used to in the United States, they gradually drop back into 
the old ways and habits.198 
 One of Gilbert’s repatriate’s interviews spelled out some of the problems at 
Pinotepa, 
The trouble is that while many of the repatriates know how to work in agriculture, 
they don’t have enough help to get started…  They show them the land and say;  
‘Here is land.  You know how to work, so go ahead.’  But naturally they go back 
into the towns where they can get something to eat.  Even if they did have tools 
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and seeds, they would have enough to last them until the first harvest.  With 
practically no money, just land alone isn’t enough.  Many that come here don’t 
have any other place to go.  They don’t have any idea of where they are going, or 
what they’ll do.  Some families just stayed down at the railway station.  What 
they ought to do for the repatriados who go out to the country, is to give them 
implements, tools, seeds and food to last them for a year or so.199 
 On page 105 of Gilbert’s thesis, he stated that, “(T)he principal objection to this 
method of providing for repatriados adjustments is, of course, the financial one, for a 
very large outlay would be needed to care for an appreciable percentage of the numbers 
arriving.  The experiment was made, however, preceded by a nationwide campaign to 
raise a fund of half a million pesos for the work.”200  Also on page 105, Gilbert claimed 
he recorded an interview he conducted, “With the president of the Comité de 
Repatriación in Mexico City, on August 30, 1933, 
The campaign to raise the five hundred thousand pesos which was started late in 
1932, and the establishment and supervision of the repatriados colonies was 
taken in charge by the Comité Nacional de Repatriación, a body which, 
theoretically, at least, was entirely independent of the government, although the 
chief of the Departamento de Migración appears to have taken an active part.  By 
the summer of 1933, approximately half of the above mentioned sum had been 
collected, and two colonies had been started.201 
 At Pinotepa Nacional, insect infestation was a tremendous problem.  The 
colonists were afraid to venture out at night without covering themselves completely and 
wearing hair nets on their faces and heads.  Pinolillo was the name of one of the insects 
found at the Pinotepa colony.  These insects were microbial and made the repatriates itch.  
The jejens were small black flies with a ferocious bite, while the nihuas ate there way 
under the repatriates finger nails.202  At El Coloso colony in Guerrero, the climate was 
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similar and insect infestation, poisonous snakes, and the constant threat of disease was as 
treacherous as at Pinotepa Nacional.203 
 In total, the Comité Nacional de Repatriación spent about forty-thousand pesos on 
farm tools, machinery and tractors for the Pinotepa colony.  Fifteen-thousand pesos more 
was spent on mules and draft animals.  The colonists were instructed to clear the tropical 
landscape using only axes and machetes, while the government organizers worked to 
install water pumps for irrigation for the crops, and showers for personal hygiene.  On a 
cultural note, the Comité built an open air theater for the colonists to enjoy various 
performances such as concerts and dances.204  In a bow to American sports, many of the 
colonists had learned and played baseball, while living in America, and in short order, a 
baseball field was added.205 
 Although less developed than the colony at Pinotepa Nacional, the facility at El 
Coloso colony was also begun in 1932.  El Coloso was much smaller and dwelling units 
had yet to be constructed by the summer of 1933.  Some of the same facilities were 
contemplated for El Coloso, such as water pumps for irrigation, and indoor plumbing for 
showers.  A great advantage to the El Coloso colony was its proximity to the port city of 
Acapulco, located thirty-five kilometers away.  Pinotepa Nacional was located several 
hundred kilometers south of Acapulco, and located in a remote and less populated area, 
which made it far less accessible.  In the final analysis, neither of these two locations was 
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well suited for colonization, because of the difficult environmental challenges.206  The 
combination of the tropical climate, along with disease, insect infestation, and vermin 
made daily life intolerable.  Allegations of abuse by government workers/overseers 
compelled many settlers to desert Pinotepa Nacional and El Coloso.  By May 25, 1934, it 
was reported that both resettlement colonies were failures (fracasos) and were 
abandoned.207 
The repatriates (colonists) complained particularly about the directors of the 
Pinotepa Nacional colony, where life had become unbearable since last October 
for the reason that, on the pretext of imposing discipline, which was unnecessary, 
the government directors/overseer were accompanied by six armed individuals 
who insulted and threatened the colonists.  They (the colonists) were threatened 
with severe punishment in the event of any disobedience.  Subsequently, all of the 
colonists decided to abandon the colony and make the arduous twenty-three day 
journey on foot to Acapulco.208 
 In a special newspaper exposé from Pinotepa, the resettlement colony there no 
longer existed.  Of the five hundred to eight hundred people who founded Pinotepa 
Nacional, only eight settlers and fifteen overseers remained.209  According to former 
colony members at El Coloso, that resettlement colony was also abandoned for many of 
the same reasons as Pinotepa Nacional.210 
 The failure of the two resettlement colonies was also attributed to the actions of 
government workers.  Their disciplinary policies were inhumane and arbitrary.  They 
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gave the colonists only starvation rations and exploited them in hopes of gaining 
governmental rank promotions and advancement.  The forced starvation weaponized the 
food distribution, and intensified the already tragic conditions for the settlers.  In one 
instance, rather than feeding the settlers, an entire corn crop was used by government 
administrators to feed their pet pigs.211  When news and reports of the failure of Pinotepa 
Nacional and El Coloso reached the Comité de Repatriación, dissension and anger broke 
out amongst its members.  Soon the committee members were mired in mistrust and 
accused each other of malfeasance, which split the Committee into small factionalized 
groups.212 
In order to bring about a semblance of leadership and control over the fracture, 
President Rodríguez announced on January 14, 1934, that the Ministry of Interior, as well 
as the Ministry of Agriculture and Development, along with their sub agencies, the 
offices of Rural Population, and National Lands and Colonization would take over the 
Comité and the Pinotepa Nacional and El Coloso colonies.  President Rodríguez 
expressed regret for the dissension between committee members, and admitted to his own 
failure in the administration of the colonies.  However, President Rodríguez stridently 
accused the Comité of “betraying the Mexican people” and their failure to help the 
repatriates.  Any and all funds that remained with the Comité de Repatriación were 
turned over to the aforementioned government agencies. 
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On July 26, 1934, the Mexico City press published the formal dissolution of the 
Comité de Repatriación.213  The official decree issued by the President of the Republic 
formally ended the National Repatriation Committee and La Campaña de Medio Millión.  
The official actions by President Rodríguez, compelled many members of the Comité to 
express their dissatisfaction with the Committee’s money management ostensibly raised 
for the betterment of the colonists.  Accusations were leveled as directors of Pinotepa 
Nacional and El Coloso were accused of money laundering and steeling (and reselling) of 
farm implements, vehicles, draft animals, and even medicine.  The press also had many 
questions about the allocation of the Comité’s funds.214 
The dissolution of the Comité occurred before other planned resettlement colonies 
were constructed.  A third colony was contemplated at Santo Domingo near Magdalena 
Bay in Baja California Del Sur.  The Santo Domingo colony was to serve 1,800 colonists 
when completed.  Other colonies were planned for Cóbano, Colima and Canton de 
Autlan, Jalisco which were located on Mexico’s west coast, and near San Andrés Tuxtla, 
Veracruz located on the east coast.215  Additionally, there were other planned resettlement 
colonies that the Comité envisioned for repatriates, colonists and settlers. 
First, in the 1920s, the Mexican government had established the National 
Irrigation Commission which led to the creation of the resettlement colonies within 
irrigation projects.  This gave Mexican laborers, including repatriates, job opportunities 
in both hydraulic projects and agricultural work.  Second, President Rodríguez 
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envisioned smaller scale resettlement colonies throughout Mexico, which would support 
smaller numbers of families.  Third, President Rodríguez hoped state governments would 
also set aside land for resettlement communities.216 
In his Master’s thesis, James Carl Gilbert mentioned the important Don Martin 
Irrigation Project in the northern states of Coahuíla and Nuevo León.  This project began 
during the administration of Plutarco Elías Calles in 1926.217  Calles was president of 
Mexico from 1924 to 1928.  By 1931, thousands of repatriates had been employed as 
laborers at the Don Martín Irrigation Project.218  These repatriates developed between 
30,000 to 56, 000 hectares of irrigated land, where agricultural crops such as cotton, corn, 
ajonjolí and melons were grown.219  These works were settled in the recently constructed 
town of Ciudad Anáhuac, and two adjacent older cities named Rodríguez and Camarón.  
These three townships were conveniently located near the Don Martín Project.220  
However the reservoir, directly behind the Don Martín Dam filled to capacity only one 
year after its completion.  This lead to the abandonment of Ciudad Anáhuac and greatly 
reduced the populations of Rodrígeuz and Camarón.  Later, during the administration of 
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), the population of Ciudad Anáhuac were relocated to 
Matamoros, Tamaulipas to work at the Bajo Río Bravo Irrigation Project, along with 
other repatriates from the United States.221 
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Many regional Mexican governors had cooperated with President Rodríguez in 
helping to establish resettlement colonies, and others only offered parcels of land, but no 
additional assistance.  The regional governments of Michoacán and San Luis Potosí did 
not take part in resettlement endeavors, but the states of Tabasco, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, 
Chiapas and Nayarit were among those states who fully participated in resettlement 
efforts by providing agricultural tools to the repatriates.  The regional and municipal 
governments of these states worked with the Mexican government in the construction of 
roadways and routes in and out of the resettlement colonies.222 
In November and December of 1932, the secretary to the governor of Guanajuato, 
Ramón V. Santayo requested that a former military garrison named Sarabia (which was 
formerly under the control of the Secretaría de Guerra y Marina), be relinquished to state 
controlled and accommodate the vast of returning immigrants.  Guanajuato had received 
the largest number if returning repatriates and Secretary Santayo wrote that they needed 
additional land and facilities.223  President Rodríguez agreed and sent an immediate 
dispatch to the governor of Michoacán, Melchor Ortega, that the former military garrison 
of Sarabia had been transferred to the state, and was now available for the steady flow of 
repatriates that had come to the area between 1931 and 1932.224 
In Veracruz, the governor set aside 50,000 hectares of land for repatriate 
resettlement, and the governor of Puebla, ceded 25,000 hectares.  The government of 
Jalisco donated lands at Atequiza y la Capilla in the town of Chapala.  In Guerrero, the 
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state government provided the Hacienda de la Burga, where thirty families from Detroit, 
Michigan, settled with funds donated in part, by the Mexican artist Diego Rivera.  Other 
states that gave full cooperation to resettlement efforts with agricultural tools and support 
included Sonora, Sinaloa and Baja California Del Norte.  Other colonies were established 
at San Jose, in the area of Bacún, Sonora and at the Hacienda del Pigar, Sinaloa.  Other 
resettlement communities were established at San Jacinto near Todos los Santos and at 
Las Palmas Tiajuana, Baja California.  Additionally, a repatriate settlement was 
constructed at Carlos, Ensenada, Baja California Del Norte.225 
Smaller resettlement colonies supported by the Mexican government were 
founded throughout Mexico and demonstrated full cooperation between federal 
government and states governments.  In addition, thousands of returning workers chose to 
live in towns and cities neighboring the settlements and colonies. 
Looking back, the establishment of the National Repatriation Committee, along 
with La Campaña de Medio Millón were difficult projects to bring to completion.  
Perhaps the members of the Comité really cared about the fates of the repatriates. While 
it is true that President Rodríguez and his administration supported the National 
Repatriation Committee at the onset, when negative publicity and news of incompetent 
administration and abuses were confirmed, Rodríguez chose to dissolve the Comité.  It 
seems logical, that Rodríguez put an end to the National Repatriation Committee due to 
the failures at Pinotepa Nacional and El Coloso. 
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In reality, Mexico provided very few effective solutions to the large-scale 
problems created by the massive flow of the repatriates in the early 1930s, stemming 
from the Great Depression of 1929.  The idea of resettlement colonies to resolve the 
repatriate issue in Mexico became more of a hopeful fantasy than a realistic goal.  
Between 1931 and 1934, only five percent of repatriates took advantage of the colony 
resettlements.  This low percentage supports the idea that resettlement colonies in Mexico 
were politically motivated by the members of the Comité.  The general public had no real 
confidence in the lofty goals of the Comité, especially after the national newspapers 
exposed the “fracasos”.  The public felt that the Comité became fraught with corruption 
and incompetence.  In the end, the public and the repatriates casted a symbolic “vote of 
no confidence” regarding El Comité de Repatriación.  Indeed, many individual state and 
local officials in Mexico only paid lip service in their efforts to support the resettlement 
colonies.  As mentioned, the mounting pressure from the repatriates themselves, the 
highly critical Mexican press, the deaths and tragedies associated with Pinotepa Nacional 
and El Coloso sounded the Comité’s death knell.   
Initially, there was much fanfare and favorable media coverage that surrounded 
the incoming administration of interim President Abelardo Rodríguez. Yet during his 
two-year term in office, the plight of the repatriates, which included deaths, disease and 
suffering, seemed to take a secondary role.  Indeed the “good press copy” surrounding the 
famous artist Diego Rivera’s efforts to help stranded Mexican workers in Detroit, gave 
his group of repatriates “priority resettling” at the Hacienda de la Burga.  On the coattails 
of Rivera’s efforts, another group of repatriates from Detroit were given “priority status,” 
and were expedited in their resettlement at the El Coloso colony.  It followed that 
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whenever the Mexican media publicized a negative image of the repatriation efforts, the 
government responded only to that concise and particular situation.  The elite, often 
insensitive and incompetent Comité members were thereby able to keep their 
comparatively lucrative jobs and political stations amid the general “fracaso.” 
Perhaps both Presidents Rodríguez and Ortiz Rubio became opposed to 
substantial federal intervention on the repatriation issue much the same way U.S. 
President Hoover was ideologically obstinate regarding emergency federal intervention 
during the Great Depression.  Certainly, Presidents Hoover and Rodríguez shared the 
hope that private citizens, industries, corporations, charities, local and state governments 
would contribute more time, effort and funding to their respective national crises.  The 
incoming presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 
the United States attest to sustained federal efforts and budgets in addressing social 
problems and economic shortfalls.  Lazaro was elected resident of Mexico in 1934, and 
made another effort at repatriation of immigrants from the United States to Mexico.  The 
Cárdenas administration published a decree on March 12, 1935, that the left over funds 
from the National Repatriation Committee be applied to colonies under construction in 
Baja California Del Sur.  The Cárdenas decree referenced an earlier provision 
promulgated on February 6, 1935 which delegated the repatriate resettlement issue to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Development; Ministry of Finance and Public Credit; 
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Ministry of the Interior; National Bank of Agricultural Credit and the National Irrigation 
Commission.226   
President Cardenas issued plans for the repatriates and with his plans for 
agricultural reforms in Mexico.227 
Cárdenas expressed a positive and genuine concern for the migrants in the United 
States.  Although his attention was focused on the more familiar issues of oil 
expropriation, reorganization of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) and 
agrarian reforms, Cárdenas was also interested in insuring that Mexican Nationals 
in the United States were not mistreated or persecuted. 
Cardenas viewed Mexico as “Mexico Lindo,” a beckoning homeland, and with 
his ferocious national pride, he launched a significant effort to attract Mexican people 
back to “La Patria” (the mother country).228  In fact, Cardenas wanted to bring every 
Mexican residing in the United States.  He believed it was Mexico’s responsibility to 
provide for its own people.  He was reinforced by the new President’s socialist outlook. 
Unlike previous repatriation movements, this was the first to originate (and find a 
true home) within the Mexican government.  In October 1937, the Mexican 
Autonomous Department of Publicity and Propaganda announced that Mexico 
intended to repatriate its citizens, before allowing foreigner to immigrate to 
Mexico.229 
In the spring of 1939, the Cardenas administration officially began its revamped 
repatriation colony named the 18 de Marzo located in the region of Matamoros, 
Tamaulipas, named after the date when President Cárdenas signed the oil expropriation 
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decree in 1938 (the nationalization of Mexican oil fields).230  The decision by Cárdenas to 
establish the 18 de Marzo colony was influenced by his encounter with former colony 
members who abandoned Pinotepa Nacional.  Cárdenas was campaigning for the 
presidency and intercepted the ragged repatriates as they made the twenty-three-day trip 
to Acapulco.  This experience affected the future president so deeply that he paid the 
transportation of the former colony members with his own money.231 
When he assumed the presidency in 1934, Cárdenas was aware of the failures of 
the repatriate settlement colonies at Pinotepa Nacional and El Coloso.  He had served in 
the Rodríguez administration as the Secretary of War.  The abject conditions that former 
colony members endured at Pinotepa Nacional and at El Coloso most likely compelled 
him to address the repatriate issue in his own administration.  Cárdenas was determined 
to make the 18 de Marzo colony succeed. 
The Rodríguez administration had funded the National Irrigation Commission and 
also had started smaller scale construction throughout Mexico.  State governments had 
also given away public land for the establishment of repatriate colonies.  However, the 
Pinotepa Nacional and El Coloso colonias were privately funded by the Campaña de 
Medio Million.  The 18 de Marzo Cárdenas colony was fully funded by the new Cárdenas 
administration.  In fact, it had been incorporated into the Cárdenas agrarian reform 
program.  More and more, the people of Mexico became preferred government programs 
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for the entirety of the Mexican population, and not just the repatriates.  Irrigation projects 
were generally supported by the Mexican public.232 
The newspaper Excelsior reported on April 23, 1939 that the Cárdenas 
administration would place nearly twenty thousand Mexican families throughout the 
Mexican Republic.  The ministry of agriculture, the bank of Ejidol Credit worked hard to 
place repatriate families, but their plans were too expensive to reach fruition.  Mexican 
repatriation had reached its peak from 1930 to 1935, and by the end of the Great 
Depression, a half-million people had been repatriated back to Mexico from the United 
States.233  The repatriation of half a million immigrants to Mexico became one of the 
largest mass movements in history.  The cycle of mass immigration and repatriation 
completed two cycles during the first half of the twentieth century.  Mexican immigration 
to the United States before World War I, and their migratory patterns paved the way for 
the first cycle of mass immigration and repatriation during the depression of 1921-1922.  
Of course, this was a small occurrence compared to the second wave of mass 
immigration and repatriation that played out after the stock market crash of 1929. 
The Mexican government’s attempts to establish resettlement colonies (El Coloso 
and Pinotepa Nacional) failed in 1934, and brought about the end of the Comité Nacional 
de Repatriación and the Campaña de Medio Millón.  By 1939, President Cardenas 
established the 18 de Marzo colonia that only produced limited successes.  By then, 
repatriation had slowed and the world prepared for a second international conflict.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The “Comité de Repatriación,” formed in 1932 during the administration of 
interim President Abelardo Rodríguez, brought together Mexican businessmen and 
government officials to deal with U.S. repatriations of ethnic Mexicans.  The Comité 
attempted to raise 500,000 pesos (the “Campaña de Medio Million”) for the repatriates to 
cultivate Mexico’s hinterlands in agricultural colonies (“colonias”).  However, the 
Comité’s promised delivery of farm equipment, tools, livestock and guaranteed wages 
came too slowly for the repatriados and they sometimes reacted with threats of violence 
against the Mexican state.  Cloaked in post-revolutionary rhetoric, the Comité did not 
meet the expectations of the repatriate population (or the highly critical Mexican press) 
and President Rodríguez dissolved the Comité on June 14, 1934.  Arguably, the failure of 
the Comité de Repatriación helped fuel the presidential campaign of Lázaro Cárdenas, 
but the brief existence of this semi-official committee (during the most intense period of 
the U.S. repatriation drives) is a relatively unexplored topic and worthy of greater 
academic attention.       
 On November 24, 1932, the leading Mexico City newspaper, El Universal, 
reported the formation of a Mexican National Repatriation Committee (The “Comité 
Nacional de Repatriación”).  According to the article, the Chief of the Mexican Migration 
Department, Andrés Landa y Piña, presided over a meeting (on November 23, 1932) 
attended by representatives from the Ministry of the Interior (Secretaria de Gobernacíon), 
the National Chamber of Commerce (Alfredo Levy), the Confederation of Industrial 
Organizations, the Red Cross, the Central Department of the Federal District, the Public 
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Charities (Beneficía Pública) and the American Chamber of Commerce.234  Landa y Piña 
believed the problem of “numerous indigent Mexican repatriates from the United States” 
required the immediate attention of a “national rather than official committee.”235  His 
suggestion to staff the Comité de Repatriación with government representatives and 
businessmen from the Mexican industrial and commercial sectors met with unanimous 
approval.  The meeting adjourned with the appointment of a provisional, seven-member 
“Comité” initially responsible for fund-raising, lunch-room and dormitory construction 
for repatriate workers and housing for the unemployed repatriados. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Mexican government brought compatriot workers 
home in reaction to downturns in the American economy.  The U.S. recession of 1920-
1921 left thousands of impoverished Mexican laborers stranded in el norte.  President 
Álvaro Obregón repatriated 15,000 Mexicans and formed the Department of Repatriation 
within The Ministry of Foreign Relations.  Obregón’s administration (1920-1924) 
displayed a genuine concern for Mexican workers and the Mexican consular offices 
received increased government funding to assist immigrants in México de Afuera 
(external Mexico).  Through consular coalition building with Mexican laborer (bracero) 
communities and “México de Afuera,” mutual aid societies such as the Comisiones 
Honorificas Mexicanos and the Brigadas de la Cruz Azul expanded the protective reach 
of the Mexican government in the United States.236  The presidential administration of 
Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) also committed government resources to the 
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Comisiones and the Brigadas as the controversy over unrestricted Mexican immigration 
in America reached a “new urgency.”237  The Comisiones and Brigadas promoted 
Mexican nationalism, provided information regarding visas, identification cards, the 
immigration process and drafted applications for Mexican government assistance.238  An 
unsigned document dated February 15, 1928 titled, “Emigration-Immigration-
Repatriation,” expressed the concerns of Mexican union leaders regarding the 
mistreatment of expatriate workers in the United States and called for President Calles to 
promulgate “an organic law to end emigration of Mexican laborers.”  The document also 
described that consular delegations traveled to Mexico City, “and requested Government 
aid and assistance for the repatriation of groups of Mexican laborers and their families in 
the United States.”239     
In order to maintain political control after the 1928 assassination of president-
elect Obregón, Calles appointed himself as “Jefé Maximo” (his de facto reign as 
“chieftain of the Maximato” lasted from 1928 to 1934).  The next three presidents 
(Emilio Portes Gil, Pasqual Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo Rodríguez) owed their two-year 
interim administrations to Calles.  As American unemployment soared during the first 
years of the Great Depression, ethnic Mexicans in the United States became the 
scapegoats of the economic crisis and blamed for the inability of many Americans to find 
and keep jobs. 
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President Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of Labor, William Doak eagerly attempted 
to rid America of foreigners and targeted Mexicans in large cities such as Los Angeles, 
California and Chicago, Illinois.  In 1931, Doak claimed that 400,000 aliens resided in 
the United States illegally and thousands of Mexicans lost their jobs.  Pressured to leave 
by community authorities, Mexicans and their children (many born in America) returned 
to Mexico.240 Abraham Hoffman examined the issue of repatriation with a clear and 
rational approach. 
 There is no argument here…that repatriation for many Mexican immigrants 
 was a traumatic experience or that repatriation could also involve coercion, 
            deportation, exploitation and racism.  However, to suggest that these elements 
            in equal parts add up to a clear definition of the repatriation movement is to  
            distort its history.  Repatriation was a complicated process composed of many 
            factors and nuances, most of which have been unexplored, neglected, omitted, 
 or oversimplified.241  
 
Each of the interim Mexican presidents dealt with growing numbers of repatriates from 
the United States.242  However, President Portes Gil amicably discussed the repatriations 
with American ambassadors (Dwight Morrow and Josephus Daniels) and President Ortiz 
Rubio allowed repatriates to re-enter Mexico with exemptions from custom duties.243  
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In 1930, the Mexican Migration Service of the Ministry of the Interior (with  
Andrés Landa y Piña as the presiding official) began negotiations with the U.S. Bureau of 
Immigration and scheduled annual conferences regarding the transportation of repatriates, 
the creation of communal colonies for the returned workers and proposed taxes on 
Mexican private property to fund the “colonias.”244 General Abelardo Rodríguez (a 
former Secretary of War and Navy) assumed the Mexican presidency in September of 
1932 and like his predecessor, “expanded the list of articles repatriates could bring in 
duty free.” 245 
Two months later, the newly formed Comité de Repatriación embarked on a 
campaign to raise a half million pesos for the establishment of agricultural communal 
colonies for repatriate farmers (the favored project of Landa de Piña).  The Comité (under 
the provisional leadership of Sr. Federico T. De Lachica) enjoyed enthusiastic support in 
the Mexican press and after six weeks, collected almost 86,000 pesos that included a 
private donation of 5,000 pesos from President Rodríguez and over 17,000 pesos from 
government workers and officials.246 U.S. State Department officials in Mexico City 
noted a special bull-fight scheduled with famed matador Alberto Balderas and radio 
announcements on stations XEW and XEB that requested public donations to the 
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Comité.247 American Vice-Consul, John Littell observed the Comité’s enthusiastic 
reception by the Mexican newspapers. 
The campaign is being kept before the public by almost daily articles, coming 
from all parts of the country, published in the Mexico City press, and Mexico 
seems determined to do something in the near future for its repatriates from the  
United States.  It is estimated that over 250,000 persons have been added to the  
population of Mexico since the beginning of 1929 from this source alone.248 
 
President Rodríguez received many letters from influential businessmen, politicos, 
academics, artists, military men, friends and acquaintances who cheerfully sent their 
contributions to the Campaña de Medio Million.   
However, on February 9, 1933, Vice-Consul Littell filed a “voluntary report” 
regarding the formation of the “Union of Mexican Repatriates” that urged “all Mexican 
workers’ organizations to work for the suspension of the present repatriation campaign, 
because the economic problems of the repatriates already in the country have not been 
solved.”  Littell also wrote that the “Union” wanted to control the number of repatriates 
“allowed into Mexico,” complained that the 500,000 peso campaign “is being realized 
too slowly” and called for an accounting of the funds collected by the Comité for the 
repatriates.249   
 El Universal reported that during a February 3, 1933 meeting with the Comité, the 
“Union” representatives pressed the Comité to distribute the donated funds to the 
repatriate population.  The Comité members rebuffed the idea as an obstacle to 
                                               
247 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, President 
of Mexico Aids Progress of Repatriation Fund Campaign (January, 1933), by John S. Littell, Vice Consul, 
Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/38, Washington, D.C., 1933. 
248 Ibid. 
249 United States Department of State, American Consulate General, Division of Mexican Affairs, “Union 
of Mexican Repatriates” Requests Suspension of Repatriation Campaign (February, 1933), by John S. 
Littell, Vice Consul, Mexico City, Mexico.  The National Archives, Record Group 311.1215/39, 
Washington, D.C., 1933. 
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“permanent relief” and decided the money was better spent on agricultural communities 
that developed Mexican rural areas and provided employment for the repatriates.250  The 
Comité initially announced that the first colony, “to accommodate six hundred families, 
is to be established in the State of Guanajuato…during the present month with funds 
already collected.”251   
 On the evening of February 15, 1933 the Comité de Repatriación provided the 
Mexican press with a statement that addressed the concerns of the “Union of Mexican 
Repatriates” and the public at large. 
 This Committee has received numerous congratulations for its decision to 
 disregard any suggestions which are not made directly by the repatriates  
 concerned and therefore avoiding outside intervention of all sorts. Regarding  
 the idea that repatriation must be suspended, this Committee declares that the  
 phenomenon of repatriation has not been provoked by the will of the nation, nor 
            can it be suspended whether we wish it or not.252 
  
The Comité also disclosed that the 500,000 peso repatriation campaign already realized 
104,742 pesos (deposited in the Bank of Mexico) with 100,000 pesos dedicated to an 
agricultural community in the State of Guerrero.  In addition, the Comité announced a 
repatriate work project in the State of San Luis Potosí, with the daily wage set at one peso 
and free railway fare for five hundred repatriates and their families.253   
 By March of 1933, the total collections of the Comité amounted to 154,062 pesos 
and the establishment of the colonias became its singular goal.  Much to the delight of 
President Rodríguez, a March 17, 1933 benefit concert for the repatriate cause (“A 
Beneficio de los Repatraidos Mexicanos”) featured the famed Spanish classical guitarist, 
                                               
250 El Universal, 4 February 1933 and 9 February 1933. 
251 Ibid. 
252 El Universal, 16 February 1933. 
253 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression, Repatriation Pressures, 
1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 139. 
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Andrés Segovia (the guitar master was paid 1,435 pesos for his appearance at the Teatro 
Arbeu).254   
Abraham Hoffman noted that the Comité heeded the advice of leading intellectual 
Manuel Gamio who stated that “skills acquired by the repatriates in the United States 
were lost to the Mexican economy if the repatriados were scattered to all parts of 
Mexico.”255 The Comité also decided that workers sent to colonias located in the 
Mexican interior removed the repatriates from competition with other Mexicans seeking 
work (the concern of the “Union of Mexican Repatriates”) and the distance from the 
United States kept them from returning to el norte. 
 In April 1933, the Comité established three colonias:  Colony Number 1, located 
at El Coloso, Guerrero remained an “experiment” and was perhaps used as a staging area 
for repatriates on their way to other colonias. 256  Colony Number 2, near Minizo, 
Oaxaca, (known as “Pinotepa Nacional”) with its fertile soil, ample water resources and 
few inhabitants seemed at the onset, a perfect location.  In his April 20, 1933 “voluntary 
report”, American Vice Consul John S. Littell explained that 1000 repatriates and their 
families came to the Oaxaca colonia from Mexico City (400) and El Paso (600).  Andrés 
Landa y Piña traveled with repatriates that left from Guerrero and arrived in Oaxaca on 
the ship, “Bravo” (provided by the Ministry of War and Marine).  Littell further noted 
that a sanitary brigade awaited the repatriates as well as an engineer corps to demarcate 
                                               
254 F. Arturo Rosales, Private Papers on Mexican Repatriation, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.   
255 Ibid. 
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land parcels for farming. Palm tree shelters served as temporary housing units for the 
repatriates.   
 El Universal reported on the March 15, 1933 meeting between Anastasio García 
Toledo (Governor of Oaxaca) and President Abelardo Rodríguez. 
 Regarding the colonization of his state, García Toledo stressed the necessity for  
 land allotment to the repatriates that was unencumbered by communal claims.  He  
informed the President of the Republic that his state would offer the Comité land 
free of all liens and without the prospect of any “agrarian problem,” on which it 
would be possible to raise two crops of corn a year.  The Governor stated the 
people of Oaxaca are willing to lend the repatriates (without charge) oxen, draft 
animals and cattle while they are raising their first crops.257   
 
Littell wrote that Colony 2 “will be a test of truth of the semi-official National  
 
Repatriation Committee” and whether repatriates trained in the United States can 
improve agricultural standards, the industrial production of Mexico and the promotion of 
its national industries.258  Colony Number 3, designated for construction at Santo 
Domingo, near Magdalena Bay, Lower (Baja) California prepared for the arrival of 1800 
repatriate farmers and Littell listed other planned colonias in Cóbano, Colima; Canton de 
Autlan, Jalisco (located on Mexico’s west coast between Acapulco and Baja California) 
and a future colonia near San Andrés Tuxtla, Veracruz on the Mexican east coast. 
 The Comité formally established Colony Number 2 in May of 1933.  Most of the 
Comité’s funds went toward the Oaxaca colonia and it was hoped that Pinotepa would 
serve as an example of progress and administrative success.  In August 1933, the 
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Ministry of Interior commended Colony 2 in an inspection report that lauded Pinotepa’s 
Provisional Director, Sr. Andrés Landa y Piña (Chief of the Ministry’s Migration 
Department).  However, plans for the construction of a school for the repatriates’ children 
came to abrupt halt when Landa y Piña resigned his positions on November 4, 1933.259  
Vice Consul Littell’s report of May 28, 1934 (reviewed by Assistant Secretary of State 
Sayre) describes the total failure of Colony 1 in Guerrero and Colony 2 in Oaxaca. 
 It appears both colonies have been abandoned, the reasons given being (1) the  
 arbitrary government thereof and (2) the starvation rations given the colonists. 
The repatriates complained…of the directors of the Pinotepa Nacional colony, 
where life was stated to be unbearable since last October (1933)…on the pretext 
of imposing discipline, the directors were attended by six armed 
individuals…(and) the colonists…were being threatened with severe punishment 
in the event of disobedience.  They decided to abandon the colony en masse, 
making a painful 23-day journey to Acapulco.  There they lived on the charity of 
the people and…it was their good fortune that General Cárdenas, Presidential 
candidate of the National Revolutionary Party…supplied at his own expense, the 
busses necessary to take them to Mexico City. 260  
       
The repatriates at Pinotepa also learned that their harvested corn crop went to feed herds 
of swine instead of its promised distribution to the workers.   
The Colony 1 repatriates abandoned their colonia for similar reasons and both 
groups presented their grievances to the Ministry of the Interior in Mexico City in hopes 
of immediate assistance.  Tools, farm equipment and mules never arrived to the 
repatriates and the workers often resorted to threats of violence in order to provide for 
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their basic needs.261  Several repatriates fell ill and some died (due to the hostile, tropical 
climate) without medicines and food in ramshackle lodging houses between the colonias 
and Mexico City.  Those that managed to make the trip hoped the Ministry of Agriculture 
considered their requests for land parcels near the national irrigation systems.  Most of 
the colonists, farmers by occupation, needed any type of assistance to restart their lives 
after the failure of the colonias under the auspices of the Comité de Repatriación. 
Allegations of graft and corruption hounded the Comité almost since its inception 
and a December 29, 1934 article in El Universal reported that unemployed repatriates 
asked the Ministry of the Interior for a strict accounting of the over 300,000 pesos that 
the Comité collected in the campaign for 500,000 pesos.  On February 9, 1934, the 
Ministry of Interior issued a statement deploring the dissentions in the Comité and the 
charges of misuse of funds.  After expenses, expenditures and the costs associated with 
the establishment of the colonias at El Coloso and Pinotepa, a balance of 101,407.09 
pesos remained in the Comité’s account at the Bank of Mexico.     
El Universal, a newspaper very critical of the Comité’s administration of the 
colonias, published two statements by Rafael González C., a representative of the League 
of Mexican Workers and Farmers (the organization that the repatriate workers joined at 
the Pinotepa colonia). 
The repatriates worked with all their strength and enthusiasm but it was useless in  
light of the poor system of administration.  Machinery was taken away before the 
colonists could make good use of it and that colonia resembled a slave colony 
rather a community of free workers.  Further, the colonia suffered from 
impoverished conditions.262 
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An agent named Manuel Chávez threatened the colonists with a pistol and often 
said that the life of a repatriate costs only 25 pesos.  No machinery or mules ever 
arrived and the repatriates worked with picks and hatchets.  They were told to 
leave the colonia if they didn’t want to work.263  
 
President Rodríguez dissolved the Comité de Repatriación on June 14, 1934 and turned 
over its monies and resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Development.  
 The decree made by President Rodríguez called for an accounting of the  
remaining funds left in the Comité’s charge and Rodríguez stated that the Comité had not 
“satisfactorily fulfilled the mission entrusted to it…and its continuance would be contrary 
to interests of the very people whom it was attempting to help.”264  Rodríguez, anxious to 
repair the damage done by the Comité’s lackluster fifteen months in operation, formed 
the official, “Mexican Repatriation Board” on July 26, 1934.  Outgoing President 
Rodríguez displayed leadership curiously absent during the Comité’s tenure and 
transferred 110,223.14 pesos and all agricultural implements to the Mexican Repatriation 
Board.   
Rodríguez also resettled the displaced repatriates from El Coloso, Guerrero and 
Pinotepa, Oaxaca to lands near Rio Verde, San Luís Potosí.  He supplied them with 
provisions and tools that amounted to 5,900 pesos.  The President contemplated the 
upcoming meeting that the Mexican Repatriation Board scheduled with the Assistant 
Superintendent of Charities from Los Angeles, California, Mr. Rex Thomson and 
reflected on the repatriates’ future. 
These colonies have as their purpose the immediate quantitative and qualitative 
improvement of the repatriates’ condition of life; material, intellectual, physical  
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and so forth…for which purpose there will be better living quarters, food, clothing 
and farm cultivation.  The purpose attempted is not only that of obtaining the 
flourishing development of the colonists, but also and principally to make their 
model of living and working an influence to the farmers of the neighboring 
regions.265   
 
Thomson moved thousands of repatriates to Mexico yet did so with the cooperation  
 
of Mexican officials. He believed that large repatriations of large numbers of Mexicans 
from Los Angeles (over 12,000 Mexican families) “should be handled by a representative 
of the County rather than be made into an international question…in this manner, 
responsibility for any difficulties which may later arise will not be attributed to the 
United States Federal Government.”266  Thomson wanted the Mexican government to 
resettle the Los Angeles repatriates in a West Coast colonia “with a view to future 
commercial interchange.”  Thomson also worked out the free railway transportation of 
repatriates not just to the border, but to the workers’ homes in Mexico.  His offer of travel 
assistance was welcomed as a remarkable gesture and in the last months of the Rodríguez 
administration, it seemed (at least to U.S. State Department officials) that four important 
benefits might occur: “1) a relief from the burden of thousands of Mexicans in Los 
Angeles dependent on the charity of Mr. Thomson’s agency, 2) the addition to the 
Mexican population of citizens with a higher standard of living, 3) profit to both 
countries from commercial interchange, and 4) the further strengthening of good-will 
between Mexico and the United States.”267  
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 In an August 23, 1934 letter to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Josephus 
Daniels, commended the formation of the new Mexican Repatriation Board that “is 
discussing ways and means of taking care and handling the 12,000 Mexican families in 
Los Angeles County who are now being supported by Los Angeles Welfare 
Organizations and whom the Mexican government is endeavoring to bring back to 
Mexico…and it has been proposed that they be returned gradually…and that idle 
government lands be colonized with these repatriates.”  
 The Comité de Repatración was not a total failure (as the Mexican newspapers 
often editorialized).  The obvious success was the fund-raising capability of the 
influential members of the Comité and their penchant for post-revolutionary rhetoric.  At 
the onset of the Campaña de Medio Million, the nation felt a unified duty to provide for 
the repatriados.  The combination of businessmen and government officials in the 
Comité gave the impression of a “societal” rather than a “governmental” responsibility 
toward those who, for a variety of reasons, found themselves in Mexico.  Delegates from 
charitable institutions, industry, commerce and government ministries gave a public 
façade of limitless opportunity, unhampered by political favoritism and perhaps the 
opportunity to raise money in an unrestricted, more “freewheeling” manner. 
 Since the mid-1990s, a revised narrative has emerged regarding the modern 
Mexican state and the revolutionary movements that helped shape it.  Over the last 
twenty years, original scholarship has challenged the traditional approaches which 
included hagiographical descriptions of iconic military chiefs and rebellious heroes.  
What we have now are more nuanced approaches to that great social upheaval (The 
Mexican Revolution) and the relationship between raw, empirical data and the more 
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popular aspects of protest, culture, and revolution.268  These comparatives present two 
theoretical constructs regarding Mexico’s revolution: revolution from above (state 
formation) and the other from below (popular culture). Regional studies have become 
elevated to general national perspectives. The interactions of local villagers with 
government officials and rebellious agrarian reformers had much to do with the new 
Mexican state; its legitimacy, popular culture, the importance of religion, and even 
resistance to the Sonoran dynasty that would dominate Mexican politics from 1920 to 
1934. 
 In this dissertation, I have attempted to show the process of repatriation through 
U.S. and Mexican governmental policies as well as the human angst it created for the 
repatriados themselves.  As with the recent macro-interpreters of the Mexican 
Revolution, I also hope to further conceptualize the work of “El Comité de Repatriación” 
in terms of a transborder, transnational analysis that finds coherence a similar 
“resettlement community” that lends itself to a localized interpretation of events. 
 In early November, 2018, I had the good fortune to interview a young woman (in 
her early 30s) from Puerto Rico who is a “clinician” and at an Immigrant Care Facility (a 
“state” academy)  in the East Valley (Mesa/Chandler, Arizona). Ms. Marie Perez-Torres 
is a college graduate (Universidad de Turabo in Puerto Rico) who decided to move to the 
mainland and use her Bachelor’s Degree in Social Work to good use.  Previously, “Mari” 
worked with deaf students on the island.  Here in the Phoenix area, Mari helps children 
who have been separated from their parents.  She teaches and advises adolescents who in 
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age from 12 to 17.  Most of the young people are from Guatemala, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Honduras. 
 In our 45 minute interview, Mari expressed great pride in her work and the 
importance of caring for these children. They have many challenges; the language barrier, 
acculturation to American society, educational disadvantages, and a general sense of 
apprehension and fear about the future.  One of her Mexican students decided to “return 
back to Mexico” and reunite with his family.  The other children are either trying to 
“connect with extended family members in the U.S.” or find “foster living arrangements” 
here in Arizona and/or other Southwestern states. 
 The myriad of issues Ms. Perez-Torres faces on a daily basis, truly makes this 
facility; “a transborder environment in the middle of a transnational issue.”  She 
explained that these children come to her workplace from U.S. federal detention facilities 
and the “Office of Refugee Resettlement.”  One of her greatest difficulties is trying to 
communicate with the children who have limited Spanish language skills.  She listed a 
few of the Indian “dialects” that she has encountered: Queche, Mam, Acateco, Kangkobal 
and Ch’uj.  She has been told that these are “Mayan” languages.  
 Mari’s interpersonal skills are very much appreciated by the children.  They relate 
to her because she too came from a distant Spanish-speaking country with no relatives or 
friends waiting for her here in Arizona.  However, she is armed with her college degree 
and a desire to “make it” in the United States; still the land of opportunity and one of far 
greater wealth and reward than her native Puerto Rico.  Mari expressed no opinion 
regarding the current political situation regarding migrant caravans, children left on their 
own, and those teens that came north alone and unprotected.  I did not ask her about any 
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of these realities.  She has a job to do and gives the impression that “the shelter” and 
“other shelters like it” are part of everyday life in what to some might be considered a 
“new normal” in the borderlands. 
 After the post-Mexican Revolution fanfare and posturing, the Comité found very 
little common ground and many questions remain.  How many acres did the colonias 
encompass?  Compared to the vast numbers of repatriates, why were so few involved in 
the colonia projects?  Why were no repatriates involved in the planning of the colonias?  
What explains the violence at the colonias?  Why were basic items (food, medicine, 
tools) and farm machinery not delivered to the colonias?  Were there hidden issues of 
class that separated the colonia workers from members and agents of the Comité?  How 
involved was Plutarco Calles behind the scenes?  These are all issues for a larger study 
(my book on this subject) that must include the presidential administration of Lázaro 
Cárdenas, an analysis of his socialist agenda, the ejido system and how it compared to the 
apparent inability of the Comité de Repatriación to turn the U.S. repatriations into 
something positive for Mexico. 
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